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In its resolution 35/56 of 5 December 1980, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Develbpment Decade, designed to promote the economic and social development of 
the developing countries. This Strategy lays down the goals and objectives 
which should be attained during the 1980s and also the measures which should be 
taken''¿t:''the'domestic level and especially at the international level to fulfill 
the purposes' proposed. • 
The IDS. laid down that the United Nations regional economic commissions 
should consider the feasibility of preparing action programmes to support the 
efforts of developing countries in the implementation of the IDS in their 
respective areas. 
In this context, the ECLA Committee of High-Level Government Experts, 
meeting in Quito in March 1981, prepared a draft Regional Programme of Action 
designed to aid in the implementation of the IDS as regards the countries of 
the region. This Regional Programme of Action was approved at the nineteenth 
session of ECLA, held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in May 1981. 
The IDS established machinery for the review and appraisal of economic and 
social development and of its own implementation, and this is carried out at 
various levels. As regards the regional appraisal, it lays down that the 
United Nations regional economic commissions should carry out the work of 
review and appraisal in their respective areas, while the General Assembly, 
for its part, will carry out the first review and appraisal in 1984. 
On 20 December 1982, in resolution 37/202, the General Assembly decided 
to set up a committee of universal membership to carry out the review and 
appraisal of the application of the IDS at the global level in 1984, while it 
requested the regional commissions to carry out these tasks in their respective 
regions. 
In these circumstances, the present meeting of CEGAN is of special 
importance. It must examine the economic and social evolution of the countries 
of the region< and appraise the progress made in the implementation of the 
IDS and of the Regional Programme of Action during the first three years of 
the present decade, at a time when a profound economic and financial depression 
/is affecting 
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is affecting the countries of the region and the course of economic and financial 
events at the national and international level has displayed, in its essential 
aspects, totally, different characteristics.and orientations from those which the 
IDS and the Regional Programme of Action set forth or. proposed to establish. 
In this, respect, resolution 37/202 states, in one of its.preambular 
paragraphs "that the adverse effepts of the continuing international economic 
crisis, especially on the economies of the developing countries ».j^e particularly 
necessary the task of carrying out such a review and appraisal with a view to 
considering the adjustment, intensification or reformi^atiçn. .of. the policy 
measures required in the light of eyo^yijjg. .nççds, and, developments, in order to 
achieve the goals and objectives of International Development.Strategy".. 
As a contribution to the deliberations of this meeting of CEGAN, the 
Secretariat has prepared the present document. 
/I. THE 
I. THE NATURE, SCOPE AND DEPTH OF THE CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. THE SCOPE OF THE CRISIS. ECONOMIC CONTRACTION AND ..-.: 
. STAGNATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
The economic and financial crisis has spread to practically all the countries of 
the region. It is getting worse, and a climate of instability, confusion and 
uncertainty is spreading as regards the future evolution of events and the 
policies which should be adopted to. contain and overcome the harmful effects of 
this 
process. The negotiations and arrangements made with regard to external 
indebtedness and debt servicing have not succeeded in stabilizing the situation, 
and 
in some cases the problems are totally insoluble if tackled within the 
context of conventional methods and forms of action. 
Even as late as 1980, in spite of the decline registered in the second 
half of the 1970s, the region's, economic gr.owth still showed a higher average 
rate than that of the industrial countries with which Latin America is linked 
through the bulk of its economic, financial and technological relations with 
the exterior. . In the. three-year period 1981-1983, however, these differences 
tended to be.reversed, since the region fell into a situation of severe economic 
recession and renewed, inflation. Latin America is now in the midst of a world 
economic recession which affects developed and developing countries alike: 
countries with market economies, mixed economies and even to some extent centrally-
planned economies; large and small nations; and oil-exporting and. non-oil-exporting 
countries. 
This overall appraisal does not mean that the manifestations and spread 
of the world-level crisis are the same in all regions and countries. It is 
nevertheless true, however, that in most of the countries there are salient 
features which evolve along very similar lines, especially as regards the drop 
in the economic growth rate and, still more frequently, the stagnation or 
contraction of national economic activities, the excessive indebtedness of some 
countries, the balance-of-payments problems of the developing countries, and 
the high levels of unemployment and inflation. /In order 
In order to clarify the nature of this crisis , it is necessary .'to take 
account of various considerations which involve the following questions: 
a) Is this depression- in the world economy the consequence df. an actual 
shortage of physical resources after the intensive exploitation of natural 
resources required by its extraordinary growth from the period after the war 
until the mid-1970s, or is it rather a cyclical or conjunctural'development, 
originating in the central industrial countries, which has been transmitted 
to other areas and especially the developing countries? 
b) Are we witnessing a process of transition of the world economy towards 
the establishment of new fozims of technology and energy which wili mark a new 
stage in the development of the forces of production and the forms and social 
conditions of life? . .. .. . i 
c) Is this a contradictory situation brought about by the well-known fact 
of the shaping of a new world economy characterized by a high growth' rate and an 
increase in the degree of internationalization and interdependence of the various 
areas and countries as regards trade, investment, financing and technological 
development, without however having at the same time established suitable 
multilateral institutions to help guide and promote the efficient and equitable^'' 
functioning of the world economy, especially as regards the place of the developing 
countries in it? This seems particularly likely when we consider that'the """J" 
existing multilateral institutions in the financial, monetary and trade fields 
have been overtaken by events arid, to tell the truth, have riot devoted proper 
attention to the development' problems peculiar to the countries of the periphery. 
In the region, it would appear that the crisis manifests itself with similar 
ĉharacteristics or features in many countries: 
a) The crisis would appear to be' determined principally by external factors, 
although this is not to deny the importance of the structural aspects and factors 
of a domestic nature which hinder developmentj 
b) The national economies have fallen during the last three years into a 
process of decline, stagnation and everi contraction in the' absolute levels of 
economic activity, so that the economic .growth of the region as a whoie has 
been nil; 
c) Such a prolonged situation of stagnation and even contraction of economic 
activity in the region as a whole is without precedent in the period since the 
war. The immediate prospectsfor a significant improvement in the economic growth 
/rate are 
rate are frankly tinpromising, and even if there were some recovery in the second 
half of the decade, the average growth for the 1980s would probably be lower 
than in any of the previous three decades; 
d) There has been a resurgence of inflation and exchange rate instability 
in the region,-and these problems havé also spread to the few countries which 
had previously been free from them. In some cases, economic panic and speculation 
have created situations which have escaped from the control or guidance of 
national policies; 
e) It is in the area of external relations that the similarity of national 
experiences and situations is most marked, in spite of considerable differences 
of degree among the various countries. The problems involved here are the high 
level of external indebtedness; the burdeii of debt servicing commitments because 
of the reduction in maturities and the high ratés of interest, and, for many 
countries, the material impossibility of facing up to the debt servicing 1 
obligations if thè inflow of new capital continues to be limited, as has been 
the case since 1982. Furthermore, the countries are likely to have serious 
difficulties in absorbing new loans if the high interest rates and short maturity 
terms prevailing at present are maintained. Thus, thè magnitude of financing 
problems, the contraction in-external demand in the last thrée yéars, and the 
deterioration in the terms of trade (which has now spread to the oil-exporting 
countries too) are giving rise to situations of veritable strangulation of the 
economic process. 
These broadly similar manifestations of the crisis in the different nations 
have differed in their absolute or relative intensity from one country to another 
according to their economic size and population, the degree of opènness to the 
exterior, the nature and extent of State intervention in the running of economic 
policy arid of the participation of the State as an economic agent, the resource 
endowment, the degree of indùstrialization, and thè level of diversification 
reached in the production and technological fields. 
The particular path followed by the countries of the region from the 
period of economic boom to thé present crisis has also varied. It may be noted 
in this respect, for example, that the óil-exporting countries have not evolved 
in the same way as the non-oil-exporting countries and that the evolution of the 
countries with high growth rates has been different from that of the more numerous 
group of countries which have traditionally shown slower growth. 
/B. THE 
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B. THE DETERIORATION IN SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND -THE SHARPENING OF 
. - .; -< , , SOCIAL TENSIONS . , ,.,v;. ., 
The crisis is exacerbating the deterioration in sociajL,. conditions in the Latin 
American..societies,, j/hich were extremely inequitably to, start with. There can 
be. no question .but that, economic growth must 'be accompanied by deliberate 'State . 
promotion of a propes^ of struptjiral.and institutionalchangedesigned to.aphieve : 
a more equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development and to 
satisfy certain., standards of imgpovepent in the social welfare of .the mass ¡of 
the population. , ;It,is nonetheless true, however» .that in the climate of .. 
stagnation, and recession, cppfusion and uncertainty prevailing, on the,.:Latin . 
American scene,.~the. absencfi; of. economic. growth: will necessarily, cause, social 
tension, io -i^g&i&pce, $p change onv the, ,pax?t of the -sectors 
which must .pake c^cee^ons : will become^raore determined, and ultimately even , 
more serious prejudice will be caused to the great .mass of, .the population in, the 
lower segments of the scale of distribution of wealth and income, while at the 
same time powerful forces, of social instability will; befomented. 
There are four.interrelated aspects, of special significance with regard 
to the social dimensions of development:, i) ;the, distribution of property and , s 
income; ii) the magnitude of extreme poverty; ii^X.unempioymentiiand- iv) the 
limitations on and differences, in social participation»; T • . «; 
The process of economic development and the rapid social changes, which : 
took place in, the period since the war, haye: sh&ped new .mid.dlB-ljeyel socioeconomic 
sectors which today have considerable weight, infthe eponoroic,r social and, political 
field. At, the sape time, it, is evidentrfthat .the. vejay, high degree.pf - concentration, 
of property and income in, asmall segment, of the population and -the very small 
participation.of the great.masses in these benefits go to make up structural 
situation of extreme and persistent inequality which conditions thewhole ., 
economic and social system and which it is essential to deal with-both for ethical 
reasons ar̂ d. for. those, of social efficiency. In other words.^reducing the 
irritating inequalities in .personal, or.family, incope distribution must be in 
itself one of the. social Objectives of ..the development strategies. 
, There can be no,doubt that the crisis., is accentuating.these inequalities 
because .of. the drop in. employment and.real wages and the reduction or limitation 
; • ..... /of the .,.. J 
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of the types of social assistance which should benefit the poorer sectors to a 
greater extent. All in all, this reduces the participation of wage-earners in 
the distribution of national income, while at the same time increasing the 
share of the other segments of society, although hot necessarily to the same 
extent for each of them. 
A Very high proportion of the population of the Latin American countries 
receive incomes lower than those needed to cover the expenditure which is 
essential in order to satisfy minimum living conditions, and worse still, a 
very considerable proportion of the population suffers the-still more depressing 
conditions of extreme poverty. This is in contrast with the high level of 
consumption in the top segments of the income distribution scale and the spread 
of high levels of consumption in the upper-middle sectors. The relative 
magnitude of the population living in a state of poverty varies from one country 
to another, being generally associated with the degree of economic development 
and the efficiency of the social policies adopted. Statistical studies carried 
out by some Latin American countries are said to indicate that this relative 
magnitude has tended to go down in the period since the war. It is most likely, 
however, that this relative reduction is not enough to reduce the absolute size 
of the poor population, at least within a reasonable iength of time. The increase 
in unemployment and the contraction in real wages already referred to are the 
main factors tending towards the greater severity and spread of poverty during 
the present crisis. 
The objective of reducing poverty situations may be compatible with that of 
improving the distribution of income (or consumption). The reverse would not 
necessarily be time, however, in all cases. It would therefore be desirable to 
consider which of these two objectives should be given immediate emphasis in 
economic and social policy, bearing in mind the veritable emergency situations 
brought about by the crisis in many countries. 
The chronic problem of unemployment and underemployment which already 
prevailed in Latin America is assuming staggering levels in this crisis. In 
some case?, for example, the equivalent of one-fifth or even a quarter or more of 
the labpur force are considered to be unemployed. The industrialized countries 
with high levels of income become deeply concerned over much lower levels of 
unemployment among their own citizens and seek to justify the application of 
/protectionist measures 
protectionist measures]by!the need'to protect employment in their countries, even 
though their vmèteplo^èd^eèèive social Welfare anoyances. .The. increase in : 
unemploymènt -diî̂ ëè'tiy' iïifâiùencës the rise in < the degree of inequality in income . j 
distribution: and' iù^tW%pread'of poverty. . Furthermore»1 the problem of unemployment 
not only involves wage-earners but also other social segments corresponding 
mainly/ to the int'ewnediate sectors in 'the' scales. .of1 distribution :0f. income .and 
property.'- • • • ••>?;~.fV,1 :T- .. •'» .' 
The SeriouSnéss of this situation can' bevapptoeoiat'ed if we take into account 
the fact that thé labour force increases each yéàr: by a considerable .amoiint in 
most of the Countries and that in order to prevent .unemployment from getting worse 
a high rate of economic growth is needed. In Latin America, except in a very few 
cases, the economic growth rate slackened durifig" the second half of the 1970s, and 
in'the last three years there has been stagnation or outright-economic recession 
which has dramatically aggravated thé problem of unemployment, while no-immediate 
favourable prospects are to be glimpsed. 
C. THE EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY:OF THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 
•vr 'AND'THEIR DETERMINING FACTORS - '••'•.-<•:•:: . • ! 
Various factors of an internal and external nature have helped to, unleash the 
crisis now affecting Latin America. The first of these factors are connected 
with characteristics peculiar:to.the national economies;, with the nature of 
the strategies and policies adopted by governments, which in many cases have 
been flagrantly unsuitable or have amplified the unfavourable effects of the 
world economic recession and the weakening of international trade; and also, in 
sane countries, with, political or social conflicts. 
Within the context of the structure and present functioning of the national 
economies, however, it is evident that it is the external factors which are most 
clearly responsible in most of the countries for the nature and scope of the 
crisis;, this is so to suçh anextent that, in some views of ,the problem the crisis 
is attributed essentially to the conjunctural and structural evolution of the 
industrial countries, transmitted, to,the...developingcountries by the close links 
of dependency binding the latter to the central economies. This view of the 
situation unjustifiably overlooks, however, the fact that these external factors 
have joined together with the domestic structural conditions which have 
traditionally stood in. the way of a dynamic and equitable process of economic 
and social development, 
/Among the 
Among the more generalized aspects of external relations which have helped 
to put a veritable stranglehold on the process of economic growth and which 
mutually strengthen each other in their adverse effects, special mention may be 
made, of: 
a) The structural imbalance observed in the economic make-up and 
technological content of the production and external trade of the developing 
countriesj as compared with the - industrial countries.' This general imbalance 
forms the .context for more specific aspects of the way the relations between 
internal and external factors have evolved; 
b) The amount of external indebtedness accumulated on account of the 
growing balance-of-payments current account deficits. A particularly important 
aspect of this indebtedness is the magnitude reached by payments of interest 
to the exterior, due both to the' large amount of indebtedness and the rise in 
interest rates; 
c) The weakness of external demand because of the world recession and, 
especially, the way it has evolved in the industrial countries with which Latin 
America maintains most of its economic, financial and technological relations. 
This has been reflected in recent years in sluggish growth of Latin American 
exports and a substantial deterioration in the terms of trade; 
d) The resurgence of different kinds of protectionist measures: not only 
in the industrial countries but also among the developing countries:,"where they 
have even affected intra-regional mutual trade; 
e) The difficulties in establishing regional programmes:of• co-operation and 
economic integration and the scanty links with other developing areas, and 
f) The problems standing in the way of the more dynamic development of. 
trade with the countries with centrally-planned economies. 
In the course of the period since the war, Latin America .has registered 
a significant process of growth and economic and technological changei It has 
displayed a high potential for economic growth and has made important changes 
in its structure of production and technology. It has attained appreciable 
progress in industrialization, to the point where some countries of the region 
are now passing through a stage of semi-industrialization which marks them out 
as the new industrial countries of the future. Furthermore there has been quite 
/intensive absorption 
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intensive ahsdfcjition ofmodern technologies and vigorous development of the basic 
production forces which must form the foundation for subsequent growth and 
economic development. , 
Neither these nor other aspects pointing in the same direction, howeverj 
have managed to eliminate to the necessary extent the unbalanced structure 
characterizing the productive and technological makë-ûp of the output and trade 
of the Latin American countries, even in the case of those which may be considered 
as being among the most advanced. At the same time, it must "be acknowledged that 
this imbalance shows different levels of severity* against the background of thé 
generally greater economic dëfénce capacity of the région. Finally, it?'lé also 
necessary to take into account the relative nature of thèse comparisons, since 
the industrial countries continue to promote extraordinary technological advances. 
In actual fact, in spite of rthe progress! made, the exports of thé Latin 
American countries to the industrial countries consist mostly of primary 
commodities with different degrees of pî ciissiriĝ  iaifti only to à much lesser 
extent of manufactures. The former have:^ëen apjîréciably diversified, expanding 
the range of non-traditional exports » while the' latter, which expanded rapidly 
during' the 1970s and even began' to include capital goodsy have corresponded 
mainly to products of light industry or those with a lower technological•content. 
In contrast, the imports from thé 'industrialized countries consist mostly of 
intermediate manufactures, which represent essential imports for national 
"im-
productive activities, and the capital goods néeded to increase production 
capacity and incorporate new technologies. 
This structural situation? é^l^ins-thé gréât importance of thé evolution 
of external purchasing power -which "derives frdm the real export income and the 
net contribution from capital movemeti^iS^ iTi mairitkining and increasing these 
essential supplies. This also highïrî'ghts thé effects which national policies, 
the performance of domestic economic activity and the policies of the transnational 
corporations can have on the demand for imports and the evolution of the balance 
of payments. Of coursé the immédiate* 6ffe<5të' of these interrelations are not 
necessarily reflected 'in simultaneous adjustments. -They have some degree of 
flexibility and are of varied intensity a!s-regards the spread through thé, economies 
as a whole and their incidence on specific; aspects or sectors. - Moreover, the 
conditions, in which they take place vary from one country to another according 
/to the 
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to the stage of. économie development reached and the resource endowment. Another 
aspect of particular importance as regards the configuration of this imbalance 
concerns the evolution of the external terms of trade. 
The high level of external indebtedness and the heavy financial burden of 
servicing it form one of the main immediate problems responsible for the 
difficult external bottleneck situation in which the economies of the region are 
involved to varying degrees of intensity, and bring out very clearly the situation 
of dependence of these countries and the limitations : on their freedom to adopt 
the economic policy decisions considered most appropriate in the domestic and 
external contexts. : . 
As is well known, the problem of indebtedness is of deep "conoefrn to the 
debtor • countriesj•but just as much concern is felt by the creditor countries, the 
international private banking system and the multilateral institutions on account 
of the serious consequences that would ensue at- the international level if the 
financial difficulties of the developing countries with the biggest volume of 
external indebtedness were such as to oblige them to unilaterally postpone the 
payment of their .financial servicing commitments. In this respect, it is worth, 
drawing attention to the speed and "efficiency" which the central countries and 
the international private banking system have shown in .organizing negotiations 
and agreements on. the payment of commitments as regards capital and interest 
which fall due now or,in the near future. It Would be highly desirable if the 
same concern and diligence were also shown in negotiations in other areas or 
on other matters of special interest to the developing countries in general and 
the Latin American countries in particular, such as the subject of preferences 
and access to the markets of the industrial countries and institutional 
reorganization in the monetary and financial field. These and other problems 
which are still without a. solution are largely responsible for the economic and 
financial situation affecting our countries,- although this is not of course to 
ignore the responsibility which must be borne by national governments for the 
unsuitable nature of the policies followed by many countries.: . , . 
The truth is that the central countries have always been more willing to 
promote direct private investment and concessionary or non-concessionary external 
financing, which they see as the most appropriate instruments for increasing 
investment in the developing countries and finding a "solution" to their 
/balance-
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balance-of-paymentS current account deficits. They have taken this course instead 
of giving effective support to the expansion aiiefc diversification of the exports 
of the developing countries-to the central countMes^by adopting the necessary 
structural measures» 
Part of the ëxtrâordinary increase in the availability of international 
financial resources due to-'the surpluses: of the oil-exporting countries and 
thé policy adopted by the United'States was; used by the-developing countries, . 
through thé international private banking system, to increase their imports 
from the industrialized countriesiand improve their gross international,reserve 
position. At the same time, many Latin American countries achieved suae ess. : in : 
their policies of increasing exports. In an initial stage, a"seftèation ofAan 
economic boom was thus created which was.reflected in one way:or another.by a 
weakening in the developing * countries' -pressure and political action to win: 
substantial changes'in the policies of'the industrial countries and place the 
opening-up of the latter*s markets in-favour : of the exports of the developing 
countries on a more seòure basis* On the other hand;, many Latin American countries 
went a'long way in the liberalization of ; their external-trade and greater 
openingHip to the exterior, and'in these cases there was a-veritable process: of 
reverse import substitution -that is to say, thé replacement of domestic; 
production by imported goods- which considerably increased'thé volume and value 
of their external purchases* As will be- explained later, this process was doomed 
to coinè to an end in the short term. "• ••• 
Another aspe&t which considerably complicates the financial'situation 
isthe magnitude Of-the external debt maintained ' by State and private enterprises 
with the international private banking system. In some countries -t economic and 
financial policy was aimed at keeping the exchange rate fixed or relatively 
stable, while at the same time applying réstrictive measures; on domestici'; credit. 
The aim; of this was to avoid both inflationary pressures and thé raising of. the 
national-currency cost of the servicing of this debt. This policy stimulated • 
imports and hindered the promotion;of; exports, while the enterprises which.had 
debts in foreign:currency acted as a source of pressure'for keeping the exchange 
irate practically unchanged. o r - : , 3 V . v 
J;; '''' " - ' /It is 
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lt is obvious that with the passage of time this situation was bound to 
have to change, especially when the external demand for Latin American exports 
slackened, the prices of primary commodities fell, and there was a considerable 
increase in the interest rates on a growing external debt. The subsequent 
devaluation in fact meant very severe losses for the debtor; enterprises. 
In spite of the efforts made to promote exports and contain imports and 
the sacrifice represented by the decline in the economic.growth rate or, still 
worse, the stagnation and depression registered in the last three years, the 
majority of the Latin American countries continue to be dependent on heavy . 
external financial support in order to meet the servicing commitments on their 
accumulated debt, which represent a very high percentage of their current 
foreign exchange income. The region is thus in a vicious circle in which the . 
debt keeps on growing, feeding itself largely because of the extraordinary rise 
in interest rates. 
/II. THE 
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... II» THE ECONOMIC PROCESS.FiROM BOOM TO CRISIS. 7 
•:i -v , : A. TRENDS IN ECONOMIC'EVOLUTION;;SINCÇ THE WAR;. 
Between the early post-war years and 1980, the growth and the productive and; 
technological,transformation of the national economies reached: high levels. 
The gross domestic product of the région as à whole: grew at an-average annual 
rate of 5.5%, so that the volume, of overall.economic activity was five times 
greater in 1980 than 30 years before. The growth of industrial production and 
capital formation was even greater... The considerable, progress made by the 
countries.of the region promoted the formation of basic structures that stimulated 
economic growth and the development of productive forces.. 
This economic evolution was accompanied by a process of social change which 
was particularly sweeping in many countries. Nations which were agricultural, 
single-commodity exporters with a low level of income 30 years ago are today on 
the way to becoming newly industrial countries and are achieving a diversified 
economic structure which is striving to reach out to the exterior through its 
trade flows. When viewed from the standpoint of economic history, this process 
is in sharp contrast to the intensity and duration of the current crisis. 
The economic process has been far from uniform throughout the region. 
The degree of progress and expansion has varied sharply from one country to 
another; three decades have produced significant differences as regards the size 
of the economy and the population, the degree of industrialization, and other 
aspects of economic development which have substantially changed the relative 
position of the countries within the region as a whole. 
So, too, the rate of economic growth has varied considerably in the short 
term as a result of these differences, the uneven endowment of resources, and 
national economic policies. 
A global analysis of the evolution since the war reveals five stages or 
phases in which there were changes of a widespread nature, although they are not 
equally valid for all the countries of the region: the first stage began a few 
years after the war ended and continued until the mid-1960s; the second extended 
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from the mid-1960s until 1974; the third corresponded to the 1974-1975 biennium; 
the fourth covered the second half of the 1970s; and, finally, the fifth stage 
relates to the intensification of the current crisis during the three years 
1981-1983. 
In many countries the first stage corresponded to the period when a policy 
of import substitution was being applied. The growth rate was slightly over 
5% per year, exports expanded very slowly, and after the Korean War, thé terms 
of trade teiided to deteriorate. • : 
This partially accounts for the slow growth of imports, which increased 
much less than the domestic product. The import/product ratio-tended to decline, 
and by 1965 it had reached its lowest level in the entire period since the war. 
This marked the saturation of the import substitution process, not because there 
was no market .or room for continuing industrialization, but rather because a 
policy of this type soon requires additional imports and must be complemented by 
a policy for; .export promotion and diversification. Despite the excesses which 
doubtlessly occurred during the application of the import substitution policy, 
later experience was to demonstrate the need to reassess the value of this 
policy, without which neither the subsequent advances in the technological and 
productive transformation'of the national economies nor the first steps'taken 
towards export diversification would have been possible. ' 
The second stage was marked by very different trends from the preceding 
one: . • •...••<••' 
a) Major changes in the countries' economic policies were>promoted which 
reaffirmed economic growth as an essential goal for the orientation of economic 
policy. At the same time, policies and measures leading to a greater openness 
to the exterior were promoted; 
b) The pace of economic growth tended to speed up, reaching a rate of 
approximately 6.5% per year <1965-1974) and even higher rates in the early 1970s. 
It should be noted that these indexes were influenced to a great extent by a 
few countries whose growth was more dynamic than many others. Nonetheless, the 




c) The vigorous growth of the world economy and international trade, as' 
well as export promotion polities, tended to.favour Latin American'exports and 
helped to improve the terms of.trade; this was especially "true in'thétearly 1970s 
and particularly so for the oil-exporting countries, which received considerably 
higher prices in 1973-1974; : 
d), The greater availability of external financing during the early 1970s 
also helped to boost the supply of imports, the rapid growth rate of which 
exceeded the growth rate of the domestic product. .Despite thè expansion of 
imports» however, the deficit on the balance^of-payments current account did not 
rise significantly. . > ...•.•. /. % - .- • '• ->,•" . . • 
.;\'Xn"!tĥ '̂ .1974—;1975 .biennium^vifactorsvwithifar—reaching implications were 
at work which changed the internal : and:external conditions of the Latin American 
economic?:process and which were later to have important consequences. . 
The year.1974 marked a period of transition from-the boom of the-preceding 
years-to an outright recessionary trend in 1975.; The product's'-growth remained 
relatively high, in 1974-, and the reetl income Of ,;the Oil+exporting countries rose 
as a result óf thé price increases which they achieved for;their èìèpòrts. 
; Imports expanded : considerably in almost : all of thè countries ; • At the same 
time*. ¡however, the exports of a. large ̂ number of them either showed ho growth 
or decreased, and the terms of trade worsened -for alifidSt all of the rion-oil-
exporting, countries as the real valtìé; :or purchasing - power , of thé ir current 
income from exports of goods and services dropped. 
. -,'In 1975 the. recession became general airiahg";the nan-òil-exporting countries; 
their: exports, remained :stagnant and the iterms of trade declined once again; 
The economic growth; rate dropped to only 3.5%, at .the same time that the volume 
of imports decreased. The current account deficit of this group of countries 
rose appreciably. This deficit was financed partially with reserves, but to a 
greater extent, through external financing. * Thus began the period during which 
the magnitude of. external financing,-cumulative indebtedness and deficits on the 
current, .account of the balance ¡of payments wére to become characteristic 
features off the economic evolutioh-.;of the region's; countries, until they "finàlly 
resulted in the deep and widespread crisis which has been affecting Latin America 
for the last three.years. 
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The phase covering the second half of the last decade (1976-1980) was 
marked by a moderate improvement in the rate of economic growth. The average 
growth rate of the gross domestic product was about 5.5% annually, ..although 
there were considerable differences from one country to another. Some notable 
developments during this period were the expansion of the exports of the non-oil-
exporting countries and the persistence of a considerable inflow of external 
financing despite the magnitude of the external indebtedness which was being 
accumulated. 
Imports also grew to some extent, although less than the real values of 
exports. Further, it is interesting to note that during this period net capital 
inflows frequently exceeded the amount needed to finance the balance of payments; 
as a result, in some years the monetary reserves of many countries increased. 
Beginning in 1981, the majority of the Latin American countries were thrown 
into an economic and financial crisis which can be regarded as the deepest and 
longest-lasting since the world-wide crisis of the 1930s. 
The performance of the domestic product has been deteriorating for the last 
three years (1981-1983). There has been virtually no growth for the region as 
a whole, and a severe drop in the absolute levels of the domestic product is 
expected for 1983. 
In these circumstances, there was a drastic decrease in the per capita 
gross domestic product, which was approximately 10% lower in 1983 than in 1980. 
If the effect of the terms of trade and the net remittances of interest and 
profits are taken into account, the decline in national per capita income was 
around 15% during that period. 
The developments during this period are examined below, and the most 
outstanding aspects of the economic process in relation to external variables 
are underlined. The nature and implications of the adjustment policies which are 
being adopted in order to deal with the new conditions will also be analysed. 
/B. THE 
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B. THEONSET OF THE CRISIS AND THE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 
1, The spread-and complexity of external dependence 
The deterioration in the socioeconomic situation during the last three years was 
due9 as already noted, to the constraints which the external sector placed on the 
development process. Ôn this occasion, as in other post-war crises of the external 
sector, the weakness and the drop in the volume and value oi exports played a niajor 
role, as did the deterioration of the terms of trade. Either because of thé march 
of events or the implementation of deliberate policies, ail of this led to the 
curbing or restriction of imports. Nevertheless, it is "clear that in these 
circumstances trade factors alone are not enough to account for the nature and 
extent of the external imbalance; financial factors also had à decisive influence 
in the onset of thé crisis. Furthermore, the relationship Between external trade 
and financial factors and the way they have evolved ovér time have beéri similar in 
most of the countries, which in a large part accounts for the extënsiveness of the 
crisis. 
During thé 19*7^-1980/period, extérnâl dependence spread and becàaie more 
complex. The région Arrowed heaviiy, and this process extended to most of the 
sectors of the economy, going far beyond the domestic banking system and the sectors 
directly liriked'to external trade. Thé foreign banks in fact acquired an 
extraordinary ability to eXert pressuré, which later pérmitted them to exert ah 
influence in the détermination of âdjustmérit policies. This helps to account for 
certain"'features common to national policies and the évolution of national economies 
during this period of crisis. 
To à large eXtént the new intérnationai position of the countries of the 
region which took shape during the past décade was,' in most of the countries, 
sustainéd by both à theoretical stance and the vie'w held of the évolution of the 
developëd world. ' " "' "" 
On the theoretical level, the promotion of more extensive external relations 
was assigned a more significant role in the development process than in the past. 
There were, however, differences with respect to the function which such external 
relations .should perform. Some felt that external trade should be the basic 
driving force of growth. Others assigned it the role of an indispensable counterpart 
to a form of transformation of production which would essentially be guided by the 
/domestic market. 
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domestic market. In both casés, however, there was a desire to increase the part 
played by external trade in the national economic process. 
ït was often thought that the future evolution both of production in the 
developed countries and of world trade would be relatively favourable. The 
1974—1975 recession in the industrial countries was largely attributed to the 
effects of the increase in fuel prices, although there was an awareness of the 
effect of other factors. A degree of improvement in the growth rates of some 
developed countries in the period between 1974 and 1979 (over 4% in the United 
States and 5% in Japan) led to the belief that the fuel crisis would gradually be 
overcome and that growth would soon speed up, so that world trade would once again 
play a very active role in the region. This optimism was encouraged by the dynamic 
growth of Latin American exports, since it was thought that if such results could 
be achieved during a mediocre period for the world economy, then it was to be 
expected that they could be maintained or even improved upon in the near future. 
The combination of theoretical stances and the apparent favourable outlook 
paved the way for policies of expansion and diversification of exports and to the 
acceptance of foreign trade défie itswhich were assumed to be temporary.. The net 
oil exporters expected a slow but steady improvement in real fuel prices, while the 
importers trusted in substitution and conservation plans and in thé dèvelopment of 
their own energy sources. Others saw the increases in oil prices as a sign of hope 
for an improvement in raw material prices in general and were confident that freer 
external relations would make the old scheme of comparative advantage begin to 
function and that this would result in a steady increase in the value of exports. 
2. The evolution of external trade and external 
financing in 1976-1980 
During the period 1976-1980, external trade registered extremely dynamic growth 
which far outpaced that of the product. The growth rates of the volume and value 
of exports were the most rapid since the war, and imports also grew, in some years 
at surprising rates, in the nations of the Southern Cone and in some of the net 
oil-exporting countries. At the same time the deficit on trade in goods and 
services persisted during most of those years in the majority of cases. Thus a 
situation arose which was uncommon during post-war development, in that external 
trade was very dynamic while, at the same time, it consistently showed a deficit 
in the medium term. 
/The rapid 
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The rapid, growth in the value of exports had varying origins. In the countries 
which were net exporters of oil or fuels, it was caused by the increase in.prices; 
in some cases this was accompanied by decreases in export volumes,; while in others 
there were increases. Situations varied in the other countries: diversion of 
production which had previously been destined for the domestic market, 
diversification of raw material production, greater processing of the raw materials 
exported, and expansion of exports of manufactures. In this last case» advantage 
was taken . of . installed capacity which had previously been idle or in the process of 
development and of the rapid expansion of the industrial'sector in some countries. 
There were very uneven price movements, and the domestic efforts which went along 
with the growthi.in the value of exports were, therefore,1 also very different. 
The motivations and composition of the growth in imports were very different; 
too. In sane cases it essentially ..served to. support ;an intensive process of 
investment, while in other cases it; sustained.a,growth.in consumption and was used, 
in the fight against inflation« . :In.general» the volume-and prices of imports rose 
simultaneously, the periodic, i^cyeases in the latter-being the most stable.-; 
Under; these circumstances* .¡a deficit on the .external trade .in goods and 
services was the,norm. The foundation» if not-the actual,reason» for this deficit 
was the .inflow or availability of external financing. . This was offered in abundance 
to. almost all the countries,, was channelled through the .transnational banking; system, 
and at first, real interest rates were low.. Gradually, however» the average loan 
terms became shorter and the interest rates.went up. 
This, net external financing was.increased substantially over time in order to 
meet the trade deficits and the mounting liabilities incurred as a result of direct 
investment and the foreign debt. The amount of interest payment s climbed in absolute 
and relative terms due both to the growth of the debt and the rise in interest rates. 
This brief description of the way in which trade and external financing 
evolved reveals the simultaneous existence of three factors that were common to most 
of the countries: the dynamic growth of trade, a deficit on trade in goods and services, 
and abundant net external financing. 
These factors are also seen to be interconnected by causal relationships which 
sustain their coexistence. In so far as the relationship between indebtedness and 
the value of exports is used as one of the most meaningful indicators of a country's 
external creditworthiness, the rapid growth of the latter variable tends to provide 
/a basis 
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a basis for greater borrowing. During the 1976-1980 period, exports grew at rates 
of close to 20%, while the nominal interest rate remained around 10%. Under such 
circumstances, .even for the countries in which the above-mentioned ratio was high, 
greater borrowing could be justified by reasoning on the basis of certain 
assumptions. Thus, for example, if the ratio was 3 to 1, it could be maintained at 
that level if both the debt and the value of exports, rose, by 20%.; half of the 
additional amount borrowed would if inane e the nominal interest rat,es of 10%, while 
the other 10% -representing 30% of the value of exports- provided support for a 
large trade deficit and an increase in.the international reserves. 
Thus, if it was believed that a. situation of rapid growth in ..the value of 
exports and considerably lower nominal interest rates could last, it was believed 
possible to expand external indebtedness without any risk in terms of the external 
payments capacity, while at the same time large trade deficits could be maintained 
side by side with increasing reserves. This provided a substantial degree of 
freedom with respect both to economic policy and the governments' own political 
action. In many cases, in fact, exchange, credit, fiscal and international reserves 
policies all joined together to stimulate domestic spending, thus producing a 
temporary boom which increased external financing requirements. 
Unfortunately, this reasoning was based on numerous assumptions which, if not 
correct, could lead to serious problems. For this reason, as early as 1-977 the 
Secretariat sounded a warning note in its prospective studies regarding the. . 
vulnerability entailed by the level of indebtedness which was being reached. 
The simultaneous assumption in the medium term of a 20% growth rate in the 
value of exports and nominal interest rates of 10% did not appear to be reasonable. 
As already noted, a combination of very different, situations lay behind 
that figure of 20%. When it was due to a very rapid growth in volume, it was , 
foreseeable that this could not be maintained in the long run, and as regards .. 
commodities, it was common knowledge that the growth in world demand for these goods 
was slow and that there was a resurgence of protectionism in the developed 
countries whenever the exports of.the developing countries came to represent 
significant percentages of their markets. 
On the other hand, in order to use manufactures to sustain high and significant 
values of exports in the medium term, industrialization policies were called for 
which very few Latin American countries were applying. Moreover, the resurgence of 
/protectionist policies 
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protectionist policies'whichalsobegan to be noted in this regard posed a serious 
obstacle to a lasting expansion in the value of exports. As regards prices, there 
was no doubt that part of the growth in the value of exports was due to mounting 
world-wide inflation." This acceleration of inflation, made it difficult to. maintain, 
noinirlal interest rates which represéntèd very low br even negative recti rates. 
As for the tirade deficit in goods ahd services, it did not Seem reasonable 
either to approach this without refër̂ h"Cé' %*o domestic policies and: the terms of ; •. 
trade. The përsistéhcé of the trade deficit concealed dangerous tie-ins mthiithe 
domestic economy. 'In many cases the'achievement of a rapid growth of exports .was 
achieved at thé expense of major" doteeŝ id coists which could not easily be .increased 
in the event of an undesirable short-term situation. On .the other, hand, the. rapid 
growth of imports was vital to thé maintenance of policies for economic growth,: 
economic liberalization, or anti-inflationary policies, J As is well known, trade 
deficits are also related to the terms of trade. During the 1976-1980 period, as 
already mentioned, the governments based their actions on expectations of an 
improvement or, at the worst* a standétill of the terms of trade. An unfavourable 
short-term situation, whether in connection with éxternal demand, the terms of trade 
or a combination of the two, would either cause the deficit to grow .more than had 
been expected or would' cause the-national-economy to suffer a great deal. 
Finally, the assumption that "debts should not be repaid, but rather 
refinanced" was implicit-"in- this reasoning, '• Itefiiiancing'is therefore viewed .as a 
relatively automatic mechanism, If the average loan teifà is extended, then the 
amount renewed'ai: âny one time represents only a small percentage of exports. With 
an avérage term of 10 years and a ratio of the debt to the value of exports of 3' -. 
to 1, the amount to be renewed represents 30% of vthé value of exports. If the 
average termis less, if it becomes shorter from year to year or,, worse yet, if 
the debt with a tei™ of under one year represents a substantial pércentage of the 
totàl, then thé amount which must be renéwed Can easily represent around 100% of the 
value of exports. In the latter case'^any unfavourable short-term situation could, 
at the very least, place the automatiëity;òf-'its refinancing in doubt. ; 
This was the reasoning which led the Sécretariat to repeatedly denounce the 
dangerous increase in external vulnerability 'implicit in this style óf growth 
which entails heavy external borrowing' fromFthe transnational banking system. 1/ 
' ' ' /3. The 
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3, The region's external economic relations in the 
1981-1983 period 
As from 1981, events diverged from the optimistic assumptions underlying the policies 
for furthering external financial and economic relations. In most cases the 
situation with respect to the various factors mentioned above worsened 
simultaneously, leading to a profound crisis in the balance of payments and in the 
mode of growth linked with the external variables. 
Confidence in the economic recovery of the developed countries was dashed by 
the slowdown of growth in 1981 and the decrease in 1982. World trade tended to 
stagnate, and the protectionist tendencies of the central economies became still 
more marked. 
World inflation slackened somewhat, and the real interest rates corresponding 
to the nominal ones rose to levels unheard-of in the period since the war. The 
terms of trade worsened for the vast majority of the countries. 
As a consequence of these facts, already in 1981 the value of exports for the 
region as a whole grew much slower; the interest on the debt rose substantially; 
yet the growth in the value of imports did not decline with respect to the preceding 
year. This resulted in a deficit on current account for the region of over US$ 40 
billion. This deficit was 45% higher than in 1980 and was twice that of 1979 -and 
the deficits in those two years had been higher than in preceding years. Additional 
financing was granted for very short terms, with the result that by late 1981 the 
debt with a term of less than one year represented more than 65% of the value of 
the region's exports (this calculation does not include Panama and the Bahamas) and 
over 70% in the case of the countries with the biggest economies and populations. 
In 1982 the situation became even worse. The drop in the prices of many 
commodities caused the terms of trade to plummet at the same time that real interest 
rates held steady or rose. The value of exports decreased for the first time in 
many years and the debt /exports ratio reached record levels in almost all of the 
countries, coming to close to 4;1 in thé three most heavily indebted nations. At 
the same time, the debt with a term of under one year exceeded the value of exports 
in one country and grew rapidly in the rest. Automatic refinancing of the debt 
became an unattainable ideal. Furthermore, it was clear that the adjustment 
mechanisms represented by the reduction of imports and the degree of utilization 
or actual level of reserves were insufficient in themselves to permit payment of 
/the interest 
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the interest on the dfcbt».". Itfbecame. - debt, and the 
banks had to provide net external financing andr increase their exposure. Thus, the 
renegotiation process began in 1981 in some countries, and"iii 1982: in-the' rest, 
4, Economic and financial adjustment' policies 
The evolution of world trade and protectionism made ,it clear by..lat,e 1981 that» at 
least in the short run, the greater part of the debt prqble^;would have to.be 
resolved in the financial sphere, 
For many countries it was evident that the most serious problem in connection 
with their indebtedness was refinancing the loa,ns,. especially,- the short-term credits. 
In sane cases these loans approached the total value of their exports and, 
obviously, far exceeded their ability to pay,. At the same.time, the interest 
payments which had to be made exceeded any.surplus they could reasonably expect on 
their trade in goods and services, or the possibility of using their reserves,. It 
was therefore not only a question of refinancing all or part of the loans as they 
matured: it vas also absolutely essential to obtain additional.credits. For their . 
part» the creditors tried to reduce to a minimum the additional n,et financing which 
they h,ad to provide. 
As from 1981, roost of the countries embarked on a renegotiation process. 
together with domestic adjustment policies designed to meet,the requirements of a 
specific balance-of-payments programme. The,governments of the region, the 
transnational banking system and the International Monetary Rand have participated 
actively in these processes. The transnational banking system,, naturally enough, 
encourages more intensive national efforts to guarantee greater external payments 
capacity. To this end, it has made, the renegotiation of the debt contingent upon 
the signing of agreements with the Fund which contain its well-known stipulations 
with respect to domestic policies. 
Some countries have attempted to negotiate with the Fund as regards.these 
stipulations on the basis of .their own national strategies and policies, and in some 
cases considerable departures have occurred from what have: .bepn the customary 
adjustments... „ .,v ,,,-j Wl,.. 
The. general principles of the traditional stipu^tions-j.^r^; w®11 known. As 
regards the general guidelines for development, they Reaffirm; the supposed 
advantages of decontrolling the economy, reducing the,public.,Rector, and expanding 
the private sector, as well as underlining the important role which international 
/trade should 
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trade should play in guiding the allocation of resources. With respect to 
identifying the causes of the crisis, they stress excessive public spending, the 
inadequacy of the prevailing pricing system to deal with the new conditions, and 
above all-the.role of the exchange rate. Consequently, they prescribe that,.in 
response to inflationary pressures or severe balanCe-of-payments deficits, national 
policies should reduce the fiscal and public deficit, adjust real wages, limit 
domestic credit and public-sector borrowing, increase tax revenues and controlled 
prices, eliminate subsidies, and achieve a surplus on the external trade account. 
Generally speaking, there has been a change of emphasis in comparison to the 
agreements of other periods, in that the external trade account is stressed and 
greater flexibility is accepted as regards the limits which used to be established 
for some domestic goals, such as those concerning inflation. 
Various opinions and assertions have been expressed as to the nature of these 
agreements and their objectives throughout the period since.the war. In the present 
circumstances they are more controversial than in the past, however, for a number 
of reasons. 
In particular, the leading role attributed to international trade is now being 
questioned, in view of the fact that it has become less dynamic and that the 
protectionist pressures in the developed countries are becoming stronger; doubts 
have also been expressed about the effectiveness of global macroeconomic measures, 
now that the crisis has more clearly revealed the economic and social heterogeneity 
of the region's economies, as well as about the limitations on action by the public 
sector at a time when the private sector appears to have been overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the problems and is demanding government intervention in order to 
deal with them, -
These doubts as to the effectiveness of such agreements under the current 
circumstances have been confirmed by the facts. Indeed, the results habitually 
differ from the goals and objectives originally proposed. Shortly after the 
signing of agreements it has frequently been necessary to make major modifications 
in them or to suspend their implementation for a time. : 
Furthermore, in economic and social terms, the results have not been 
satisfactory in all cases. The drops in output and employment have exceeded the 
original estimates, and during 1983 the signs of stagnation -if not an outright 
drop-in production have tended to increase. Some countries, however, have 
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successfully controlled the more immediate effects of the crisis, particularly in 
connection with the&Cjbalance-of-payments problems. 
The most serious doubts concern.the Latin American economies' ability to 
withstand the current ..recession much longer.if conditions in the world economy do 
not change soon. Indeed, the persistent efforts to attain a relatively large :trade 
surplus in goods and ¿services -which would generally imply an-eye» greater surplus 
on the trade in have, had effects which go beyond, mereddcopS: in output. 
Serious imbalancesr.are being produced in the areas of employaient * inflation and the 
budget» -ïnjsçpeioçagesrindustrial plants have begun to .be dismantled, and there 
seems a danger that this process will spread» ; At .the same time discouragement 
among entrepreneurs'.is growing ¿projects for expansion are being abandoned and, in 
all probability, disinvestment, i s occurring in many lines of .production* 
It is also 'cQkeaxt that these-policies' have distributed the -external ând 
internal costs of. the-'crisis^inequitably. In the• external sphere,, thé Latin. 
American countries are being;severely penalized and the international banking'-system 
is being rewarded» The renegotiations have been carried out as if the poor-
allocation of the loans, (when:this did in fact occur)::or the high real interést 
rates were the exclusive, responsibility of thé debtors and. as if there were no 
obligation to share thecosts.^Moreoverj surcharges, fines and costs are applied 
in these renegotiations-which further increase the interest rates and the banks' 
potential profits. Pressure has also been applied to,obtain State guarantees in 
respect of credits which .¿were , granted to the private sector without them. In the 
domestic sphere, a large part of the costs have been passed on.to the lower-income 
sectors; eloquent, proof-pf this is provided by the high levels of unemployment and 
the decreases in real wages» 
In short, thus;far the adjustment process, despite the. fact that it is 
generating trade surpluses as big as, or even larger than,...those; demanded, has. 
proved to-be inefficient, destructive and inequitable:in many cases, and it should 
therefore be reviewed in depth. In order to do so, it is necessary to find external 
financial and trade alternatives which will .distribute the costs of adjustment more 
equitably and: gradually and, in the domestic sphere, will lead to a rapid and 




III. SOME ASPECTS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC TRENDS AND EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN 1981-1983 ^ 
The socio-economic crisis affecting the Latin American countries has important 
common elements, such as external dependence and vulnerability and the application 
of adjustment policies corresponding, in broad outline, to a common conceptual 
matrix. There are, however, marked inter-country differences as regards the scope 
of the crisis and the depth of the deterioration it has caused. It has already 
been pointed out that, alongside the oommon factors, there are others which help 
to account for the diverse ways in which the situation has evolved in the various 
countries during the three-year period 1981-1983. Thus, for example, the scale and 
profile of external indebtedness are not always comparable, nor are the fall in the 
value of exports, the changes that have taken place in production, economic growth 
trends and the extent to which adjustment policies have been applied. 
In the present section discussion will be focused on some aspects of the 
global evolution and external economic relations of the region and of the Latin 
American countries during the period 1981-1983. The phase of crisis, however, 
will be analysed within a broader time'framework, linking current events with 
trends7 in the 1970s, in order to bring out more clearly the differences between 
countries, especially as regards their potential capacity to weather the present 
crisis. • 
A. GLOBAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 
1. Changes in production and economic growth 
During the 1970s, both the growth of the countries of the region and the changes 
in their structure of production followed different lines. The fuels crisis, with 
its countless repercussions on the international economy and the central countries, 
compelled most of the Latin American countries to introduce changes in their 
policies as from 1973, The consequent transformation of production affected, to a 
widely differing extent according to the countries concerned, industrial develop-
ment, investment for the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the development of alter-
native sources of energy, agriculture and the sectors linked to trade and finance, 
/From another 
- 26- -
From another angle, it may be remarked that in• formulating andy executing 
projects on the ejqpansion-of prodùctioh, sòme "countries placed emphasis on domestic 
market prospects and others on -the opportunities offered by external markets, 
while elsewherë attempts Were made to ' demonstrate the viability of a combinaticn 
óf thè two. • 
There were also manifest disparities in the countries' efforts to mobilize 
resources for investment.' In seme'instances the proportion of the product used -
for investment was high; in others, on the contrary, it continued to be small. 
: In Consequence of these and other points of dissimilarity, during the period 
1974-1980 hot only the direction taken by thé changes in production but also the 
average rate of growth varie dconsidsrably from one country to another; It has 
already been noted that the eèotìòmic dynamisift Of the region as â whole slackënèd 
considerably in relation to trends in' thè early 1970s;'^Nevertheless, in four - -
countries (Brazii , Ecuador,-México and Paraguay) the annuali growth rate exceeded : 
6%; in the majority, on the' otherhand;, there; was -nò -improvement upon long-term 
tretids. ' As can be séëh in table 1, growth rates were very low in some countries 
of the region; • ••'••-' ' .. : •. " --A 
This moderate cind disparate- recovery-in the regicsn's economic growth died 
out in 1981, when the- growth rate (1.8%) was the lowest since 1940. ; The situation 
has- continued to deteriorate during the two-yeaT period 1982-1983. ; In 1982 the, 
product contracted by 0.8%; what is more, the downward movement was generalized'*, 
and out of 19 countries 11 showed negative variations. In this context, the 
contraction was particularly acute 'in the Southern Cone countries, and next came 
the Central American countries, which were further affected by their in tra-region al 
conflicts. The bJijéVfen sharper 1^1983: and to extend to 
most countries., including, those tha^had so far avoided decreases in their domestic 
product. . ; r ....... 
Manufacturing and coj^Ç^^^qn ..were, the sectors hardest hit by the recession 
at the regional level. ,v'̂ ,,fiirjst...p£ t^ese.^.y^.i^^.?1.1980 had accounted for about 
24% of the region's product ^^.^ur^Pg -the, .decade had grown at an annual rate 
of 6.6%>v declined, by -1.5^ in,. 1982; in the latter, year 13 of the 
19 countries considered and Brazil, Which contributes 
approximately 37%. of the,.region's?.|^ufaçturirîg product» only managed to maintain 
the already; depressed level of 1981, in which year its manufacturing product had 




LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Percentages on the basis of values at 1975 prices) 
Countries 1976-1980 1981 ; 1982 
Large countries 
Argentina 1.6 -6.4 -6.7 
Brazil 6.2 -1.0 0.7 
Mexico. 6.4 • 8.1 • h, 0.2 
Total 5.6 1.5 .-0.4 
Medium-sized,countries t&.c; 
Colombia 4.4 3.9. 1.3 
Chile • ' ' ' 4.4 6 ,g t." _io.9 
Peru 2.4 . 4.0. . 0.7 
Venezuela 2.3 0.0 -1.1 
Total 3;o 2.7 -1.6 
Small countries 
Bolivia .  4.2 -1.3 -9.6 
Costa Rica 4.7 -4.9 -6.3 
Ecuador 6.5 4.6 2.3 
El Salvador 1.5 -9.4 -5.2 
Guatemala . 5.1 . - 1,1 -3.5 
Haiti 4.2 0.6 0.6 
Honduras 5.4 0.0 -Ó.9 
Nicaragua .,. -2.1 . . 8.4 . -0.4 
Panama 10.2 4.6 4.1 
Paraguay 9.9 8.4 -2.1 
Dominican Republic 4.8 5.3 2.0 
Uruguay 
Total 4.9 1.5 -1.8 
Total Latin America 5.1 1.7 -0.7 
Source; ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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Even more marked was the slump in construction, which had been a very dynamic 
sector in the 1970s, with an annual growth rate of 7.3%; in 1982, only in two 
countries of the- region' did a modest increase take place, while in the other 17 
countries considered there were abrupt downturns which in the aggregate represented 
a decline of -5.7%, ihis situation was unquestionably largely due to the decrease 
in investment. 
- The reduction of global-and-sectoral production meant thât thé form, structure 
and transformation of production current up to then were disrupted' or brought • to 
an end.. 
Countries with gfeait economic dynamism and high rates of investment in 
1974-1980 showed, in the same period, particularly intensive growth in the manu-
facturing and construction sectors. In others, with less dynamism; .the growth 
rate of/the construction ¡sector greatly exceeded the average for the economy and 
that of the manufacturing sector. Thus, for example, in the case of Argentina, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay, the annual growth rates of the construction sector in the 
period 1974-1980 practically quadrupled, doubled and trebled, respectively, that 
of the product of eachfof these countries* Bolivia and Chile, too, had'their 
boom periods -especially in construction- although these were shorter^lived. 
In the special case?: of Colombia, it was the agricultural sector that:. 
attained growth rates exdeeding those of the global product and very high in 
relation to those customary in the sector.,. : 
Up to 1982, it was the countries which had previously exhibited most 
dynamism and in which the, growth rate of the manufacturing sector had been highest 
that were, best able to withstand the effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, the 
data available for 1983. indicate that at least in Brazil and Mexico, which; were 
in this group of countries, the domestic product was significantly reduced. On 
the other hand, covin tries with less dynamism, whose growth was largely "based on 
the ejqpansion of construction, were .those which showed the sharpest downturns in 
that sector as well as in the global product. During 1982, in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay the sectoral product plummeted abruptly, in two 
cases by more than 40%, and the global product also dwindled. In such countries 
as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru, where during 1982 the sector in 
question maintained or increased its product, the consequent positive effects to 
some extent counteracted depressive trends. 
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To evaluate the depth of the crisis and its impact on the sectoral structure, 
a useful way of measuring the setback that occurred is to compare the per capita 
global product and 'the product of the main sectors in 1982 with those recorded in 
previous years, drawing attention to the year in which the levels in question were 
exceeded for the first tine. In 1982 the per capita gross domestic product of 
four countries reverted to the levels of about two decades earlier (the beginning 
of the 1960s) and that of six countries fell back by about one decade (to the 
early 1970s); in two countries it dropped a little below the level recorded five 
years before, and in seven countries it reached the same levels as at the beginning 
of the 1980s (see table 2). 
In the sectors producing goods some notable decreases are observable. With 
respect to agriculture, three countries stood at the level of the early 1950s, and 
the same was true of two others with regard to the construction sector. 
It is in the agricultural sector that severe contractions have affected the 
largest number of, countries. While variations frcm year to year and from crop to 
crop are usually more intensive than in other sectors, an appreciable decline is 
generally apparent. Ten countries recorded lower levels than in 1970. 
In three countries (Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua) a simultaneous decline 
took place in the agricultural, manufacturing and construction sectors, all of 
which sank below their 1960 levels. On the contrary, in five countries (Brazil, 
Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic) the decreases in the per 
capita product of those three goods-producing sectors were relatively small up to 
1982, leaving them at the same levels as"at the beginning of the 1980s, 
As can be seen, up to 1982 at least the deterioration of production differed 
appreciably in intensity from country to country, and was not independent either 
of the changes in production or of the economic dynamism previously shown by the 
various economies' of the region. 
2. Export and import flows and the physical balance of resources 
Attention has already been drawn in earlier pages to the special form taken by the 
evolution and the interlink age of Latin America's external trade and financial 
relations in the period 1976-1982. The-region's general trends in this respect 
were also followed in most of the individual countries, but, as in other respects, 
at the national level the phenomena occurring can be seen to differ in intensity 
and scope. 
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: Table 2 - ' ' 
LATIN AMERIC'AY PER CAPITA PRODUCT IN 1982, IN RELATION TO LEVELS 






(dollars at • 
1975 prices) 
Year in which the 1982 level of thè per capita global 




Agriculture Industry Construction "^f^ance^ 
¡'O'! 
Panama 1 933 1982 1965 1972 1982 19ÄL 
Venezuela 1 879 ' 1954 1964 1976 1956 1969 
Mexico . 1 707 1981 1965 1980 " 1981 1981 
Uruguay 1 782 1978 1951 1975 1978 1976 
Brazil 1 322 1979 ' 1980 1978' 1978 1979 
Argentina 1 307 1969 1973 1965 V 1969 1Ö61 
Costa Rica 1 128 1973 1969 1974 ' 1954 1968 
Peru 974 1974 1950 1970 ^ 1956 1974 
Chile 876 197Í 1958 1939 'J1950 1980 
Dominican 
Republic 840 1982 • 1982' ' 1982 .<" 1977 - 1982 
Paraguay 787 < : 1980 : 1980 - -1980 1981 • 1980 
Ecuador 749 1981 1971 :,: - >1982 1971 ; ; 1980 
Colombia' t 647 ' '1981 1979 '<•••• 1Ò76 .. 1982 1981 
Guatëmala : ' 607 ' 1976 "• 19723 1977 Vi. y''-- 1977' 1974 
Nicaràgua 498 ' ' 1963 1*952 < ir -1967ci" - 1954 
Bolivia 452 1972 1975 1972* •••'4 1951— ' 1950 
Honduras 393 ; . 1965... 1977 .. . . • ;. „ 1950 . 1978 
El Salvador 314 1962 """"1950 1962" 1956 1959 
Haiti 171 •,'• >'••'.. C: :í 1952 ; 1950 '1980 1 ' 1978 1976 




The volume of imports (see table 3) expanded between 1976 and 1980 at 
exceptionally high annual rates (ranging from 18 to 27%, by countries) in the 
three Southern Cone countries, Paraguay and Mexico. It contracted.in Bolivia, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru. In the rest of the countries it increased at 
relatively moderate and even -in Brazil, Guatemala and Paraguay- low rates. The 
adjustment policy applied as from 1981 presupposed, in the great majority of 
cases, a reduction in the volume of imports. The effects of this reduction on 
the product differed commensurately with the indispensability of imports for the 
growth pattern in vogue or with the existence of margins for compression. Moreover, 
the scale on which inports were reduced varied widely. In 1982, with the exception 
of Paraguay, the very countries in."which expansion had been greatest in 1976-1980 
recorded, in relation to the preceding year, the most marked contractions m import 
volumes, which in the case of Argentina, Chile and Mexico reached as much as 37%. 
The relation existing between economic dynamism and imports in the Southern Cone 
countries was highlighted by the notable extent to which the product fell; Mexico, 
in contrast, wasi able to keep up its level. In the same year, five countries 
succeeded in a.t least maintaining the level of their imports and avoided signif-
icant decreases in their product in some cases even obtaining slight increments. 
In an extreme position were a few countries, such as Brazil, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Honduras, which, despite having had to cope with appreciable cuts in . 
their imports, managed to keep up or to some extent raise the level of their 
product. 
The data available for 1983 show that most countries went on making efforts 
to reduce imports and thai reactions continued to occur which, although their , 
general direction was towards decreases in the product, were very different in 
their scope. A notable case in point is that of Mexico, where an appreciable 
reduction in inports seems to have been reflected in a fall of only about 4% in 
the product. This fact seen® to demonstrate the great inportance attaching, with 
respect to imports, to the magnitude and nature of the investment undertaken in 
the preceding period and the substitution capacity acquired in the years of 
booming growth, both of the product and, in particular of investment. In contrast, 
other countries, as for instance, Peru and Bolivia, seem to have stood the decline 
in inports very badly, 
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i . • • • Table 3 .•-..•' :• 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORT?.AND IMPORTS OF GOOD,S AND SERVICES 
(Annual growth rates,, values at constant prices) 
Countries 
Exports of goods and 
services 
Imports of goods' and 
services 
1976-1980 1981 1982 1^76-1980 1981 1982 
Large countries ' 
Argentina 7.1 . 15.2 .-3.7 27.0 -15.8 -37.1 
Brazil 13.3 24.1 -7". 7 . , • 3t 7v -, -11.4 -7.1 
Mexico 16.3 , 3.4 , y 3.2 21.2, . 19.8 -37.5 
Total 13.0 15 .1. -3.5 13.5 0.5 . -27.2 
Madium-sized countries 
Colombia 3.4 ' -7.9 ' 0.1 13.7 ' 0.7 : 11.4 
Chile 14.8' 0.9 8.7 .••.; 19.9,:- r . 17.9 -37.0 
Peru , 11.4 -7.2 10.3 -1.0 20.5 0.7 
Venezuela -1.7 -'8,0 -12.1 2.9 1.6 9.4 
Total 3.4, . -5,9 : 2,3 ; ' 6.6 . 7.0 -1.7 
Small countries - - ' , • - ; 
Bolivia , -4.7 -5.8 2.8 , -2.3 0.2 -29.7 
Costa Rica 1.3 28.13 '' -9 .1 5.9 -25.3 -24.9 
Ecuador , 1.5 1.2 . , -1,1. ' 'A 11.5 v -0.7 -9.2 
El Salvador -l.H -10.9 -9.4 . -2.3 -5.9 -10.5 
Guatemala 2.8 -13.4' -8.7 ' 2.1 -2.1 -27.5 
Haiti 10.3 -14.4 -2.5 11.5 3.1 -10 .0 
Honduras 7.4. 1.2 -14.3 i%. 10.7 -11.6 -24.6 
Nicaragua ' • _14 $ 819 -9.4 ' -0.1 5.2 -33.6 
Panama .•;•' a 10.5 , -2.1. • * 2.2 0.3. 9,1 
Paraguay 12.0 -9.9 24.3 17.1 11,1 15.3 
Dominican 'Republic . -1.7 v ! 10.5 "• -i2.rv • 6.3 -11.3 -6.2 
Uruguay -, • Ì: 4.1 .. : 7.1 -17>7o,v ;vv 18.3 -12.1 , -24.1 
Total 1.8 1.1.. 6.8 6.2 5.6 -15.1 
Total Latin America 7.8 .7.0 3.6 10.3 , 1.3 18.1 
. . • .:- •• • • 
Source ; ÉCLÀ, On the basis Of official data. 
..'.... . ' u • -'/ii.f 
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This reduction was necessary, as has already been explained, as a means of 
counteracting, via the trade balance, the sharp upswing in interest payments just 
when the international banks had adapted a restrictive attitude to the issue of 
new credits and both the value and the volume of exports had diminished, Ali these 
circumstances entailed a much more arduous effort to obtain a trade surplus. 
It must be recalled, in addition, that during the period 1976-1980 the 
majority of countries had shown trade deficits that were gradually rising as tine 
went by; nevertheless, the average annual growth rate of the value of the region's 
exports was 22,3%, almost identical with that of the value of imports (22,2%), if 
the beginning and end years of this period are compared. This state of affairs 
was almost universal, and significant deviations occurred only in the case of 
El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
The volume of exports increased at an average annual rate of 8.1%. Inter-
country differences are marked, however, and in five countries the volume 
contracted (see table 3). On the other hand, the growth rate of the volume was 
especially high (over 10% per annum) in Brazil, Chile, Mexioo, Panama, Paraguay 
and Peru. 
The deterioration that began as from 1981 spread to most of the countries 
in 1982; Although the volume of Latin America's escorts in 1982 was about 3% 
larger than in 1980, their value dropped by more than 1.5%. Only Brazil, Mexico 
and Panama recorded higher export values in 1982 than in 1980"; the reductions 
were particularly marked in the medium-sized and small countries. In the great 
majority of cases, as will be shown in detail later, an appreciable proportion of 
the decrease or the increase in value must be attributed to the fall in interna-
tional commodity prices. It is worth mentioning that in 1982 thé export volumes 
of four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay) exceeded the 1980 
figures by over 10%. 
In the context of this review of trends in thé value at constant prices of 
inports and exports of goods and services, it is of particular interest to 
establish the amount and the negative or positive sigi of what ïs usually called 
the physical trade balance. 
At the macroeconomic level, of course, an excess of inports over e?q>orts 
increases internal availabilities or supply, and makes it possible for consumption 
and capital formation to surpass, in the aggregate, the domestic product. In 
/turn, an 
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turn, an excess of exports over imports. diminishes interna! availabilities, and, 
consequently,, domestic Consumption and investment, in ¡the; aggregate, are of lesser 
magnitude than the domestic product« 
During; the second half of the last decade, the region as à-whole showed an • 
excess of imports over.exports on a scale-of some significance in relation, to the 
absolute levels of external variables. * This margin of excess (in dollars.at 
constant 1975 prices) amounted to: approximately US$ 7. billion in'1974 and about 
US$ 5.5, billion in 1976,rand rose to.more than US$ ,13 billion .in 1980 (see table 4). 
In this period,"bothdàports and e^jorts of goods and services appreciably increased, 
but thé former in a higher proportion than the latter. 
Generally speaking, this import : surplus for thè region as a whole was the 
result of similar balances for the great majority of the Latin American countries, 
although their relative size varied appreciably from one country to another.; Only 
a very small number of countries hàd in certain of the three years .mentioned a, 
physical balance that was virtually riil, or an excess of exports over imports»;• :rr 
Among these, the most important instances are Argentina and Venezuela; in a lesser 
degree, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Panama. 
In 1982 the situation changed considerably. . In the region, as a: whole, 
exports surpassed imports by about US$ 1 billion. . This figure is -the product ôf 
different situations. Out of the.total number of 19 countries considered, eight 
exported more than they imported and 11 did the reverse. Pre-eminent among the 
former, for the size òf the figures concerned*; were the three large countries and 
Chile; under the latter head come almost .all the medium-sizéd and small Countries. -
In the former group of countries , the export surplus was due not only to an 
increase in external sales, but also -to a curtailment of imports, which is charac-
teristic of the adjustments to the new conditions generated by the crisis. 
3. Investment and saving 
a) Trends .in domestic investment 
During the 1970s, the investment process was stronger and more sustained 
than in the preceding decades. While its evolution was similar to that of the 
global economic proœs§^as. .regards dynamism, stagnation and contraction- its 
average relation to the,^rçduçt^remained at relatively high figures. 
,<:•.. -.n-', t ^ • /Table 4 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: PHYSICAL BALANCE OF EXTERNAL TRADE IN GOODS 
AND SERVICES (IMPORTS MINUS EXPORTS) 
(Millions of dollars at constant 1975 prices) 
1974 1976 1980 1982 • 
Large countries 
Argentina 539.8 -1 452.1 2 359.4 -2 379.9 Brazil 7 255.0 . .4 .358.7 358,7- -4 741.3 
Mexico 1 716.0 1 245.3 4 865.8 -224.1 Total 9 511.3 4 151.9 7 584.0 -7 345.3 
Medium-sized countries 
Colombia 497.4 241.7 1 ,439.5 2 059.3 Chile 1 095.0 -271.7 157.8 -1 232.8 Peru 1 094.3 873.4 -131.3 331.9 
Venezuela -6 797.7 -595.6 1 ,077.7 3 ,829*0 Total -4 110.9 . 248.0 2 543.9 4 987.3 
Small countries I 
Bolivia -40.2 42.0 87.5 -66. 5 
Ecuador 0.2 41.7 663i0 468.6 
Paraguay 64.4 64.6 195.0 311.0 Uruguay 258.1 -1.8 534.6 183.2 Total 282.5 146.5 1 480.1 896.3 
Small countries II 
Costa Rica 205.4 249.6 444.0 -152.1 El Salvador 120.8 199.3 151.2 148.5 Guatemala 150.3 448.4 459.9 251.4 Honduras 159.1 83.4 193.0 24.5 
Nicaragua 326.7 68.9 296.6 129.5 Panama 327.7 138.8 -150.9.. -62.8 Total 1 290.0 1 179.3 1 393.7 339.1 
Small countries III 
Haiti 37.9 75.9 125.4 133.7 Dominican Republic -83.1 -194.7 141.4 -27.9 Total -45.3 -118.7 266.8 105.8 
Latin America (19 countries) 6 927.6 5 606.9 13 268.5 -1 016.8 
Source; ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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The most important change occurred in the early 1970s, when investment grew 
faster than the product. Thenceforward, even in periods when #ie product declined, 
a certain parallelism between the respective growth rates was-maintained, and 
consequently the coefficient reached' by 197«+ remained relatiyely constant. Even 
in periods when the growth of the product slowed down (as in 1975 and 1981) or 
enjoyed a moderate recovery (1976-1980) the coefficient tended to be kept stable. 
In 1982, on theother hand, 'the fall 'ininvestment easily exceeded the decrease 
in the product, .affording yet-'another proof of the depth of the crisis*-- -
In the context of this picture of global trends the domestic investment, 
coefficient in relation to the gross domestic product differs remarkably in size 
in the various countries, and also, up to a point, as regards the trends it 
follows. Trends ,towards variation, however, are very similar in this short period: 
of the last three years, in. comparison with the average levels of the coefficient 
during the years,that went before. 
In the second half of the last decade, among the 19 oountries considered, 
diverse situations arose in respect of the. investment coefficient. Six of the 
countries recorded an investment coefficient amounting to approximately 25% of 
the domestic product or more; the coefficients of another six range from 20 to 
25%. In the seven remaining countries, Whose indexes of gross domestic investment 
are relatively low, instances are to be found of countries that indubitably . 
exhibit less ability to increase their production capacity. 
, The crisis very seriously affected the investment effort made up to then by 
a number of countries in the region, as becomes evident when the investment' . 
coefficients for the second half of the last decade are compared with the most 
recent coefficients available, corresponding to the two-year period 1981-1982. 
As can be seen in table 5, out of the 19 .countries considered, in 1981 ten had an 
investment coefficient below that recorded in preceding years. In 1982, 13 
countries had investment coefficients lower than those attained in the second 
... •. • ;,; • ' " • • C { :. 
half of . the previous decade. The sane y ear "witnessed art increase in-the number of 
countries of the region with extremely low .¡coefficients, which will do very little 
to further the growth of future production capacity in the economies concerned, 
especially in view of the fact that from those indexes (of gross domestic invest-
ment) amortizations or replacements will still have to be deducted in order to 
obtain the efffecrtiv» size, of -the lnwoase in capital formation. 
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Table 5 
' LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT. COEFFICIENT IN 
RELATION TO THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Values at constant 1975 prices) 
Countries 1976-1980 1981 1982 
Large countries 
Argentina 28.7 26.2 22.5 
Brazil 24.6 21.6 21.4 
Mexico 24.6 30.5 21.9 
Total 20.5 25.5 21.7 
Medium-sized countries 
Colombia, 19.5 21.2 21.5 
Chile 16.4 21.7 11.2 
Peru 12.9 15.9 13,6 
Venezuela 33.7 26.5 29.7 
Total 23.9 22.2 - 21.7 
Small countries 
Bolivia 18.8 12.0 7.5 
Costa Rica - 23.6 16.1 10.8 
Ecuador 25.8 24.1 21.2 
El Salvador ' 1 2 > 2 11.7 
Guatemala ' • 19.9 17.7 14.9 
Haiti >• 16.2 18.5 16.7 
Honduras 24.2 22.5 18.1 
Nicaragua 15.2 28.2 19.8 
Panama . 17.3 17.8 18.7 
Paraguay 33.0 38.6 34.5 
Dominican Republic • 22.4 19.9 17.1 
Uruguay 15.4 15.5 13.2 
Total 21.3 19.9 17.2 
Total Latin America 24.6 24.4 , 2 1 . 3 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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b) Domestic resources for investment and national saving 
Before examining the contribution of national saying and of net external 
financing to the global financing of domestic investment, it is useful to consider 
the relations existing between gross- domestic product and consumption, on the one 
hand, and national saving on the other. The difference between the domestic 
product' and consumptioiriuiiepresents what may be called gross geographical or 
domestic saving. This concept provides a more representative indicator of the 
efforts made in the individual countries .to. promote their capital accumulation 
process. 
- The fundamental differences between gross domestic saving and national saving 
lie in the fact that the latter is affected by two variables linked to external ; 
relations, which play a particularly influential part in its determination. 
National saving is reduced in relation to. domestic saving by net transfers of •• 
profits and interests abroad; moreover, when analysis of the question is based 
on an evaluation at constant prices, national saving increases or decreases 
according to the favourable or unfavourable effect of variations in the terms of 
trade, for which in the present study 1975 is taken as the base year. 
In 1981-1982, according to the most recent data available, the erosion . 
undergone by national resources on account of the transfer of interest payments 
and profits, as well as~ of the unfavourable terms-of-trade effect, has been highly 
significant for many countries. This is-clear from the figures presented in -
table 6 on trends in the coefficients of-domestic saving and national saving, 
respectively, in relation to the gross domestic product. Thus, for example, iii 
1982 the coefficient of gross national saving was lower than the coefficient of 
grosy domestic saving in most countries, and in some of them by a considerable 
margin, as can be seen in table 6. In all these cases a simultaneous influence 
wee exercised by the hi$i index of external profits and interest payments, in 
relation to the gross domestic product, as well as by the serious losses'Resul-
ting, in a large number of countries, from the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
In nine out of the 19 countries considered, the coefficient of gross national 
saving was lower than that of gross domestic saving by over 5 percentage points, 
and in another five by up to 5 percentage points. Consequently, in only a small 
group of countries did the coefficient of gross national saving equal or exceed 
that of domestic saving, fundamentally because of the terms-of-trade effect .in 
relation to the base year 1975. 
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LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC SAVING AND GROSS NATIONAL SAVING 
(Percentages of GDP on the basis of dollars at: constant 1975 prices) 
Gross domestic saving Gross national investment 
Countries ;." 
- 1977 1978 1979 • 1980. 1981 1982 1977 1978 1979 1980 .1981 1982 
Large countries 18.5 Argentina 36.3 35.2 30.3 24.9 ; 26.1 28.7 32.8 31.1 27,2 23.1 19.9 
Brazil 22.0 21.3 20.5 23.7 24.7 24.2 20.9 19.1 17.6 19.5 17.9 16.3 
Mexico 23.0 23.2 23.5 24.3, 24.2 22.1 20.6 20.5 21.3 24.0 23.9 20.6 
Total 24.5 23.9 22.9 24.1 24.7 23.9 22.6 21.2 20.2 21.6 20.4 18.1 
Medium-sized countries 
Colombia 13.9 « 15.2 16.5 11.5 11.7 9.7 22.7 21.7 21.5 17.6 14.1 13.1 
Chile •II. 4 10.6 :. 13.7 20.4 14.3 23.4 7.5 5.2 9.7 LI. 1 -1.1 -2.2 
Peru 10.0 15.5 . 16.7 14.9 12.8 • 11.7 7.0 9.5 13.4 13.9 10.1 7.7 
Venezuela 32.0 25.2 28.1 22.1 20.4 .17.5 32.2 22.2 32.2 35.2 33.9 23.2 
Total 20.8 : 19.1 21.2 18.0 15.9 15.2 21.5 17.2 22.9 23.2 19.1 14.0 
Small countriès 
Bolivia 17.1 11.7 11.4 .'• 11.3 . 7.9 10.0 16.4 10.1 9.0 10.9 5.7 3.9 
Costa Rica 8.2 • 6.3 6.1 10.5 17.0 16.4 16.4 11.5 9.2 10.7 8.1 1.9 
Ecuador 18.4 18.4 14.5 15.1 14.0 13.9 19.7 16.2 16.9 18.8 14.1 Il. 1 
El Salvador 9.1 9.7 14.8 3.8 2.0 2.4 32.8 21.3 27.6 7.9 2.2 3.2 
Guatemala 6.4 4.5 6.0 . 5.9 6.3 9.5 20.7 16.7 15.0 13.0 9.9 10.6 
Haiti 3.6 5.6 8.1 5.5 2.9 3.9 8.8 8.7 9.9 8.8 5.7 6.1 
Honduras 15.9 13.1 16.7 13.3 .15.8 16.5 18.5 15.3 15.2 12.2 10.3 9.1 
Nicaragua 19.0 10.6 . -9.3 -0.7 7.8 11.1 24.9 11.5 -8.7 -1.8- 5.7 5.1 
Panama 12,3 14.1 15.5 22.0 21.1 20.3 8.6 10.0 9.2 12.0 • 8.3 11.5 
Paraguay 23.6 26.1 26.9, 29.7 27.6 22.8 27.2 27.8 28.7 29.7 29.5 22.0 
Dominican Republic 30.0 25.8 .27.9 ' 20.1 22.1 17.7 19.3 15.9 16.8 13.9 15.2 10.2 
Uruguay 10.8 12.2 10.1 . 9.5 10.2 9.7 10.5 12.5 12.3 11.0 11.0 7.9 
Total . 15.1 13.8 13,4. 13.2 13.9 : 13.7 18.1 14.8 . 14.3 13.4 11.5 9.4 
Total Latin America 23.0 22.1 21.8 22.1 22.2 21.5 . 22.0 19.9 20.2 21.1 19.4 16.7 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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c) The contribution of national saving and of net external financing to the 
financing of investment 
From the data assembled in tables 6 and 7 on the coefficients of national 
saving and of net external financing it can be demonstrated that in the last two 
years considered (1981-1982) the contribution of gross national saving to the 
financing of gross domestic investment followed a downward trend in a large number 
of countries, and there was an increase in the proportion covered by net external 
financing, corresponding to net balance-of-payments positions on current account. 
This happened despite the decline in investment, especially during 1982. 
The explanation of the increase in net external financing lies in the need 
to offset the significant increments in net payments of interest and profits 
abroad, and, in many cases, the losses caused by the terms of trade. The 
situation seems to have worsened during 1983, when in seme countries net payments 
of interest and profits will exceed net external financing. 
In short, the crisis called a halt to a major capital accumulation effort 
made by the region during the 1970s, thanks to which investment came to represent 
a higher proportion of the product. What is more, despite the slackening of the 
average growth rate in Latin America as from 1975, in 1976-1980 the region kept up 
a relatively high average coefficient of gross investment. This situation was 
maintained during 1981 and gave way in 1982, in which year the coefficient fell to 
approximately 21%. 
Employment and wages 
Unemployment and underemployment are structural problems in most of the Latin 
American countries. The 1970s did not signify much improvement in this respect; 
on the contrary, the problem was exacerbated in many countries, while urbanization 
helped to make it more visible and to give it a political character which it 
lacked in rural environments. 
At the beginning of the 1980s it was known that the growth rate of the 
labour force would be very high, scarcely less than 3% per annum. In the second 
quinquennium of the 1970s there had been only a moderate recovery of economic 
dynamism; even if this situation had been maintained, an appreciable aggravation 
of the employment problem could have been predicted. 
/Table 7 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: NET EXTERNAL FINANCING AND GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(Percentages of GDP on the basis of dollars at constant 1975 prices) 
External net financing Gross domestic investment 
Countries 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1977 1978 1979. 1980 1981 1982 
Large countries 26.2 22.5 Argentina -2/4 - -3.7 0.9 7.2 6.3 4.0 30.4 27.4 28.0 30.3 
Brazil 3.3 4.0 4.8 4.4 3.7 5.1 24.3 23.1 22.3 23.9 21.6 21.4 
Mexico 1.9 2.8 4.0 4.5 6.5 1.3 22.5 23.3 25.3 28.5 30.5 21.9 
Total 2.0 2.5 3.9 4.8 5.1 3.6 24.6 23.8 24.2 26.4 25.5 21.7 
Medium-sized countries • 21.5 Colombia -2.7 -1.6 -2.3 2.6 7.1 8.4 20.0 20.1 19.2 20.2 21.2 
Chile 6.1 10.3 8.5 10.8 22.8 13.4 13.6 15.4 ia.2 21.9 21.7 11.2 
Peru 5.4 1.2 -2.9 0.3 5.8 5.9 12.4 10.7 10.5 14.2 15.9 13.6 
Venezuela 8.7 14.4 -0.8 -9.6 -7.4 6.5 40.9 36.6 31.4 25.5 26.5 29.7 
Total • 5 » 3 7.6 -0.4 -1.9 3.2 7.7 26.8 24.8 22.5 21.3 22.2 20.8 
Small countries 
Bolivia 4.. 1 9.8 9.2 3.4 6.2 3.6 20.5 20.0 18.3 14.3 12.0 7.5 
Costa Rica 8.0 11.4 14.5 14.4 8.1 8.9 24.4 22.9 23.7 25.1 16.1 10.8 
Ecuador • - 6.7 11.6 8.5 7.4 10.0 10.1 26.4 27.7 25.4 26.2 24.1 21.2 
El Salvador -1.0 9.9 -4.5 4.0 10.0 8.5 31.8 31.2 23.2 11.9 12.2 11.7 
Guatemala = 0.9 6.0 3.8 2.4 7.9 4.3 21.6 22.7 18.8 15.5 17.7 14.9 
Haiti 6.8 7.3 7.2 8.9 12.8 10.5 15.6 16.0 17.1 17.6 18.5 16.7 
Honduras 9.0 9.6 10.0 13.4 12.2 9.0 27.5 24.9 25.2 25.6 22.5 18.1 
Nicaragua 9.8 1.7 -5.2 22.9 22.5 14.8 34.8 • 13.2 -13.9 21.1 28.2 19.9 
Panama 5.7 - 6.6 7.5 5.9 9.5 7.2 .14,3 : 16.6 16.7 17.9 17.8 18.7 
Paraguay 3.2 5.5 ,7.5 7.7 9.1 12.5 30.4 • 33.3 36.2 37.5 38.6 34.5 
Dominican Republic . * 2.9 6.3 6.3 9.3 4.7 6.9 ' 22.2 22.2 23.1 23.2 19.9 17.1 
Uruguay 3.2 2.3 4.9 7.4 4.5 4.9 13.7 14.8 17.2 18.4 15.5 13.2 
Total . .. 4.5 L A 6.4 7.8 8.4 7.8 22.5 22.1 20.6 21.2 19.9 17.2 
Total Latin America 2.8 3.9 3.4 3.9 5.0 4.7 24.8 23.8 23.6 • 25.1 24.4 21.3 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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The logical consequence of the fall in the growth rate in 1981 and the 
depression throughout 1982 and 1983 has been a very serious increase in overt 
unemployment and in underemployment, In these circumstances, the problem has 
grown to proportions exceeding all previous experience since the Second World 
War, The increment in the economically active population in Latin America during 
the three-year period 1981-1983 alone amounts to over nine million persons. 
Naturally, in so far as new sources of work are not created, the great majority 
of this population, essentially young people, will not find employment. Moreover, 
everything suggests that many who are at present in work are losing their jobs, 
whereby the problem is considerably aggravated in many of the Latin American 
countries. 
With regard to the significance of unemployment figures, it should be 
pointed out that percentages of overt unemployment must be interpreted differently 
for the developing and for the developed countries. There are differences among 
the Latin American countries deriving from their degrees of development, but an 
element common to them all in the unemployment situation is the meagre pittance 
handed out by the social security system to the unemployed. In the developed 
countries, in contrast, unemployment insurance provides coverage for high 
percentages of the number of unemployed and of the average value of their 
earnings when in work. 
Unemployment has been accompanied by sizeable decreases in real wages. In 
previous periods, according to PREALC studies, this variable did not show a 
significant relation with the unemployment rate. In contrast, an examination of 
the data for the last half of the past decade and the first two years of the 
present one reveals that minimum wages in manufacturing and construction are 
more closely linked to the level of activity than to a real wage. In this last 
context, there is nothing to indicate that during the three-year period 1981-1983 
the reductions in real wages, n otwi ths tan ding their magnitude, have succeeded 
in significantly counteracting unemployment. 
The countries' degree of openness to foreign trade appears to exercise 
greater influence on real wages. Thus, small countries highly open to foreign 
trade seem to have confronted the crisis not only with a significant reduction 
of employment but also with a decrease in real wages. In contrast, others of 
larger size, which have not introduced drastic innovations into their economic 
/policy, have 
- 43 
policy, have even adopted measures to step up real wages notwithstanding the 
adverse international conditions. In the Southern Cone countries the cost of the 
adjustment has largely been transferred to real wages. Lastly, the petroleum- ; 
exporting countries, after enjoying, up to a short time ago, an economic boom 
which facilitated the application of more liberal policies with regard to ; 
increasing real wages, have had to face internal.and:external disequilibria which 
are threatening to cancel out the advances achieved. In short, no common pattern, 
can be traced in the evolution of real wages at the regional level. In this field 
the differences in the countries' capacity to react to conjunctural problems become 
apparent, and perhaps it is only possible to hazard an opinion to the effect that ; 
the economies which continue to focus attention primarily on the domestic market 
seem to have had relatively more success in coping with the cost of the adjustment 
as regards the distribution of the losses incurred by real wages; but this is 
demonstrable only within the framework of a broad scale of variations. 
Bearing in mind that unemployment rates and real wages seem to depend on an 
appreciable extent upon the level of activity and the degree of openness of the 
economies, differences are to be expected among the Latin American countries with 
regard to the first two indicators. These differences-may be accentuated by 
government policy, .in the field of wages and employment and by the growth of the 
labour force. 
Moreover, negative effects on employment have been especially serious in 
countries wherethere has been a slump in construction, given this sector's 
well-known influence on employment. This happened, for example, in Chile, Costa-
Rica and Uruguay, where the percentage of overt unemployment notably increased. 
Even in Argentina the corresponding percentage, which was very low in the past, v 
rose from 2.2% in 1980 to 5.2% in 1982. The effect is also more striking in 
countries where the urban sector is preponderant; in those where the rural sector 
carries great deal of weight, unemployment is relatively less in evidence. 
5. The public finance and budget situation and 
the acceleration of inflation 
The crisis has been accompanied by major financial disequilibria which have 




External, indebtedness, on a scale urikown since the Second World War, became 
prevalent in most, of the sectors of production. ,. The way in which financing was 
transferred to the countries did not follow a common pattern. Above all, there 
were differences with respect to the domestic agent who received the loan: in 
some instances it was mainly the State, in other® the private sector. In the 
latter .case , there were also disparities in the .percentage of such borrowing that 
was guaranteed by the public sector. 
The transfer of external financing to the domestic agents was effected in 
all sorts of ways. On some occasions the dollar or some other foreign currency 
was adopted as "Hie unit of calculation; on others, the exchange risk was absorbed 
by the .State or the financial middlemen. The rate of interest, too, was subject 
to diverse arrangements. Sometimes it was directly transferred to the.users, in 
other cases it was fixed by the domestic financial middlemen, as a result of 
which it was a good deal higher than the external rates. Lastly, in many 
instances the State subsidized users, lowering the rates of interest. 
With regard to domesti9 financing policies, too, the situation varied 
widely. In many countries systems, were introduced whereby loan contracts 
contained clauses tying the debts to foreign currencies, ,which meant that they 
were subject to the exchange risk. Loans in domestic currency were a 1 8 0 granted 
on all kinds of different terms, ranging from high real interest rates and credits 
readjustable in accordance with inflation, to negative real rates. Thus, 
financial systems, on the outbreak of the crisis, depended in very dissimilar 
ways and degrees on the „exchange rate and the external rate of interest. 
. The financial crls.ig caused particularly serious disruptions in countries 
that had adopted a neoliberal position in their external economic relations and 
above all in their financial relations, or in those in which this attitude did 
not prevail but a high percentage of the external debt corresponded to the 
private sector, a^d was not guaranteed by the State. In 1982 many private groups 
whose size made them of national significance were in a state of virtual bankruptcy; 
and notwithstanding the liberal policy -supported by both the internal and the 
external groups affected, they themselves"exerted pressure on the public sector 
to take charge of the situation. The numerous formulas' adopted to this end 
were reflected in heavy pressure on the budget and reductions in the level of 
external reserves. To cope with these pressures, the government had to guarantee 
/internal and 
- 45 -
internal and external renegotiations and to increase public outlays in order to 
settle serious financial imbalances. When the latter step was taken, the outlays ; 
in question greatly accelerated inflation or enforced the curtailment of other :•. 
expenditure, with undesirable effects on the social and production sectors. 
Paradoxically, in many countries high domestic interest rates, devaluations 
of the currency and other adjustment measures, while creating grave problems for 
most of the sectors, have transferred far from negligible resources to other 
groups. The boom in the foreign exchange markets, both official and parallel* 
to be noted in many countries; or the sums deposited in the banks at high real 
rates of interest, betray the possession of abundant funds by private-sector 
groups. The liquidity existing in the hands of this sector and the potential 
impact of its transfer from one use to another imposes severe constraints on the 
definition and implementation of policies implying alterations in exchange rates . 
or rates of interest. 
In these circumstances an almost unmanageable internal financial situation 
has been created: the economic agents try to transfer their financial burdens 
to others, looking mainly to the public sector. The pressure on public expen-
diture, real or financial, is stepped up precisely when unemployment and the fall 
in real wages might call for the public sector to come to the aid of the lower 
income groups, upon whom the effects of the crisis today are bearing much harder 
than on the rest. 
In many countries this state of affairs was superimposed upon public 
expenditure policies which, since before the Crisis, had been resulting in 
heavy deficits financed by internal and external borrowing. Deserving of special 
mention in this respect is the behaviour of public enterprises, which in some 
countries have played a central role in the trans formation of production and in 
economic growth. 
It goes without saying that the financial disequilibria that preceded and 
followed the crisis, together with the struggle of the economic agents to 
transfer them to other socio-economic sectors, have helped to speed up inflation. 
/Ap from 
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As from 1981 inflation accelerated in the region, mOuntirig from 53% in ; 
1980 td 61%, 86% and 130% in the three-year period 1981-1983 (see' table 8). 
This acceleration has not been very intensive inmost of the Caribbean and 
Central American economies. In contrast, in some countries where inflation has 
traditionally been'moderate, such as Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador, in 1982 
it'verged on 300%, 80% "and 66%, respectively. 
The highest rates of inflation have occurred in the countries of largest 
economic and demographic size. In Argentina, the rate of inflation, which was • 
about 200% in 1982, virtually doubled in 1983. In Brazil it rose in the Same 
years from 100% to 175%, and in Mexico it remained at around 100%, despite a 
slight downward movement in 1983. In Peru and Uruguay, too, rates of inflation 
accelerated sharpiy; the former exceeded 120% in 1983, and the latter soared 
from 20% in 1982 to 62% in 1983. : 
It should be noted that in several countries the acceleration of inflation 
actually coincided with a contraction in économie activity and an increase in 
unemployment and underemployment, inflation appeared alongside adjustment 
policies directed towards the curtailment of éxpèhditure and éven, in sane 
instances, the réduction' of nominal wages. Currency devaluations, difficulties 
in maintaining previous sources of financing and the efforts of the agents of 
production to transfer the burden of the recession seem to have influenced the 
speeding-up of the inflationary process. 
The panorama thus outlined cannot but arouse concern, Since at a time when 
it is essential to bring about a recovery of production and employment, policies 
have to cope with serious financial and budget imbalances. ' Attempts to eliminate 
or reduce this disequilibrium by méaris of further curtailments of economic 
activity might lead to rates of unemployment and to an income distribution 





LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
(Variations from December to December) 
Countries 197.5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Latin America a/ 57, J3 62, ,2_ 40. ¡0 39, £ 54, .JL 52, J L 60, 85_ •Ä 
Countries with traditionally 
high inflation 68. .9 74. •47. ÜL' 45, LZ 61. â. •61, 71, 102, .8 
Argentina 334, .9 347, .5 150. .4 169. .8 139, .7 87, .6 131, .2 2Ò9 .7 Bolivia 6, ,6 5. .5 10, .5 13. .5 45, .5 23 .9 25, .2 296 .5 Brazil 31. .2. 44, .8 43. .1 38, .1 76, .0 86, .3. 100, .6 101 .8 
Colombia d/ 17, ,9 25. .9 29. .3 17, .8 29 .8 26, .5 27, .5 24 .1 
Chile 340. .7 174. .3 63. .5 30, .3 38. .9 31, .2 9, .5 20, .7 
Mexico 11. .3 27. .2 20. .7 16, .2 20. .0 29. .8 28. .7 98. .8 
Peru 24. 0 44. .7 32. .4 73. .7 66. .7 59. .7 72. .7 72, .9 
Uruguay 66. 8 39, .9 57. .3 46, .0 83. .1' 42. .8 29. .4 20, .5 
Countries with traditionally 
moderate inflation 8. J_ r. J} , 8, JB 9, J . 20, JL; 15. 14. J L i L 
Barbados 12. .3 3. ,9 9, .9 11, .3 16, .8 16. .1 12. ,3 6, .9 
Costa Rica 20, .5 4. .4 5, .3 8, ,1 13. .2 17, .8 65. .1 81, .7 
Ecuador tl . 13. 2 13. .1 9, .8 11, .8 9, .0 14, .5 17. .9 24, .3 
El Salvador 15. ,1 S. .2 14, ,9 14, .6 14, ,8 18, .6 U . .6 13 .8 
Guatemala 0. .8 18, .9 7, .4 9. .1 - 13. .7 9. .1 . 8. .7 -2, .0 
Guyana 5. ,5 9. ,2 9. .0 20. .0 19. .4 8: .5 29. .1 
Haiti -0. ,1 . -1. 4 5. .5 5. .5 15. ,4 15, .3 16. ,4 -1. ' u / 
Honduras 7. 8 • 5. 6 7. 7 5. .4 18. ,9 15. ,0 9. .2 : 9. .4 
Jamaica 15. ,7 8. .3 14, ,1 49. .4 19. 6 28. ,6 4. ,8 7. .0 
Nicaràgua 1. 9 6. .2 io. ,2 . 4. .3 • 70. .3 24. .8 •23. .2 H, 2 
Panama 1 . ,4 4. 8 4. ,8 5. .0 10. .0 14. ,4 4. ,8 3, .7 
Paraguay 8. .7 3. ,4 9. .4 . 16. 8 351 J 8, ,9 • 15. ,0 . ,. 4. 2 
Dominican Republic 16. ,5 7. 0 8. 5 1 . 8 26, ,2 4. 2 7. .4 7, ;l Trinidad and Tobago 13. 4 12. ,0 11. 4. 8. .8 19. ,5 16. .6 11. ,6 10. ,8 . 






















Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, November 1982, and official data 
supplied by the countries. 
a/ The totals for Latin America and the partial figures for groups of countries correspond to the average 
country variations, weighted by the population in each year, 
b/ Variation between November 1983 and November 1982. 
c/ Variation between October 1983 and October 1982. 
A! Up to 1980 corresponds to.the variations in the Manual Workers* Price Index; from 1981 onwards to the 
variation in the National Total, which includes workers and employees, 
e/ Corresponds -to: the variation between July 1983 and July 1982. 
II Up to 1982 corresponds to the variation in the Consumer Price Index in the city of Quito, and in 1983 to 
that of the National Total. 
j>/ Corresponds to the variation between August 1983 and August 1982. 
h/ Corresponds to the variation between April 1983 and April 1982. 
i! Corresponds tô the Variation between September 1983 and September 1982. 
j/ Corresponds to the variation between June 1983 and June 1982. 
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B. TRADE IN BASIC COMMODITIES AND MANUFACTURES AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER AREAS 
1. Basic commodities 
a) Evolution of the international market 
The main feature of the present economic situation is the spectacular drop 
observed in commodity prices on the international market. The downward trend 
which began as from the last quarter of 1980 is different from previous trends in 
that it has been more prolonged and widespread, affecting both the minerals and 
metals sector and that of agricultural raw materials and almost the whole range 
of foodstuffs and beverages. 
: An idea of the gravity of this fall can be gained by looking at the combined 
commodity price index prepared by UNCTAD,2/ which (if petroleum is excluded) shows 
a drop of 16.1% in 1982 after a decline of 15.6% in 1981 (measured in current 
dollars). This total drop of over 30% is the biggest in the last twenty years. 
Furthermore, even though this may be attributed partly to the strengthening of 
the dollar with respect to other convertible currencies, there was also a very 
significant contraction in prices in terms of SDRs, with declines of 7.5% and 
10.5% in 1981 and 1982, respectively. 
This drop in prices is even more serious if considered in terms of constant 
dollars. The real prices of a considerable number of products in 1982 were less 
than..-half the levels reached in 1950, and some of them did not even reach the 
level of the 1930s. 
The drop in prices may be attributed fundamentally to the stagnation and 
later reduction of industrial production and real income as a result of the world 
economic recession, which helped to weaken import demand for these products; to 
the substantial reduction in stocks (which is due in turn to the unprecedented 
levels of interest rates and the reduction in demand), and to the appearance of 
production surpluses resulting from the investments made during the previous 
period of high prices. The present market prices of many primary commodities are 
below their production costs. 
In addition to the immediate causes, there are other long-standing factors 
which have contributed to the present crisis. Over the long term, the demand for 
primary commodities has grown only slowly, because the amount of materials used 
/per unit 
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per unit of production has been reduced as a result of technological advances; the 
proportion of final expenditure accounted for by the actual product itself has 
gone down because of the increase in the importance of publicity, packaging and 
other services; the demand for natural raw materials has been restricted as a 
result of the invention of synthetic materials, and there has been a reduction in 
demand as a result of the increased protection of national agriculture in the OECD 
countries. 
At thè same time, the supply of primary commodities has shown an upward 
trend, since the developing countries have needed to increase their volume of 
exports in order to increase their foreign exchange income. This situation, which 
generates an excess of supply in the long run, creates a downward trend in prices. 
In overall terms, for the developing countries as a whole, it is estimated 
that the drop in basic commodity prices has led to a shortfall in export income 
of around US$ 8 billion in 1981 and almost US$ 13 billion in 1982.3/ 
b) The situation in Latin America 
In order to appreciate the dependence of the Latin American countries on 
their basic commodity exports it is only necessary to consider that, although the 
relative importance, of the latter went down in the last decade, they still 
represent around 80% of the, total value of Latin American exports (or, if fuels 
are excluded, around 40%). 
It is for this reason that the performance of this sector, from the point 
of view of the volume of basic commodities exported and the prices obtained, f i 
carries considerable weight in the economies of the countries of the;region 
(see table 9, which presents an overall view of the evolution of the;main basfc 
commodity export prices for Latin America). ' 
The repercussions of the drop in the prices of the region's basic commodities 
may be appreciated from the index of prices for the main basic commodity exports 
of Latin Anerica prepared by ECLA on the basis of the international prices of; 
these goods in the first ¡two quarters of 1983. This quarterly index covers the 
24 main commodities exported by the region (26 if petroleum and petroleum products 
are included). The weightings assigned to the three commodity groups making up 
Latin America's exports: were calculated taking into account the average value of 
exports of these items in the period 1979-1980. Thus, if petroleum is excluded 
, t 
' /Table 9 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(Dollars at current prices) 
Annual averages Growth rates 
Unrefined sugaci 
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12.8,. . 8.1 7.8 ; 9.7 28.7 16.9 8.4 8.4 -3.7 24.4 195.9 -41.1 -50.3 -
121.8 240.2. 185.2 183.4 178,8 V 1̂ 5.3 . 148.6 137.9 22.9 -1.0 -2.5 . -18.7 2.3 r7.2 
' 86.3 172.Ö 154.4 ; 149.̂  118.1 9«.2- 79.0 93.6 10.2 -3.2 -21.0 -20.2 -16.1 18.5 
11.8 14.0 1-5.7.. .15.7, 18,9 19.2; 18.4' . 21.5̂ / -2.1 13.9 21.2 • 1.6 -4.2 16.8 
125.1 105.6 131.9 r- 164.4 177.4 178.5 163.0. 162,0 • 24.9 24.6 7.9 0.6 -8.7 -0.1 
127.5 114.4 132.5'. 154.8 210.3 181.0 137.4 .155.9 15.8 16.8 35.9 -15.9 -24.1 -13.5 
82.2 .68.4 97.1 ; 130.9'- 125Ì9 112.2 108.4 111 42.0 3Ì.8 -10.9 -3.4 2.7 
354.7. 454.0 410.0 j. ¡595.0; 504.0 468.0 353.0 439.8 .. -9.7 -3.7 27.6 -"• -7.1 -24.6 : 24.6 
232.4 280.0 268.0 298.0, 296.0 288.0 245.0 268,2 -4.3 , 11.2 -0.7 . -2.7 -14,9. . 9.5 
61.2 73.9 72.9 : ;77.4' 94;è - 85.8 • 72.8 82.0j>/ -1.4 6.2 a,7 rr.15.2 ,12.6 
131.5 153.6 157.4 .j, 190.$ 194.5 178.2 154.6 144.8 2.5- 21.0 2.1 -8.4 -13.2 -6.3 
69.6 .• 59<3 61.9 C' 90.0 98,6 79.0 67.2 74,9 .'. •4.4 45.4 9.6 : -19,9 --14.9 11.5 
3.9- . 5.8 7.0 7.6 6.4 5.8" - 5.9 18.4 2Ó.7 8.6 -15.8 . -7.8 1.7 
ie.3' 20.2 ' 19.7 :•"•' 24.0 28.9 25.9 - 27.1; 25.2Ì/ -2.5 .21.8 20.4 . -10.4 4.6 -6.6 
25. 3 '.:' 28.0 29.9 ,. 54.6 41.1 33.0 24.8' - 19.6 6.8 82.6 -24,7 -19.7 24.8 -21.0 
29.7" 26.7 26.9 33.6 24.6 ; 38.4. 33.8 ' 3Ì.3 0.7 24.9 3,0 11.0 -12.0 -1.5 
103.5 -134.8 138.4 152.6 212.5 216.3 ! 208.3 '•iejid/''. 2.7 10.3 39.3 " 1.8 -YÒ -11.9 
10.0 '•12.4 12.7 17.0 28.7 32.5 : "53.5; 29.6 
-i 
; 2.4: 33.9 68*8 .. 1 3 ° 2 3.-4 -11.6 
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Souree:UHCTAP, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Supplements 1960-1980 and Vol. IH, Ho. 2, February 1983; International Monetary Fund, International 
Lf.inahcial Statistics, Yearbooks 1981 and vai. XXXVI, No. 8 August 1985. 
Note: Unrefined ;sùgar, FOB Caribbean ports, for export to the frfee market; Coffee, Colombia mild .'arabica, free alongside ship, Hew York; Cocoa beans, 
ayeragé of daily prices (futures), New York/London; Central American Bananas,, CÌF Hàmburg; Cotton, Mexican M 1-3/32", CIF Northern Europe; Wool, 
cl$an'j.; combed,.;50*s,. quality, United Kingdom (New Zealand Wool Marketing Cofrp.i,Clac}»n-on-Sea, England); Beef, frozen and boneless, from all 
sources, United Spates ports; Fish meal,' from ali sources, 64-69$ protein, CIT Hamburg; Wheat, United States, No. 2, Hani Red Winter* FOBf 
Maize,'{Argentina, CIF North $ea ports; Soya,' United States,No.2, yellow, in bidk, CÌF Rotterdam; Copper, cash payment quotations on thè London 
Metal Exchange, electrolytic copper .in bars;. Tin,cash payment quotations on the London Metcfl. Exchange; Iron ore, Canada, Mount Wright, Co 
FE, CIF' North Sea ports;. Lead, bash payment quotations on the London Metal Exchange $ Zinc, .cash payment quotations on the Londbn Metal.jExchange; 
Bauxite, Guana (Baltimore); Petroleum, Saudi Arabia (Ras Tanurà), Venezuela (Tia Juana), 
jJ"Dollar cents per pound. L, ' . . 
J1/ Average for January-August. 
c/ Dollars per ton. ; • " ".-• 
d/ Dollars per pound. 
e/ Dollars per barrel. 
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the relative weights are as follows: food and beverages, 57.1% (tropical zone 
products,48.4% and temperate zone products, 8.6%); agricultural raw materials, 
20.8%, and minerals and metals,22.2%.4/ 
According to these calculations, prices in -the food and beverages group as 
a whole fell by 32% in the period 1980-1982. The tropical products subgrovp, 
which comprises such products as sugar, bananas, coffee and cocoa, registered a 
drop of 34%, while the temperate zone products subgroup,, including such products 
as wheat, maize and meat, dropped by 24%. The index corresponding to the group of 
agricultural raw materials, which includes such products as cotton, wool, hides 
and skins, soya bean oil and fish meal, fell by 16%. Minerals and metals also 
dropped (by 23%). For the 24 commodities as a whole, the index registered a 
decline of 27% between 1980 and 1982. In the case of petroleum and petroleum 
products, the index was 10% higher in 1982 than in 1980, but suffered a serious 
decline with respect to 1981. 
It should be noted that the food and beverages sector, which is of 
fundamental importance for the countries of the region, suffered the sharpest 
fall. It is also worth noting that, compared with the basic commodity prices of 
other developing regions, Latin America was most seriously affected by the grave 
crisis suffered by this sector. 
Analysis of the price index prepared by ECLA (excluding petroleum) for the 
first quarter of 1983 indicates a rise of approximately 2.4% compared with the 
last quarter of 1982, although additional drops continued to be noted in the 
prices of certain products such as raw sugar, coffee, wool, zinc and bauxite. 
If the calculation is expanded to include petroleum, the price of which fell on 
the international market, then the index would have gone down by 1.5%. 
In the second quarter of 1983, the index (excluding petroleum) continued 
its general upward trend, although.this was only moderate, and an increase of 
4.2% was registered. This phenomenon may be attributed principally to reactivation 
of demand on the United States market: on the one ;hand, which was reflected in 
increases in stocks, and to the bad weather conditions which led in a number, of 
countries to a reduction in crops of soya beans, cocoa, sugar, cotton and 
bananas. It should be noted, however, that this increase in the prices of the 
main basic commodities was offset by the drop in the price of petroleum. If 
/petroleum is 
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petrolëum Is included 'in the ECLA index, it is ëeen that Latin" America'suffered•••• 
an ovèrall drop of 4.9% in the second quarter of 1983 compared with thè first •; 
quarter. 
In the third quarter of 1983, there was an increase of 2.4% compared with 
the previous quarter for the index-including petroleum and petroleum products ' 
(2.3% if petroleum and petroleum products are excluded), tt should be noted that 
the generài rise in the index in this quarter was due above all- to'" Increased in 
the prices of agricultural raw materials* (especially oottoh and soyabéan oli) ' 
and petrbleutó products. Over "(he same period, however-, there were Significant 
drops'in the minerals and metals sector (copper,'tin, "iron ore) and in tropical 
and temperat^-zone foodstuffs (bananas, wheat ànd beef). 
ih terms ó'f constant dollarè, basic oommodity prices followed their downward 
trend iii the first nine months of 1983 (séè table 10). The terms of trade of ' 
these basic commodities, which had dropped by 14% in 1982 compared With the >ear 
before, continued their deterioration in 19Ò3cwith respect to the unit value of 
the manufactures exported by thè developed countries to the developing countries. 
Consequently, it may be stated that although the rise in basic commodity 
prices in the first nine-months of 1983 was apositivè element, it had only à 
marginal impact on the Latin American economies. It is worth noting that the 
average price level for théëe products continued to be around 20% belcw that 
registered in 198Ò. " r 
c) The impact of the crisis on export income 
Because of thè sharp drop in basic commodity prices, there was à considerable 
decline in the export income of all producers. The Situation is particularly 
serious for' Latin America because of its dependence ori exports of these products. 
In some caSes, the drop in iri corné was dué'nòt only to the réduction in interna-
tional pricés but also to a decline in the voiume exported. In othèrs, the 
bigger volume èxportèd only partiàlly offset the drop in prices. This situation 
has considerably reduced the ' region 's capacity to face up to its heavy debt 
servicing commitments, While at the same time it has affected investments in this 
sector, which will undoubtedly have sérious consequences in the longer term: both 
for the producer and the consumer coùntriès.- ^ • 
' /Table 9 
Table 10 
LAIIN AMERICA« PRICE MOVEMENTS EXPRESSED IN DOLLARS AT 
CONSTANT PRICES FOR THE MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS!/ 
(Dollars at constant 1980 prices) 
1970-
1980 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 19835/ 1978 1979 4980 1981 1982 19835/ 
Unrefined sugar 20.8 11.6 9.4 10.5 28.7 17.7 9.0 8.7 .-18.2 10.7 174.1 -38.1 -49.1 -3.3 
Coffee 190.1 342.2 223.7 198.5 178.8 152.7 159.4 143=4. -34.6 -11.3 -9.9 -14.6 4.4 -10.0 
Cocoa 130.1 244.9 186.4 161.6 118.1 98.9 . 84.8 97.3 -23.9 13.3 T26.9 -16.2 -14.3 14.7 
Bananas 19.7 20.0 16.6 17.0 18.9 20.2 19.7 :22.4 -16.8 2.3 11.0 7.1 -2.4 13.7 
Wheat 208.7 150.4 159.2 178.0 177.4 187.5 174.9 168.4 5.9 11.8 -0.3 5.7 -6.8 -3.7 
Maize . 213.6 163.0 160.0 167.5 210.3 190.1 147.4 162.1 -1.8 4.7 25.5 -9.6 -22.5 10.0 
Beef 142.4 97.5 117.2 141.7 125.9 117.8 116.3 115.8 -20.3 -20.9 -11.2 -6.4 -1.3 -0.1 
Fishmeal: 606.6 646.7 9̂5.2 427.5 504.0 491.6 378.8 457.3 -23.4 -13.7 -17.9 -2.5 -23.0 20.7 
Soya 394.6 398.9 323.7 322.5 296.0 302.5 . 262.9 278.9 -18.9 -0.4 -8.2 2.2 -13.1 6.1 
Cotton 101.1 105o2 88.1 . 83.8 94.2 90.1 78.1 85.3 -I6.3 -4.9 12.4 -4.4 -13.3 9.2 
Wool 217.2 218.8 190.1 206.2 194.5 187.2 165.9 150.6 -13.1 8.4 -5.6 -3.8 -II. 4 -9.2 
Copper 124.2 84.5: 74.7 ' 97.4 98.6 83.0 72.0 77.9 -11.6 30.4 : 1.2 -15.8 -13.3 8.2 
Tin 6.0 7.0. . 7.1 7.6 7.6 6.7 6.2 6.1 1.0 7.6 0.3 -11.4 -7.4 -1.6 
Iron ore 30.8 28.8 23,8 26.0 28.9 27.2 29.0 26.3 -17.3 9.3 11.3 -6.2 7.0 -9.3 
Lead 40.3 39.9 36.2 59.1 41.1 34.6 26.6 20.4 -9.4 63.3 -30.4 : -15.8 -23.3 -23.2 
Zinc 50.9 38.1 32.5 36.4 34.6 40.3 36.2 34.6 -14.6 11.9 * -5.1 16.8 -10.1 -4.4 
Bauxite 160.9 192.1 167.2 . 165.2 212.5 227.2 223.6 190.9' -13.0 -1.2 28.6 ' 7.0 -1.6 -14.6 
Crude petroleum 
Saudi Arabia 14.2 . 17.7 15.3 18.4 . 28.7 34.1 35.9 30.8 -13.6 20.3 56.0: 18.8 5.3 -14.2 
Venezuela 14.3 ; 17.7 15.0 18.1 27.6 33.6 34.4 29.5 -15.2 21.0 52.1 21.9 2.1 -14.2 
Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Supplements 1960-1980 and vol. III. No. 2, February 1983; International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, Yearbooks 1981 and vol. XXXVI, No. 8 November 1983. 
a/ Deflated by the index of the unit value of exports of manufactures (SITC, chapters 5 to 8) from developed countries to developing countries, on a CIF basis. 
The estimated deflator for 1983 is based on data supplied by the World Bank in a six-monthly review of estimated commodity prices, June 1983. 
bj Includes.only the period January-June 1983. In the case of bauxite and petroleum, only February-May. 
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Although no definitive global figures are yet available for thé Latin 
American countries for 1982, the following examples, will illustrate, the conse-
quences of the drop in international prices for the export income of certain 
countries. • ' 
Thus, the value of exports of Argentine meat went down by around 16% in 1982 
with respect to 1980, :although the volume of exports grew by over .13%., If the 
unit value in 1982 had been the same as that registered in 1980, the export income 
would have gone up by over US$ 275 million (equivalent to 35% of Argentina's 1982 
exports of this product). 
In the case of Brazilian coffee, the 1982 ejqport income from this product 
was 25% below that of 1980. This contraction may be attributed mâinly. tp the 
decline in the unit value, which was 33% lower in 1982 than it had been in 1980. 
This decline in income reflects the incidence of the drop of pricesands not the 
volume exported. If the unit value of 1982 had maintained .the 1980 level, rthe 
income from coffee would haye increased by over US$ 950 million in 1982, equi-
valent to over 50% of the total value of exports of coffee in that year. ; , 
In Colombia, the 1982. export income from coffee was 34% below the 1980 
level. If the unit value ip 1982 had been the same as in 1980, the export Income 
would have been over US$ 320 million higher: equivalent to 20% of total Colombian 
coffee exports in 198?. ; 
In Chile, the volume of copper exports in 1982 was 16% higher than in 1980, 
! : 
but the unit value was 30% 'lower, so that it is estimated that the net export 
income generated by this prjoduct fell by 20%. If the unit value of 1980 had been 
maintained in 1982,. this income would have been US$ 760 million higher: équivalent : • ' j 
to 44% of Chilean copper exports in; 19 82, 
Income frail' tin in Bolivia suffered a severe con trac tien of approximately 
US$ 100 million in 1982 (36% of the total value of tin escorts in that year), 
due fundamentally to the ¡drop in the unit value of the country's tin exports to 
a level estimated to Ée between 20% and 30% lower than that of 1980, 
These examples Clearly show the conseqùenoes of the drop in basic oommodity 
prices for the economies of the countries of the region. Because of the ; importance 
and significance these products have for Latin America, it is difficult to see 
how it will be possible to emerge from the present economic crisis unless there 
is a substantial reoovery in this sector. It is therefore essential that the 
/countries of 
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countries of the region should lose no time in joining forces and co-ordinating 
their action with a view to enhancing the value of their basic commodities on the 
international market, defending their prices and seeking to organize and exert 
greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the consumer countries. Overcoming the present 
difficult problems suffered by the basic coranodities sector is undoubtedly a 
complex matter, but it is a vitally important challenge for the countries of Latin 
America which they must face up to right now. 
2. Manufactures 
The value of the trade in manufactures 5/ of Latin America 6/ increased over the 
period 1975-1980 at an.average annual rate of 23.5% until it reached a total value 
of US$ 19 857.3 million in 1980, or 20% of the total exports of goods of the 
region. There, was substantial growth in exports by the engineering industry 
(mainly transport equipment and .non-electrical machinery), whose share in the total 
value rose to 27.3%. The main suppliers have been the three largest countries of 
the region (Argentina, Brazil.and Mexico), which supply almost 90% of the total. 
The group of intermediate goods (mainly chemicals and plastic products) represents 
around 30% of the region's exports of manufactures, and although its share has 
declined it continues to be the most important group in exports of manufactures. 
Non-durable consumer goods (above all footwear and clothing) increased their share 
to 24% despite the growing restrictions applied in the majority of the developed 
countries. The foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco sector represents around 18% 
of the total and has been one of the least dynamic sectors, since it includes 
processed agricultural products which are the subject of considerable protection 
in the markets of the developed countries. . 
Latin American escorts of manufactures go mostly to the markets of the 
industrialized countries (54%). Among these, the United States is the principal 
purchaser (it buys 30% of ttie total), followed by the,EEC with 15%. Only 2% goes 
to countries.with centrally-planned economies, while around 37% of exports of 
manufactures go to the Latin American market, with Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
accounting for 79% of these sales to the region. 
The regional groupings also play an important role: exports of manufactures 
among the member countries of ALADI in 1980 represented 33% of total exports of 
manufactures by the member countries, while the intra-area exports of the Central 
/American Common 
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American Common. Market were much more important, since a.proportion of close to 
80% of the total manufactures escorted by the five member countries went to other 
countries in the same grouping,, . 
It is; worth noting that .imports from Latin America represented in 1980 only 
1,8% of /the total' mantof açtures imported by the industrialized countries. The 
sali®, percentage had already been reached in 1978, reflecting the „growing obstacles 
which have to be faced by esçorts of Latin American manufactures in those countries. 
The Latin American export manufacturing sector was the only one which 
increased its share in the value of'WOTld'exports during the last decade. This 
source of growth !ifor the region sèéms to have lost its dynamism in the ¿arly .years 
of thè present decade^ however. As a result of the international eœncmic crisis 
and, above alii as a cohséq[uéhce of the reaction of the industrial countries to 
that crisis , which has'beeii reflected in a cànsideràblè; increase in the tfëal» level ; 
of protectionism, the Latin American trade in exports of*manufactures did not. . 
increase at all in 1981 aid suffered a clear sètba<3c in 1982, 
In order to illustrate thé more recent situation,-let us analyse the case •••• 
of the three largest countries in thè region {Brazily Mexico and Argentina), for 
which preliminary statistical data are available and whose'exports of manufactures 
represent, together, about* 80% Of the regional total;'.' 
In 1982, Brazil's exports of manu factures reame to US$ 10 352 million, that 
is to say, 13% less than ihe figure for the year'before. In 1980 and 1981,.in 
contrast, Brazil's exports of manufacturés had registered increases of 35,9% and 
31,6% respectively,?/ ; r-r.-•:,„• 
In the case of Argentina; the Situation was somewhat different, since that 
country's exports of manufactures did not-go down in terms, of current values, 
althou^i the increase in 1982 Wises only 1,2% compared with 10% in 1981 and .21,6% 
in 1980,8/ 
In 1982, Mexico's exports of manufactures went down by 7.6% compared with , 
the previous year's figuré, while in 1981 the increase had been -only 1. 3%.9/ 
In spite" of the cOmpatative advantages enjoyed by some Latin American . 
countries in an increasing number of markets" of in dus tri aKze ¿countries, exports 
of manufactures have suffered from the, ill-effects of the protectionist measures 
applied by! W e latter coxintries. Exports of manufactures to the-.international 
market forirr'the potentially most dynamic part of total exports., - and indeed it is.;, 
- /essential to 
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essential to escort in this way, because this is required by the industrialization 
process. Latin America cannot renounce to this process, because it will be a key 
element in its future economic and social development. For these reasons, the 
region must exploit and promote to the maximum the new possibilities for trade 
with other developing countries and take full advantage of the Latin American 
market itself, the importance of which for manufactures has been growing with the 
passage of time. Furthermore, the region's exports continue to include a 
relatively low proportion of manufactured goods, and it is essential to increase 
this proportion in order to expand the share in the most dynamic categories of 
international trade and in order to give trade with the exterior a more balanced 
structure. To this end, Latin America must therefore develop joint bargaining 
power which will give it greater weight in international negotiations so that it 
can put across its own points of view to counterbalance the protectionist measures 
prevailing in the North. • 
3. Protectionism 
a) Background 
The use of protectionism as part of the trade policy of the industrialized 
countries has been one of the most outstanding features of the international 
economy in recent years. It has been put into effect in very different forms and 
has had important effects cn the production and export of primary commodities and 
manufactures by Latin America. 
The exports of the region run into a broad and complex range of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in the markets of the industrialized countries. As. regards 
the former, special note should be taken of the negative impact of the sliding 
scale of tariffs applied according to the degree of processing of the products 
exported, which has constituted a very serious check on the regional industrial-
ization process. As regards the latter, mention may be made of quantitative 
restrictions on imports, variable surcharges, safeguard clauses, "voluntary" 
restrictions, discriminatory practices, countervailing duties, technical barriers 
to trade, and production and export subsidies. Protectionism has also been 
accentuated through other forms which take the shape of "agreements" between the 
parties, to which the countries of the region have been forced to submit as the 
only way of exporting to some developed countries (for example, the Multifibres 
Agreement signed within GATT). 
/The scope 
- 58 -
Thé scope and scale of these sets of protectionist measures can be 
appreciated when it is borne in mind that, according to calculations made by ECLA 
on the subject, in recent years -these measures have affected about half of the 
region's exports (excluding petroleum) to the United Statés, the European Community 
and. Jap ai. 
In practioe, the forms of protectionism referred to above, together with 
others which it would be too long to list here, have gradually chan'ged the previous 
situation so that the industrialized countries can how "manage" their trade with 
the developing countries in general and with Latin America in particular as it 
suits them best. Thus, they can proceed in a selective and sporadic manner, or, 
if necessary, apply these measures in a broader, more rigid and more frequent 
manner. Analysis shows that the domestic demand of these countries is increasingly 
satisfied, on apriority basis, from home production, while imports are used in 
a controlled manner to supplement domestic supply, 
b) New forms of protectionism 
Since the beginning of the present decade, the recession and the rapidly 
growing unemployment in the.industrialize^ countries, have encouraged the inten-
sification of ¡protectionist pressures* . This action has helped not only to ipake 
the application of : the existing barriers more rigid, but also to create new kinds 
of measures which, taken together, have constituted a very serious additional 
obstacle to the growth of international trade. 
The new protectionism has been characterized by . various aspects which are 
worth noting. Fir?t;of all, it hps evolved without paying much attention, to the 
rules and obligations which should be respected in international trade in line 
with the provisions of GATT. • Secqndly, it..is, essentially bilateral and has 
tended to. depart increasingly.: from the principle of multilateralism as away of 
solving the growing economic and trade problema, of the present time. Thirdly, 
it not only covers, restrictions and barriers applied to imports which cross the 
national frontier, but also extends, to external markets through the subsidies 
given to national ejçorts and industry by means of economic and administrative 
measures which tend to increase their capacity for competition and their 
comparative advantages* Fourthly., the level and nature of protectionism has been 
progressively escalated as a result of the veritable "trade war" going on between 
the industrialized countries. At the same time, thesemeasures have introduced 
/serious rigidities 
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serious rigidities into international trade as a whole and have affected very 
particularly the developing countries, which have been able to do very little 
to withstand these new restrictions. Protectionism has not only had a negative 
impact on the already depressed international trade, but has also had a special 
influence on the development strategies of many countries of the region. Fifthly, 
it has been reflected in the multiplication of agreements on voluntary limitation 
or "managed" or "regulated" trade, based on reciprocity in the strict sense. 
The new rules applied today to the trade in goods between countries, 
especially between the industrialized countries, are based on ooncepts foreign to 
the multilateral system. Among the concepts which have recently crane to the fore 
and are frequently applied it is worth noting the following: i) "unacceptable 
levels of market penetration" or "maximum market shares", which are concepts 
whereby the industrialized importing countries can limit imports from certain 
countries; ii) "minimum viable production", which permits the reservation of a 
particular share of the domestic maricet for national industries; iii) "minimum 
import prices", whereby prices are fixed and any comparative advantage which 
... ' • _ -
imports from third countries could have over national production is eliminated; 
iv) "low cost production" or "undercutting", which is a concept enabling the 
industrialized countries to limit the advantages of exports from regions or 
countries where labour is cheap, etc. 
As already noted, as well as the measures of protection applied at the 
frontier, a number of other measures have been added which have had a decisive 
impact on the. possibilities open to various sectors of production for competing 
on the markets of industrialized countries. The aim of these measures is to give 
advantages to national industry and agriculture both on the local market, 
vis-a-vis imports from third oountries, and on the external market, in order to 
maintain or expand existing markets or to penetrate into new ones. The role and 
participation of the State have been vital in this respect, although in government 
declarations some countries of the North maintain different theses. Action has 
been taken through specific financial and administrative measures, among the most 
widespread of which are: reductions of taxes and duties; cheap credit; manipulation 
of the exchange rate; help in encouraging the consolidation of inefficient 
industries into more solid groups; promotion, support and financing for such 
/activities as 
- 60 -
activities as pure and applied research; accelerated depreciation of. capital goods, 
and a whole range of direct and indirect' export assistance measures whiàh ihClùde, 
in particular, export subsidies. . - i 
This latter form of aid'has been Used frequently in the period 1980-1983» 
It is estimated -that the percentage of exports of manufactures which receive 
'subsidies, amounts to 13% in the United States', 25% in France, 42% in Japan and 51% 
in Great Britain. 10/ In the agricultural, sector, it is estimated that.much more 
than half the volume of world agricultural' trade depënds on ekport subsidies. In 
1982, such subsidies totalled around ÙS$ 11 billion for the United States and the 
European Economic Community togethèr. If production subsidies and other types of 
financial support to the agricultural sector are added, this figure rises to 
US$ 40 billion. 1 ,. 
c) The impact of protectionism on Latin America 
The objective of maintaining or improving the income of agricultural . 
producers in the industrialized countries has ccntinued to provide the governments 
of those covmtries' with arguments to justify ëvèr-incTeasing protection for their 
agricultural sectors. This has beèn achieved through a series of measures ranging 
from the establishment of guaranteed product support prioes" to a number of direct 
or indirect forms of assistance such' as the app li c âti ono f r es tri c ti ve measures 
at the frontier which tend to raise the world marfcet price of à product to the 
level of the domestic price. It is estimated thàt thé average level of'protection 
given to the agricultural products of the industrdaKzed:1oo\mtries is équivalent 
to more than three times the level of protection given to manufacturing. 
Protectionism "in the agricultural sector has been one of the 'toàin obstacles 
standing in the way of the dynamic expansion of production and trade in Latin 
America's basic commodities, especially those from the temperate zidné (cereals, 
meat, milk products, edible oils, sugar). The policies followed by soibe 
industrialized countries with the aim of ensuring self-sufficiency in this Sector 
have" seriously limited the markét access conditions far a substantial number of 
products. Moreover, the sUrplusés generated by the application of costly support 
policies are competing on the international market with the esçorts of efficient 
developing country producers and have further depressed price levels. Finally, 
the frequent use by the industrialized countries of export subsidy machinery to 
promote the sales of their pro ducts: has caused a definite setback to the developing 
/countries as 
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countries as regards their position on traditional markets and in some cases has 
even caused them to lose those markets. Ah example worth quoting in this 
connection is that of -the European Economic Community, which in the early 1970s 
was the main importer of beef and the second most important importer of sugar on . 
the international market but has now converted itself, since the beginning of the 
present decade, into the main free market exporter of sugar and the second most 
important world exporter of beef. The Uhited States, too, has recently introduced 
new restrictions on imports of meat and sugar. 
It is in the field of manufactures, however, that there has been the greatest 
intensification in protectionist tendencies and the greatest variety of restrictions 
have been imposed in recent years. In the textile sector, the Multifibres - : 1 ; . 
Agreement, which regulates international trade in these products, was extended 
from 1 January 1982 to 31 July 1986. The protocol extending this agreement-
includes provisions that further restrict international trade". It-has introduced 
the concept of limitations on imports of textiles and clothing from "dominant 
suppliers". At the same time, fresh limitations have been introduced in the 
bilateral agreements between signatory countries of the Agreement. 
In 1982, the international trade in steel and steel products continued to be 
subject to serious obstacles in the main industrialized countries. Imports by 
EEC countries were "tile subject of bilateral agreements limiting imports or 
agreements on prices. In the United States, internal pressures for a reduction 
in foreign competition also brought results. Thus, ceilings were established and 
the tariffs on imports of special steels, which are of great importance to Brazil, 
were increased. The international trade in motor vehicles has also been the 
subject of strict regulation since 1982. 
Various industrialized countries have introduced new restrictions can imports 
of products vdiich affect the region, especially in such sectors as leather goods 
and footwear, clothing, and electronic and similar products, thus seriously 
weakening the growth rate of exports. Likewise, because of the threat of increased 
protection, there has been a reduction in investment in activities oriented 
towards the export of manufactures in many countries of the region. Although it 
is difficult to measure the global repercussions of the increase in protectionism, 
this phenomenon nay be considered to be one of the main problems currently 
affecting international economic relations and it is standing in the way of a 
vigorous reactivation of the world econoiry, since it is applied not only to North-
South trade, but also to that between countries of thé North. ,'./i+. Latin 
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.Latin America and its economic relations with 
other geographical afreas 
So far, an effort has been made in this study to present a global picture of the 
effects of -the international crisis on Latin America, It now seems appropriate, 
however, to look more specifically at what has happened in the region's economic 
relations and especially its trade relations with the EEC, the United States of 
America and the member countries of the CMEA, on the one hand, and with the other 
developing regions on the other. In the case of the former, the reason is that 
these countries are very important in the trade relations of the Latin American 
countries, as well as being suppliers of technology, financing and technical 
assistance. In the case of the latter, the reason is that it is necessary to have 
a proper,conception of the future potential for trade exchanges and for increasing 
the mutual economic links in which so much hope has been placed, particularly in 
the present circumstances. 
a) The European Communities 
In trade relations between Latin America and the EEC, the characteristic 
feature, as already noted on other occasions, has continued to be the sluggish 
growth of the Community's market for Latin American exports. Thus, 26% of Latin 
America's exports went to the EEC in 1970, but in 1981 this proportion came to 
only 17.5%, 
. This phenomenon has been aggravated by the special structure of Latin 
American exports to the EEC, In recent years, barely one-eighth of 1hese exports 
has corresponded to manufactured goods, whereas the corresponding proportion for 
Latin American exports as a whole has been approximately 25%, 
At the sane time, the EEC's share in total Latin American imports has gpne 
down from 2-3,8%. in 1970 to 14,8% in 19.81, but gs almost 85% of the EEC's exports 
to Latin America consist of manufactures, the marked asymmetry in the trade in 
goods between the,.two areas is clear, . 
Latin Ameijix̂ i's pqsition is. particularly unfavourable as regards the EEC's 
trade policy, . This is because the set of measures which go to make up the overall 
protectionist policies of ,th$ EEC affect the region more than they affect other 
developed countries and Other developing regions. This protectionism is due 
mainly to the priority given Jay the Community, to the expansion -and even the 
incorporation of nesg mem£er_countries- and strengthening of its own Common Market, 
It may be recalled, in this respect, that half the external trade of the member 
countries of the Community is of an intra-regional nature. /Tram another 
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From another point of view, it should be mentioned that on account of the 
Falklands conflict which took place in 1982, the EEC's position with regard to 
Latin America has acquired a political dimension of a unilateral nature. In view 
of the ebanomic coercion measures adopted jointly by the member countries of the 
Community against Argentina, there-has been a suspension of the dialogue between 
the two regions. .-. • 
The EEC maintains some preferential trade régimes. Among thèm, special 
mention may be made of the preferences given by the Lomé Convention to the 
countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries) and the 
agreements with the member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
arid the countries of the Mediterranean area. Thus, an extensive area of trade 
preferences ha£ been gradually built up which divides the world" economy and 
adversely affects the principle of multilateralism in international economic 
relations. 
The' functioning of the Community's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
has not succeeded in solving the difficulties encountered by Latin American exports 
in gaining easier access to the EEC market, Qi the one hand, the changes made in 
the Community's system mainly favour the relatively less developed countries, and 
cn the other, the various limitations of the GSP applied by the EEC include in 
particular the exclusion of agricultural products and textiles. 
Furthermore, in addition to the existing limitations as regards beneficiary 
products and countries, there is the special watch kept over certain products, 
which provides for the suspension of preferential treatment whén a certain fixed 
quota is exceeded. 
As regards trade relations between Latin America and the EEC, the future 
picture seems likely to be one in which considerable difficulties will continue 
to exist and there will be few possibilities of any significant improvement in 
the short term. In view of this, it is obvious that the Latin American countries 
should organize themselves and make proper use of their bargaining power in order 
to prevent the discriminatory and protectionist tendencies mentioned above from 
continuing to spread and grow stronger in the future. 
/b) United 
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b) United States 
In spite of the various distorting eff ects caused by the world . 'recession 
since the beginning of the present decade, trade relations'with the ••United States 
have continued to be important for Latin America. The United States is clearly 
the main country in Latin America's trade exchangès, since approximately one-third 
of the region's exports go to this market (representing about 13% of the total 
imports purchased by the United States), while on the other hand almost one-third 
of Latin America's imports come from this country. 
Behind this apparent trade balance, however, there are Some important 
conditioning factors. Firstly, Latin America registers a persistent and 
significant trade'deficit ori thè reciprocal merchandise trade balance.' Secondly, 
in Latin America's exports to the Unitéd 'Statès the'¿hare of fuels has teen rising 
and is now. close to 50% of the total, to the prejudice'of basic ctomrtbdities -which 
have mainly been affected by the drop in their world prices- and Manufactures, 
which account for rather more than 20%. In contrast, it may be noted that around 
75% of the United States' exports to Latin America consist of manufáctures. 
The traditional asymmetry in the structure of the trade between Latin 
America and the United States has! bèen getting worse in recent years, ànd further-
more the maintenance of thè United States market's share in the region's exports 
has been possible almost entirely because of the increased salès of fuels from 
some Latin American'countries. " 
For this rèasòn ,' it will be necessary in the coming years to activate and 
strengthen the negotiations carried on by Latin America in the appropriate forums 
with a view to" solving thè persistent difficulties in its trade relations with 
the United States and combating the accentuation of protectionist tendencies 
observed in that country. Priority topics in this respect should include the 
reduction or suppressioh of" tariff barriers {sliding scales and dispersión of 
customs duties) and nón-tàriff barrièrs which hinder the access of latin America's 
exportable products to the United Stated market; the need for the Unitèd States 
to participate and collaborate in the ádbptióri of à éèt of measures to stabilize 
international commodity prices; and the expansion and more flexible àpplicatión 
of the United States' Generalized System of i^fi^encès! (GSP)/%specially in view 
of the imminent expiry (in 1985) of the present system. 
/Among the 
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Among the existing instruments5for^hindering the entry of some imported 
products, especially manufactures, into the United States marketi special mention 
may be made of the 1979 Trade Act which gave the President of that country 
discretion to make use of the so-called safeguard clause or to impose counters-
vailing duties to deal with the possible presence of export subsidies, depending 
on whether the respective exporting countries had signed or not the agreement on 
subsidies adopted at the Tokyo Pound held within GATT. It should be noted that 
although the adoption of this Act did help to make the non-tariff protection 
instruments more uniform and give them greater clarity, it did practically nothing 
to restrict their use and it consolidated a procedure which has had negative 
repercussions for the countries of Latin America. 
As regards the Generalized System of Preferences, it is essential .that-this 
should be renewed promptly and made permanent, and that it' shòuldj continue; to. be 
generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discrlmittàto*y-ias2originally4xnceiyed.In 
this respect, the countries of Latin Amèrica have put. forward various-important 
proposals for improving- the functioning of-thé• United 'States, GSEii Among these, 
special mention may be made of those regarding the elimination^ of the principle 
of sliding scales of duties';" the"need for the expansion of the: range of; products 
covered; the heed for greater flexibility in the procedures .necessary for. the 
inclusion of products considered to be of interest for the region ; the extension 
of the concept of "accumulative origin" to cover all systems of econome 
integration among developing covin tries, and the elimination of the "competitive 
need" clause or, at least, the modification of the limiting criterion of 50% and 
a substantial increase in the valuè of the minimum value clause, 
A recent event of considerable importance in the economic and trade policy 
of the United States vis-à-vis Latin America was the approval by Congress of a 
programme known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative. This Programme shows the 
United States' political concern over the situation in Central America and the 
Caribbean. The Initiative pursues three main lines of action: increasing trade 
through the reduction of tariff barriers, economic assistance, and investment 
incentives. 
A central element in the Initiative is the provision of free access, free 
from tariff duties for a period of 12 years, for the products exported by the . 
subregion to the United States. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this measure 
may be reduced by, inter alia, the exclusion of some countries and products 
/(such 
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(such àé-'t»xt!Î 1ercand-leather goods) from the benefits envisaged in the project, 
as well ais'the limitation;! on its, period of operation. 
Furthermore, the fact that it is left to the discretion of the country 
granting these advantages to decide.whether or not countries are eligible for 
benefits under these measures, depending on the.line followed by their policies,, 
introduces the possibility of discrimination against countries for non-trade 
reasons.' 
As regards allocations for emergency economic .assistance, the sum of 
US$ 350. million was approved for the first year. Finally, in order to promote 
United States investments in the Caribbean, tax reductions;.will be granted to 
United States investors in proportion; to the amount they,invest , in this subregion. 
c) •:v'The European'membfer, countries of the Council for-, ̂ utual Economic 
Assistàhee- OCMEA):- 11/ 
Ih • ïè'cent years, : trade between the Eastern European member countries, of 
CMEA' and the Eatihv.American countries has shown some positive features. Among the 
most important! of .thèse, mention may be made of the., .behaviour of imports by the 
European CMEA countries frota. Latin American. countrieŝ ,. the total value of which 
increased substantially over the period 1980-1982, .reaching an annual average of 
approximately US$ 4 billion; As regards GKEA; ̂ exports -to. Latin America, no similar 
proigresS'Was registered, and because of their. slow gppwth (.except in the case of 
exports to GidS'a) rtheir average level in 1980-1982, was. only around US$ 800 million 
per year. : • ' .. . . . . 
A global'appraisal of recent trends in trade .between the Eastern European 
member countries of CMEA and Latin America (excluding trade with,Cuba) reveals 
the following main features: a) the sharp imbalance between ejqports and imports 
has persisted (and recently.become more pronounced) -a. matter of undoubted 
importance "in view of the fact that the trade; policy objectives of the parties 
carrying out this trade ' include the achievement of. reasonably balanced mutual 
trade exchanges; b) the marked concentration of trade in .a, few Latin American 
countries (mainly Argentina and Brazil, and to a much seller extent Colombia 
and Peru) has been maintained and lately been intensified, while the trade with 
the other countries is characterized-by small; total amounts aid great instability; 
c) when It is" borne in mind that in re,cent years a substantial proportion of the 
increase in imports by the European CMEA -countries from Latiiv-America has corres-
ponded to purchases of cereals (and, to a: .lesser extent, bee£> in. Argentina, and 
/that the 
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that the level of these transactions is determined partly by the results of 
domestic production in the importing countries' (mainly the Soviet Union) and by 
the state of relations between: that country and the United Statesthere seem to 
be grounds for thinking that this recent expansion in trade lacks a sufficiently 
solid basis and depends rather, to a considerable-extent, on circumstantial . 
factors which may, or may not be repeated in the future, and d) finally, although it 
is true that progress has been made in the field of exports of Latin American 
manufactures to the Eastern European member countries of CMEA, their relative 
importance is still very small, they correspond almost entirely to the exports of 
only two countries (Argentina and Brazil), and their composition is inadequately 
diversified, since they consist mainly of products of traditional industries. 
From a broader point of view, it may be noted that the evolution of trade 
exchanges between the European CMEA member countries and Latin. America has been 
accompanied by evolution in the instruments and institutional machinery established 
between the countries of the two areas, especially as regards the negotiation of 
an extensive and varied system of traete agreements, payments agreements, lines of 
credit, and broader economic co-operation agreements designed to support the develop-
ment process of the participating countries. In most cases, under the terms of the 
trade agreements and economic co-operation accords which have been signed, joint 
government commissions are set up which serve asi channels of information and 
mechanisms for negotiation on specific aspects of the mutual relations. Although 
sufficient information and the necessary experience are not yet available for 
appraising the contribution made by these agreements to the economic development 
of the signatory countries, it .would appear that in a number of specific cases 
(including those of electrical equipment, fishing, hospital equipment and education 
and training) they have given satisfactory results which make these a premising 
form of co-operation. 
d) Co-operation among developing countries 
During thè 1970s, the true potential of economic links between the developing 
countries was madè clear. Thus, reciprocal trade grew rapidly f ran US$ 11 billion 
in 1970 to US$ 50 billion in 1975 and over US$ 143 billion in 1981. Total Third 
World exports increased their share from 20% in 1970 to 26% in 1981. At the 
same time, the relative importance of the market of the developing countries 
themselves is even greater in the case of their exports of manufactures, above all 
/as a 
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as a consequence of what is happening in the various intra-regional integration 
schemes whose trade is included ̂ within the above overall figures. 
As regards trade between Latin America, and the rest of the countries of the 
South, it may be noted that in' 1970 Latin American exports -to the rest of the 
other developing countries did- not exoeed. 2% of the total-exports of the region. 
Partly because of its incipient., nature, ;this trade ;has- gene.; through a period of 
rapid ̂ eĵ ansiorfi so that in 1981 it accounted for,, 6%-. of; the total, exports of the 
region, corresponding to ar total-of US$ 7 billion,, The share of manufactures, in 
the total, although it has been growing in recent years , was stiill .slightly -under 
22% in 1981, .•••:'• .•• 
Qn the other hand» trade between Latin America and the, rest of the developing 
world generated a deficit for the region. In 1981, this negative balance came to 
some US$ 9 billion, equivalent to 72% of 5the region's imports of fuels, which is 
the main category of products ¡responsible for the deficit. There was also a 
deficit of US$ 1 160 million m 'the trade in; manufactures, while Latin American 
imports came to US$ 2 600 million. Only in the category of foodstuffs and 
agricultural raw materials does Latin America show a, substantial surplus, amounting 
in 1981 to US$ 2.7 billion. 
: All this, seems to indicate that trade between Latin America and the other 
developing, countries has considerable, possibilities for growth in. the future. 
This- -impression is strengthened by the fact that,,compared with the total imports 
of the developing countries, (excluding theLatin.American ones), Latin- America's 
exports t© -these;:^ountries -continueto represent very low, albeit rising, percentages: 
in 198,1, for example, they did not even amqunt. t9;2-%, In contrast, the Lati^, American 
market has,a relatively ̂greater . importance -for the exports..of the other, developing 
countries (of which it-accounts for around .4%),-mainly.-because, of the big- •imports 
of fuels which the region makes from non-Latin American countries of the South. 
It must be acknowledged that there are important factors which unfavourably 
influence the possibilities of expanding trade between Latin America and the rest 
of the Third World. These include problems of limited exportable supply; problems 
of financing, transport and communications; the absence of tariff and no n-? tariff 
preferences; the weakness of the South-South trade links in comparison with the 
strength of those'between the countries of the South .and the industrialized centres; 
--,.- ,. .. /and the ,, -
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and the shortage of reliable and timely information. It will be necessary to 
eliminate these drawbacks progressively in order to expand and strengthen inter-
re gional trade. . 
It is only natural that in economic co-operation among developing countries 
there should be an important trade component. Thus, trade co-operation has always 
been present in the efforts made by the countries of the South to intensify their 
links and joint action. As far back-as the first Conference on Co-operation Among 
Developing Countries, held in 1976 in Mexico City, emphasis was placed on the need 
to carry out studies on this matter and especially on what has come to be termed 
the Global System of Trade Preferences. At subsequent international meètings on 
these matters -the United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among 
Developing Countries (Buenos Aires, 1978); the Fourth and Fifth Ministerial 
Meetings of the Group of 77 (Arusha, 1979 and Buenos Aires, 1983, respectively) and 
the High-Level Conference held in Caracas in 1981- these matters have been analysed 
in increasing detail and general principles, standards and specific procedures for 
the implementation of the various areas of economic co-operation have been 
established. 
There are many areas of possible co-opèration among the countries of the 
Third World, and all of them offer possibilities » Such co-operation must be seen 
as a process which requires time, however. If Látin América has had to make 
intensive efforts for a number of decades to strengthen the processes of 
co-operation and integration, it cannot be expected to achieve this goal at the 
interregional level without going through the inevitable and neoessary prior stages. 
Nevertheless, the rate of progress must be speeded up and greater dynamism must 
be imparted to the process, above all at this time of uncertainty and slack activity 
on Latin America's traditional markets. 
/IV. LATIN 
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IV. LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND THE 
T NEEP FOR NEW POLICIES 
The economic and social evolution of the Latin American countries during 1983 gives 
rise to deep concern, since the negative signs of 1982 have Ijeen further 
accentuated. For many countries, the pressing need to renegotiate the external. 
debt while rejecting solutions whi^h involved declaring a moratorium meant that 
they had to resign themselves ;to complying eve,n„more rigorously with the so-called 
adjustment policies. . The most seriously affected -countries managed to achieve or 
increase trade surpluses, and in some cases, they,.¡surpassed the; targets previously 
set. Despite all the efforts and sacrifices made in :an attempt to increase their 
surpluses, however, t3ie drop in the value of ejq?orts in both 1982 and 1983,forced 
a number of countries 'to reduce their imports in order to attain the. goal they had 
set'themselves* .This was accompanied, inter alia., by policies .of a restrictive 
nature which generated declines in production» higher unemployment, a further : 
deterioration in installed capacity, discouragement-.in business circles,. reduced 
investment and the resurgence of inflation» , cuo>.>' r . , 
The fundamental aim of these adjustment policies was to try to solve the . 
problem of the countries' inability to servioe'.^^r^xt^i^^l-deb-tf..... The agreements 
signed with the International Monetary Fund and the,..transnational private banking 
system made it possible to renew expired credits, subject to a promise to make 
every effort to pay at least part of the interest, due,, In the present circum-
stances, the ability; to pay in teres t.depends; ..essentially on achieving a trade 
surplus or gaining access to new credits fr.om the ipiernational public banking 
system. . In actual fact, the 1983 trade,$uiplus c^me to over US$ 20 billion, 
representing 67% of the total payments;of-;profits, and interest to the exterior, 
while external indebtedness increased yet again,, rising to US$ 305 billion. 
The assumptions on which these measures were based were that the domestic 
effects deriving from the need to generate trade surpluses would diminish or 
disappear with time. It was considered that the recovery of growth in the 
developed countries should bring with it an increase in export volumes and an 
improvement in the terms of trade, together with a reduction in real interest 
rates. Furthermore, the devaluations and other economic policy measures taken 
would alter price relations, favouring both an increase in exports and a reduction 
or substitution of inports, thus counteracting the recessive effects of the 
adjustment policies. /Despite the 
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- Despite the recovery being shown by the United States economy, up to the end 
of 1983 there were no signs of the hoped-for results as regards .the economic 
reactivation of other industrial countries or any increase in Latin American 
exports or in most commodity prices. In practice, protectionism continues to 
represent a growing obstacle to export sales, the terms of trade continue to go 
down, and real interest rates hâve risen once again.. The only element tending to 
offset to some éxtent the negative- effects of the adjustment policies is the 
capacity being shown by same countries to operate with a much lower level of 
imports, without causing their product to contract as much as had been ejected. 
In.these circumstances, it is essential to review the prospects for the external 
economic relations of the Latin American countries in the light of the evolution 
of the industrial economies, world trade and external financing. 
There can be no doubt that Hie prospects of the countries of the region will 
be influenced by the way these external factors develop, . At the same time, it 
.must be understood that such recovery as may take place in the industrial countries 
may well fail to bring with it a spontaneous and immediate .reactivation of the 
Latin American countries to the level and on the terms which existed in the past. 
The effects and repercussions which the reactivation of the world economy may 
have on* the Latin American countries must be examined; specifically in relation to. 
the conditions and problems, both internal and external, which have been growing 
up and which are different in both magnitude/and nature from the basic candi tiens 
of the past decade. Among the aspects which will tend to limit or condition the 
effects of the reactivation of the.world1 véConony, special mention should be made 
of the following: the changes which have itaken place in the international money 
and financial markets; the high level of indebtedness of many Latin American 
countries; the protectionism being practiced:in the industrial countries, and the 
technological changes which are being incorporated in those countries' production 
processes, 
The international financial market has undergone substantial changes. The 
big surplus resources generated by petroleum in the countries exporting that 
commodity and subsequently recycled, largely through the international private 
banking system, through loans to the developing countries in general and Latin 
America in particular have disappeared. In addition, it is necessary to bear in 
mind the various kinds of repercussions caused to the Latin American countries by 
/their high 
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their high level of indebtedness and burdensome financial servicing commitments. 
All this will limit access to or availability of external financing*,. 
If the present real price of petroleum is maintained, there is nothing to 
indicate that the balance-of-payments surpluses of the OPEC countries will be 
repeated. This fact is particularly noticeable in Latin America, where the net 
oil exporters have an appreciable external debt. For this reason, there are no 
grounds, for expecting that the transnational banks will be as permissive as they 
were in the 1970s. 
Although the financial and monetary policy of the United States succeeded 
in reducing the.rate of inflation, at the same time it caused a substantial rise, 
first in nominal and then in real interest rates. Moreover, the fiscal deficits 
of the Federal Government represent a permanent incentive for keeping those rates 
high. 
In this respect, most forecasts point to the maintenance or increase of 
the ratio between the fiscal deficit and the product rather than a reduction in, it. 
In view of this fiscal situation and the probable maintenance of restrictive 
monetary policies, the most likely result is that there will be no significant ; 
reduction in real interest rates. Furthermore, in the case of the Latin American 
countries this situation is aggravated by the surcharges included for various 
reasons in the renegotiation processes. 
At present, there is a more pronounced relative scarcity of external 
financing and real interest rates have risen, so that the conditions are very 
different from those prevailing in the 1970s, and it could therefore be said 
that the share of new external financing is likely to be significantly less than 
in that decade. 
The heavy servicing charges payable in respect of the region's present 
external indebtedness largely compromise in advance the new external resources 
which could be derived from the recovery of the centres. As will be shown in 
greater detail below, a considerable portion of the bigger resources which migjit 
be obtained from an increase in export values would not be reflected in similar 




It might be supposed that a recovery in the growth rates of the developed 
countries should be accompanied by an expansion of world trade. This assertion 
calls for some qualifications today, however. As long as interest rates remain 
high, there is a positive inflow on the United States capital account, and 
protectionism is. growing, the recovery which has begun.in the United States does 
not seem likely to transmit to the developing countries the dynamic impulse which 
was so earnestly hoped for. Furthermore, the trade imbalances between developed 
countries due to the differences in productivity and the rise in the relative 
value of the dollar vis-gi-vis the other currencies are not likely to favour an 
increase in trade, especially when there is serious unemployment in those countries. 
For this reason, everything seems to indicate that protectionism will not disappear 
easily, and indeed, there are many who fear that it will keep on increasing. 
The technological changes now underway threaten to increase the developed 
countries' comparative advantages in the manufacture of the goods of fastest-growing 
world production and consumption, and, what is even more serious, they threaten to 
reduce the advantages now enjoyed by the developing countries in certain branches 
of manufacturing.. 
Consequently, special account must be taken of these factors when appraising 
the effects of a recovery in the OECD countries on Latin America. 
In these circumstances, it is considered useful to explore and illustrate 
the nature, and. scope of the principal problems faced by the Latin American countries, 
building up a picture of the possible evolution of the economies of the region in 
the context of the probable policy developments and events in the external context 
just described. This picture, of course, constitutes neither a forecast of future 
events nor a set of proposals on the institutional and structural changes and 
modifications called for at the national and world levels to promote an authentic 
development process. 
The evolution of exports, their purchasing power and interest rates has 
been estimated on the basis.of considerations regarding the economic dynamism of 
the OECD countries. 
A moderate recovery in the growth rates of the OECD countries in the remaining 
years of the decade (3.5% per year) has been assumed It should be borne in mind, 
however, that in most of the studies carried out by international agencies the 
recovery of this group of countries has been linked with the future behaviour of 
/real interest 
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real interest rates. So far, real interest rates continue to be high, and are 
moreover accompanied by declining rates of profitability. 
It has been assumed that, for this rate of growth of the product of the 
OECD countries, the volume of Latin American exports would increase by a little 
over 3% per year, while at the same time there would be an improvement in the 
terns of trade, in contrast with what happened in 1983, when the growth in volume 
was offset by a drop in unit prices. It should be remembered that in 1982 fuels 
represented 23% of total exports at 1975 prices, and the growth rate assumed for 
them is less than that for the remaining products, which would be ovèr 3.7% per 
year. At the same time, it has been assumed that thé tèrms of trade would not 
improve equally for all countries, since the influence exerted by the evolution 
of oil prices would favour seme, prejudice others, and be of little importance for 
a few of them. The study is based on the effect of an improvement in real export 
prices (excluding fuels) of around 3% per year for the Latin American countries. 
The real interest rate to be paid to the transnational private banking 
system would come to around 6% per year. 12/ This wcuid represent an improvement 
over the situation in 1982, when it was estimated that that rate averaged over io%. 
The real interest rate being paid is not ïndéjpehdéht of the renegotiation 
conditions. The ratio between debt servicing and the valiie of exports was already 
described, with the renewal of the short-term debt being taken into account in 
that case. It is estimated that in 1982 this ratio represented 127% of total 
exports. 13/ Until a substantial, proportion of the debt -especially the short-term 
debt- is reprogrammed for the medium term, the renegotiations will have to be 
repeated at short intervals and it is hard to see how the real interest rate, 
including all the surcharges which are being imposed, can be appreciably below 
the figure given in this study. 
No significant increase in direct foreign investment has been assumed for 
the region as a whole in the rest of the decade, in spite of the importance which 
such investment may be expected to assume in some countries. 
In the trade and financial circumstances assumed, in which a certain level 
and purchasing power of exports and a certain level of interest ratés have been 
established, the level of imports must be compatible with thé external financing 
which it is believed possible to procure, bearing in mind the evolution of the 
countries' payments capacity. 
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At the same time, however, recovery of the economic growth rate involves 
bigger import needs. When both these aspects are taken into account, the ratio 
of imports to the product resulting from the projections made is much lower than 
that prevailing in the period of moderate recovery of economic growth (1976—1978), 
which was ¿imilar, in the case of the countries of large economic size and 
population, to that corresponding to the 1960s. It may be recalled that at that 
time the levels were the lowest since the war. 
The external financing néeded is such that the ratio between the debt 
servicing and the value of exports is slightly lower than the present levels. 
Different economic growth options were examined in this context. They 
include a hypothesis which, as well as' b¿ing consistent with the assumptions made, 
provides a good illustration of the depth of -the crisis facing the region. According 
to this hypothes is, the region as à whole will recover in 1990 the level of per 
capita product which it had in 1980 -an attainment which assumes an overall average 
economic growth rate of around 4% pet1 year for the period 1984-1990. 
The main conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis of this scenario 
are as follows: 
a) The low level of economic dynamism in this scenario brings with it a 
considerablë aggravation of thé problem of unemployment and underemployment. ' Thus, 
even if the growth rate of the product per person employed in the period 1980-1990 
was as little'as 2% per year (which is below the historical average of 3. 2% 
registered in the last threé decades), it woUld only be possible- to absorb 0.3% 
per year of the" growth in the labour forcé (estimated conservatively at 2.8% per 
year). In these circumstances, about 90% of the labour foikie incorporated in the 
1980s woUld be without work in 1990. Even if transfers took place between the old 
and new labour force as regards the occupation of jobs, there can be no doubt that 
an appreciable percentage of the young pèople reaching active age in this decade 
would not bè able to find work. This means that, by 1990, there would be about 
35 million more unemployed than in 1980. 
b) During the whole of the remainder of the present decade it is likely that ' 
one of the main principles of international co-operation will be contravened, since 
the physical balance between exports and imports will he favouring the developed 
countries, so that the region will be transferring real resources to them in an 
amount likely to exceed US$ 65 billion at 1975 prices. 
/c) The 
c) The variation assumed in .the behaviour 9f ; imports, calls for ¿the intro-
duction of important, changes in the . policies applied before the present economic 
adjustment,,and, the realization]of these changes will prove to be difficult in 
many countries. Thus, a calculation .made for the period 1983-1985 shows that the 
reduction in imports involved in this change canes to around US$ 40 billion at 
1975 prices. In those countries where growth in the period 1974-1980 was propelled 
by industrialization, it will be easier to substitute imports, and indeed this . 
has already begun to take place in sonie cases, such as that of.Brazil. In 
countries- which applied liberal policies; and where industrial growth was very 
small, on the other hand, the task will be more difficult* Moreover, in these 
countries the import policy provided much of. the support for anti-inflationary and 
wage policies.Consequently, this solution, which is based on balancer of-payments , 
considerations, calls for very .important;changes in economic policies. 
d) The maintenance of a level.of debt servicing which represents such high 
percentages of Uie . value of exports and which involves maturity dates that follow, 
each other and are .renewed in periods ÎO£ .lesss than;: one year will oblige countries 
to engage in a continuous renegotiation exercise which will undoubtedly affect the 
degree of independence with which ih.ey can handle their domestic policies» In 
spite of the reduction,noted earlier,-debt servicing in the period 1984-1990 is 
likely to remain close to 100% of the value of ejçorts* ., 
e) A continual increase in external.indebtedness is bound.to be registered ; 
during the rest of the decade as a result of these high levels-of servicing costs, 
in spite of the trade surplus. Thus in 1990 the region's external debt will 
amount to US$ 451 billion: more than double that of 1980* 
If we- now look at the scenario as a whole, .we see that it completely fails ; 
to satisfy the essential objectives of the development process,.. 
In the 'economic and social fields, the problems of unemployment will become 
increasingly acute,, to such a.point that they will almost certainly cause a 
recrudescence of the violence already being observed in many countries, of the 
region. As regards the satisfacticn. of the most urgent needs of many social 
groups which were already jliving in a situation of extreme poverty at the, 
beginning of the 1980s, no'solution whatever is to be glimpsed. As the per capita 
product will remain unchang&ds .there will be no progress-in this respect in the 
; . ••.{••??) •• •• /1980s. Worse >:-
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1980s, Worse still, so far everything indicates -that income distribution has got 
worse, thus making the situation of the poorest groups even more: serious,::• - ' 
In the production field, the decline in investment, the dismantling of 
installed capacity and the discouragement rife in business circles give grounds-for 
fearing that the production potential likely to be achieved in 1990 will be less' ': 
than that existing in 1980. 
In the field of external relations,- it is likely that the degree ofi indepen-
dence in the taking of national decisions will have been reduced and the region 
will be relatively more indebted. 
3:.,Thé projection of the present policies contained in the sœhario:just;; .i. .'; 
analysed, shows- that the intense -sacrifice now .being irfade by the region- will not ¿V 
solve the;.main development problems it is. facing. It is obviously nécessary to 
seek" a different solutionj since in thé present external tradé and finance 
conditions it is impossible to service the debt in line with the maturities and 
interest, rates laid down in the agreements signed with : the developed countries and 
the . transnational banking system; '..-:. • 
: New conditions could be created which would providé support for scenarios"• 
different from that analysed, if substantial changés topk place in the conditions 
prevailing in the developed countries as a.result of agreements between the Latin 
American and developed countries designed to take account of thé central problems 
of their éxternal relations or merely to.recognizé the downright impossibility, 
fromvithe economic; social «and political:point of view, that : the countries of the 
region, cân; kèep on respecting the present conditions, xal.t:- V. ' : 
The changé in external conditions which would take^place in linerwith the 
possibilities referred to aboyé:would make possible another scenario charactérized 
by fundamental'changes in policies and resvilts as compared with the présent 
situation and prospects, . •- ' 
As there are substantial differences.between the Latin American countries, 
the elements which could be taken into account in formulating national policies 
will be mentioned and analysed here, J •:. 
The most important changes concern economic growth rates, the selective 
rehabilitation of sectors of production, s tru ctural -and institution al ch anges at 
the internal level-to promote suitable equity in the social distribution of the 
fruits of economic growth, the role of regional.co-operation and changes in the 
external trade -and financial situation. 
/The recovery 
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The recovery of economic growth rates, the selective rehabilitation of 
sectors of production and the improvement,of the employment situation require, 
as a necessary prior condition, an increase; in the level of imports compared with 
that-contemplated in. the previous scenario. This increase could be achieved in 
two ways: 
a) Through changes in external trade conditions. 
b) Through changes in external financial conditions. 
The solution based.on m e^ansion of external trade depends fundamentally 
on the dynamism of the economies of the developed countries and the external trade 
policies they decide to apply. It has been estimated that a 6.8% increase in the 
volume of exports, accompanied by-&n ̂ improvement in the terms of trade which put 
them at a level similar to that" existing in'the region in 1975, would make it 
possible to achieve the level of imports needed to make the 1990 per capita gross 
domestic product 21% higher than that of 1980. This result, which assumes ah" 
annual increase of only 2% in the per capita product between 1980 and 1990, would 
call for overall growth of the gross domestic product by 6.6% per year from 1983 ' 
onwards* Despite the magnitude of this growth rate, the achievements would still 
be modest in relative terms, as is clear if we consider that the per capita gross 
domestic product achieved in 1990 would represent only 77% of the target laid 
down in the: Regional Programme of Action. 
It.was already noted that without a substantial change in the policies 
applied by the developed economies to permit either higher^Whomic growth or a 
reduction in protectionism it would be difficult to improve on the projections 
for exports, and the:• terms of trade contained in the previous scenario. 
If the solution to the problem is sought principally through the financial 
field, then the present debt should be changed into a long-term one.with very low 
real interest rates and substantial periods of grace for servicing payments. An 
exercise has been prepared in this- respect which illustrates the importance of 
these financial measures. Thus, it has been estimated that in order to attain 
by 1990 the level of gross domestic product already noted, with the same external 
debt as in the previous,case, but with real interest rateis reduced to an average 
of 1,5% and private indebtedness renegotiated for a term of 10 years with a period 
of grace of 5 years, it would be necessary for the volume of exports to grow by 
5,6% per year. In these conditions, the debt servicing would represent an average 
/of only 
of only 30% of the export income. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the 
fact that once the period of grace was over the debt servicing would show ! 
significant increases Unless corrective measures of a more permanent nature 
were agreed upon. Another solutioh which has been suggested is that the 
transnational private banking system, with the co-operation of the governments 
of the developed countries, should agree to absorb some loss of capital to cover 
part of the debt. •"' 
It m^r be noted that bot& these solutions have been applied internally in 
some Latin American 'cóuntriéis where the government has assumed an1 "active role 
in view of the seriousness of the problems affecting the privatesectdr. 
'A formula whibh seems practical for implementing thé kind'of financial* 
solutions côïisidered here would consist of "the issue of long-term State-guaranteed 
bonds with suitable grace periods and low interest rates which would replace a 
significant part of thé present debt. The period of grace Would be of fundamental 
importance, since it would give an opportunity fcir the niuch-heralded recovery of 
growth 
rates in the centres tb take place. This Solution would bé still more viable 
if, in addition, the governments of the developed countriesündérfo&té the 
issue of these bonds in somie way. "'-•' 0 1 w ' 
Whatever the solution adopted, it must not be forgó'ttén that it is essential 
to establish new forms bf insertion into the ¿nteí^tfiáfál '-domraunity, find new 
forms of regiohal co-operation, and make domestic ecohcmiC and social changes. 
The new forms of international insertion should correct the well-known problems of 
imbalance in international trade and finances. Correction of the trade imbalances 
calls for the establishment of greater equilibrium betwëen production arid 
domestic expenditure. Thus, to the extent'that consumption and investmeht 
expenditure5 œntairis a higher proportion of manufactures or modern serviced, thén 
production should placé more emphasis on these lines; It is not a questi'ort of 
proposing an autarkic model, but merely of promoting a trade structure different 
from that which resulted from thé policies applied in the 1970s. This strategy ."Vf: . . . 
wili nátürally need a reasonable length of time before it can be expected to give 
results, since at the beginning around 80% of thé exporté will bé made Up of basic 
/commodities arid 
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commodities and fuels. In proportion as the changes in domestic production begin 
to give rise to a structure which permits a greater balance between exports and 
imports, external trade will be able to play a more important role in overall 
demand aid supply in the economies. For this purpose, it will be necessary to 
stimulate the. production of exportable manufactures and defend the production of 
those goods which managed in the 1970s to win markets that must now be retained. 
In „the 1980s, the international financial market has given a revealing 
lesson regarding the absolute imbalance which exists between decision-taking power 
and the distribution of the cost of the policies adopted. The costs which United 
States economic.policy has entailed for Latin America through the rise in real 
interest rates and the fact that little or no consideration has been given to 
the consequences of these additional costs clearly illustrate this aspect. Further-
more, everything seems to indicate that the international banking system will not 
be as permissive as it was in the 1970s, and in any case the region is also not in 
a position to increase its real indebtedness significantly. 
In order for external relations to be similar to those postulated for the 
scenario in question, it would be necessary to make a number of changes in 
domestic and regional policies, the most important of which are set forth below. 
First of all, it is essential to reactivate and restructure the domestic 
market, not only on account of the economic considerations set forth below, but 
also for ethical reasons. It is totally unacceptable that the burden of the 
crisis should continue to fall on the lowest income groups. The goal of equity 
should become a priority objective of the new development strategies. In the 
reactivation of domestic demand account must be taken above all of the groups 
which were already in a situation of extreme poverty before the crisis and whose 
situation has since got even worse. To this end, it is necessary to stimulate 
the brandies of production which form the backbone of employment and mass 
consumption: many branches of the agricultural sector are specific examples in 
this respect. Because of the need to guarantee, in the short term, both supplies 
of agricultural origin and the productive absorption of a high proportion of the 




At the same time, the physical and industrial infrastructure must be 
preserved:: the creative effort and accumulation of resources made in the past 
form a national patrimony which must not be sacrificed.in pursuit of conjunctural 
macroeconomic objectives. 
. In the efforts to bring about a recovery in investment, close attention 
should be paid to,the elements involved.in the policy of containing imports, 
which it is essential to put into practice as soon as possible and which is 
already being applied with extreme severity in some countries in 1983. There will 
be renewed opportunities for development for sectors Whose growth rate had been . 
slackening even before the crisis. The manufacturing sector calls for special 
attention in this respect. In order for this sector to expand, the State must . 
intervene to create the physical, institutional and financial infrastructure 
needed to give both public and private business circles the time horizon which 
their activities require. . -
It is also well known, in this connection, that in previous periods when 
a process of import.substitution:was. being carried on in the region, side by 
side with the successes achieved as regards changes in the areas of production 
and technology, problems of scale, efficiency and faulty linkages were encountered 
which should now be avoided. Policies as regards the distribution of income and 
consumption, medium and long-term planning, and regional co-operation and 
integration could play leading roles in this respect. 
The policies on the distribution of income and consumption would make it 
possible to build up industry on the basis of a more homogeneous economic and 
social demand structure, which would bring with it great benefits, quite apart 
from the intrinsic objectives of this kind of measure. 
Medium and long-term planning would make it possible to take advantage of 
the valuable experience accumulated in the region as regards changes in the areas 
of production and social affairs. The serious consequences suffered by many 
countries through lack of foresight (and even through the adoption of unsuitable 
measures) should serve to reassert the value of planning processes. The experience 
/of most 
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of most of the developed countries confirms the tieed for the State to be guided in 
its short-rterm actions by a long-term social and economic project which gives • 
continuity' and guidance to the. accumulation efforts called for. by .all development 
processes. . 
Regional t co-rope rati on -and1 economic integration should play . an important role, 
since they will give greaterIspaoe...and efficiency to the processes. - The 
restriction of inports sandcthe_ need to generate, trade Surpluses referred to earlier , 
mainly concern trade with.1countries .outside the region; .There is no reason, how- ;-; 
ever, why the expansion ;of regional;trade should not -be effected while still 
maintaining suitable relations between the share ofctrade and of the product. . 
Naturally, this process should be based onra broadwaystern of measures which ;; 
distribute the benefits of:integration-in'an equitable..manner, and it should 
involve in particular the establishment of basic conditions ¡which safeguard and , 
favour the interests of the relatively less developed countries. On the other • ;,• ir 
hand, in ¡making use of the new regional space careful; consideration should;be 
given to the' role that should be played by the transnational;-<50Ep0rations, since i 7 
if proper / attention is not paid t© this aspect it .-would 3mean opening up to them >; 
a market in which they /would, not have any adequate, counterweight» 0.; 
•"•' .•••.•• •'.•••. , ' 1 •-, -< r rr-.r r,. . •••-..-- , ¡' • • , • ..: •• - • f c. . 1 -V .. . . . . . ..... . 
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' ' V.' : LATIN /^RICA-ÀNÌ5 INTERNATIONAL'CO-OPERATION 
1." Backgricki'nd 1 ; 
Since the adoption by the General Assembly on 1 May 1974- of the Declaration and 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
almost ten years of debates, consultations and negotiations among the developed 
and developing countries in a multitude of forums both inside and outside the 
United Nations system have gone by, in which it has been sought to apply the 
essential elements of the new order. 
In view of the limitations of the existing system of relations, the 
shortcomings in the established structures, and the inappropriateness of the 
prevailing machinery to their pressing needs, the developing countries put forward 
during this period a series of demands and specific proposals for negotiation, 
which constituted the central topics of the so-called North-South dialogue. 
These demands had two fundamental objectives for these countries: 
a) to put forward the need to make structural changes in the system of 
international economic relations in order that these should not be conceived of 
only as mechanisms for "aid" and other measures destined exclusively for the 
transfer of certain financial resources from the North to the SoUth, and 
b) to gain greater control over the process of the adoption of decisions 
regarding all international affairs affecting development:' and to achieve greater 
participation in the systems determining the course of events and affecting the 
developing countries' destiny. 
Although the developed countries voted in favour of the resolution, motivated 
particularly by their desire to reach agreement jyn the ordering of energy resource 
markets after the price adjustments of the mid-1970s, throughout,the process of 
negotiation there prevailed among then an attitude of skepticism regarding the 
competence of and possibilities of economic dialogue with the Third World in 
United Nations forums, as opposed to negotiations in appropriate specialized 
bodies. This attitude helped to weaken the general framework of negotiations 
and, in spite of some efforts to get closer to the positions of the developing 
countries, no agreement was reached regarding the principle of structural changes 
in international economic relations as a fundamental objective of the North-South 
dialogue. /The so 
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The so-called North-ëbutlir"ëîâi8iûe ' tooft''plàCè in vdrious* forums. It is 
worth recalling the negotiations carried out by UNCTAD at its fourth and fifth 
sessions (1976 and 1979); the multiï^Èeràl; trade negotiations held in GATT 
(1975-?1979); the Conference on J^eçn^iQn|ili-.gçpn<OTic-Cp-oper^ti^; (Paris, 
197p-1977); the initiative for..the.holding,of a round.of global(.negotiations „,.. 
(1979 to date); ther,Canc.un summittimeeting, (1981) and, more recently,,.the Ministerial 
Meeting of GATT in.. November 1982 and the-'sixth session of UNCTAD held in Belgrade 
in June 1983, • ? ; _ ...,:-. 
If we analyse what took place at these international meetings and 're -
negotiations, there- are": seen; î©Kbe:tWi fundamental- aspects; on the .pnf! hand., the 
central thesis- or: proposal ;.of.r. the developing,* countries has been,practically the 
same.throughout this;periods and onthe other.hand, the results of all these 
meetings : have been far.; belo\i< the: aspirations and initial expectations of the. 
developing countriesr»,:. - r-? . , 
The central; proposal of the developing countries, which comprises, three .,, 
subject areas intimately related.with each other- and decisive);fpr them -basic 
commodities, trade, and monetary^¿a^d, financial ;matters- was the creat iojj-pf, a new 
international framework for ecosppnji'p. relations between ¡South-and North with greate 
participation and decision-makingponer. as regards,;.4bhe :"rules of the game-". 
. Thus, in the field of basic comtaod'iîiies théy ^ought a new approach and a 
new structure, fqr their trade, with';h "Vifcw-• 'cox*ec£in!g..Itjxe,.existing shortcomings 
not only as regards prices (something which had already., b.ê n sought in previous 
approaches) but also as regards export income, the terms of trade, systems of 
marketing,,distribution and transport,.and-the.processing pf .raw materials, in the 
producer countries. , ,r ,.. 
In the trade sector, they proposed, basically to halt and reverse protectionist 
tendencies and advance towards the liberalization of international trade through 
clear commitments as regards standstill agreements, safeguard .clauses, subsidies, 
the reduction of tariff and. non-tariff barriers and the. withdrawal of other 
existing restrictions and undertakings regarding structural adjustments. In 
addition, they sought to arrive at a set of rules and principles aimed at 
achieving a jpster and more, equitable international, trade system capable of really 
achieving differential treatment in fayour of the developing countries. 
/In the 
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In the ; area of ¡monetary and financial.;matters, the.objective of the developing 
countries was.to build:a new international monetary system whichwould be in 
keeping with their needs and would permit them: to have greater participation in 
the taking of .decisions which affect:,theirtinterests,. As regards, the serious 
and growing shortage of resources^: the aim'-was to; secure the expansion, of: financial 
flows from international financial institutions, especially the IMF,.and to channel 
them to the developing countries through an additional.allocation of^Special 
Drawing Rights; an increase in. official}development aid; access to private capital 
markets ; greater participation in. the development ..financing provided by-,public -
multilateral agencies, and an increase in-direct, private investment in line with 
the priorities and sectors decided by the recipient.countries. 
As well, as seeking important changes in these three priority aspects, the 
developing countries promoted many.other „ actions of co-operation with the 
industrialized countries insuch areas as the transfer of technology, maritime 
transport, trade with the:Socialist countries, and the special problems of 
island or landlocked countries; :In addition, they promoted a substantial; 
programme of action in̂  favmr of. thevleS!S'^eveloped countries, while at the same 
time progress was made in -studies aimed at' strengthening cp-operation. among the 
developing countries, themselves.. , . , 
" " ' ' " " " 2. Some results' ' ' 
If we compare the proposals made by the developing countries with the actual 
commitments or resolutions emerging from these conferences, we clearly see the 
lack of positive results, and the frustration of the developing countries with 
regard to international co-operation is clearly evident. 
On repeated occasions, the developing countries concentrated the expression 
of their dissatisfaction on various fronts, among which mention may be made of 
the following: 
a) In the area of basic commodities, they emphasized that, after six years 
of negotiations on 18 commodities within the framework of the UNCTAD Integrated 
Programme for Commodities, it has only been possible to reach two new agreements 
(those on rubber and jute); four existing international agreements have been 
renegotiated -those on sugar, cocoa, coffee and tin- and the Agreement 
Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities has been negotiated.1M-/ 
i. ,.. • •• /The rubber 
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The rubber agreement is a traditionál-type agreement aimed at the 
stabilization of prices, within a, negotiated fringe, through the establishment 
of an international buffer stock. Although the negotiations arose from the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities, it has not so far been possible to agree 
on any other type of measures,within this; agreement. In the case of jute, the 
results are very limited, since the. agreement does not have any economic provisions 
and the international measures provided in it are limited to certain research 
and development projects, reduction of costs and trade promotion. The existing 
international agreements which; have been renegotiated have maintained their 
original objectives of price stabilization. 
b) With regard to the Common Fund which arose out of the negotiations in 
UNCTAD, the developing countries noted that this• has.proved to be a much weaker 
mechanism than that originally projected. It-has much fewer resources and less 
power than initially foreseen, and its potential usefulness.depends ultimately 
on the existence of international commodity agreements which need this mechanism 
and become associated with it. Nevertheless, this Fund could become an important 
innovation in international economic relations and it also has ¡a, .number of 
interesting elements.15/ The text of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund 
was approved in 1980, but this new financial institution has not yet come into 
effect, since it has not proved possible to comply with the requirements for 
this as regards member countries and capital. To date 108 countries have signed 
the Agreement, but only 53 of them have ratified it. in order for it to come into 
force it must be ratified by 90 countries representing two-thirds of the capital 
directly contributed to the Fund. The contributions of the countries which have 
so far ratified it amount to 36.25% of the total capital, but there are many ; 
developing and developed countries which have not yet done so. According to 
the timé limits laid down by the sixth session of UNCTAD, in order for the Fund 
to cone into effect on 1 January 1984 the above requirements should have been 
completed before 30 September 1973, but this did not take place. 
c) As regards international commodity agreements, the developing countries 
stressed that there has been no acceptance of their proposals on better térms 
of access to the markets of the developed countries, on greater participation 
by producers in the systéms of marketing and distribution of such commodities, 
nor regarding a higher degree of processing of raw materials in the developing 
countries. All these subjects remain under study, but there has been no action 
/regarding them. 
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regarding them. Finally, the developed countries have not agreed to enter into 
negotiations for expanding the coverage of compensatory financing. 
d) As regards international trade, the developing countries have noted that 
in GATT the negotiations have been concentrated mainly on the trade, problems 
raised by the relations between the United States, Japan and the European 
Communities, and have either failed to consider -or have considered only in a 
marginal manner- the objectives of the developing countries.16/ 
e) As regards the more recent negotiations, they noted that, in spite of 
the critical situation through which the world economy is passing, no progress 
has been made as regards arrangements for doing away with protectionist measures, 
or organizing programmes to facilitate the structural adjustment, or laying down 
multilateral guidelines to guarantee the stability of the Generalized System of 
Preferences; nor has any significant progress been made as regards countervailing 
and anti-dumping measures or safeguard clauses and subsidies. Finally, no progress 
is being made in the efforts to formulate a new set of juster, more equitable and 
more effective rules and principles for international trade. The Ministerial 
Meeting of GATT held in November and December 1982 is a good example of this 
lack of progress, 
f) In the financial and monetary area, they note that there has not been 
any progress either as regards the developing countries' demands for a fresh 
allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a significant increase in IMF quotas, 
or the expansion of the Compensatory Financing Facility, nor has there been progress 
in the initiatives aimed at the reform of the international monetary system, 
such as the possible convening of an international conference on monetary and 
financial questions. 
Some developed countries, for their part, have taken the1 view that the 
existing co-operation institutions and machinery are sufficient for increasing 
and strengthening international trade relations, and that structural changes 
such as those demanded by the developing countries are therefore not necessary. 
Recently, some industrialized countries have emphasized the role of the automatic 
adjustments resulting from'full application of the market laws. In addition, 
they have shown dissatisfaction with the number of negotiating fronts involved 
in the proposals of the developing countries and the difficulty of tackling them 
all together in a negotiation effort. 
/This list 
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G This: list of the different attitudearof the parties involved is illustrative 
of the way the North-South dialogue has gone on so far and the .consequent, feeling .. 
of frustration and disenchantment which is to be observed. The appeal^for dialogue 
and negotiation, made by the Group of 77 in the. Buenos Aires PXàtâàm did n&tf?; ' 
succeed in bringing about any substantial change -in- the;-expected /results of.-¡the? 
sixth session of UNCTAD held in Belgrade in June 198:3 .17/ j ;. . M 
3. Thé <tàfclook for thé1 Iftte^atlotiiàl'hëgcitiations " v a 
What has happened in recent ye^s as regards the. international negotiation process 
has given rise to a series of obvious facts which call for serene and realistic 
analysis by all the parties involved ̂  with a view to rescuing the international 
negotiations from their present state of stagnation. Such an analysis is all . 
the more necessary at critical times like the present, which call more than ever» 
for the stimulation of active and vigilant international co-operation.to match 
the pressing needs of the developing countries. 
Mention vha^, be^n made on .several occasions of some attitudes and positions 
which could be changed in order.to make the negotiating process more..dynamic. , 
The following would appear to be the main aspects which could be borne in mind , „ 
*%cnq ic >s.éi 
by the negotiating parties: 
a) The fundamental disparity of criteria, approaches and objectives between 
the industrialized countries and the developing countries as jregaxds the important 
matters being negotiated in the North-South dialogue. In view of the.bases, 
rules and power relations g;ov^rning_these negotiations, their result has 
inevitably been unbalanced,, /to the detriment of the developing countries. 
b) The deterioration of multilateralism as an approach for solving the 
criticaleconomic, ^nd financial problems^ Thjjjçe i§ a growing tendency to tackle 
problems by bilateral means and not through collectively negotiated commitments. 
As a result;, on,many occasions the burden of adjustment has been transferred 
to the international community in general and the developing countries in 
particular.. 
c) The.decision taken by the majority of the industrialized countries to 
give firm priority to the trade and financial negotiations held within the 
framework of GATT, the IMF and the World Bank, rather than those.held within the 
United Nations system and, in particular, UNCTAD. .Without denying the fundamental 
/role of 
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role of those institütibhá in' their areas of competence, it is essential to 
recover the'Vital rotó'that rshdüld be played in this pfrobess tof negotiation by 
politicaldialogueand technical" debate within the world ótfgáñÍ¿átioh and its 
respective organsVw '":/r-~ ; • •'••'•••' >• ' • -
d) The" multiplicity of negotiating fronts', although essientxal rfor progress 
towards integral f¿ritó; of international co-operation, is frequénfly reflected in • 
an excessive number of problems to be negotiated and lack of operational selectivity, 
which militates against the effectiveness of the negotiation processes. 
e) The lack of firm political decisions to advance towards the restructuring 
of the international trade, monetary and financial system to fit it better for the 
premotion of more harmonious and equitable development. While not denying the 
complexity of this objective and the time that may be needed for its fulfilment, 
it is important for the entire international community to make progress in this 
direction. 
f) The lack of any decided reassertion of the thesis that there can be no 
sustained and lasting reactivation of the world economy without a significant 
recovery of the economies of the developing countries, and that for this purpose 
it is not enough merely to have reactivation in the centres and the spreading 
of its effects to the periphery: it is also indispensable to carry out concerted 
and active international co-operation actions. 
g) The fundamental role which the industrialized countries continue to 
assign to the so-called free play of market forces as a central element of the 
structural adjustment, and their opposition to government intervention at the 
international level, although they frequently resort to such intervention at the 
national level. 
All the above considerations should lead the developing countries to 
re-examine the prioritities of their future international action. If they do not 
succeed in substantially strengthening their bargaining power and capacity in 
order to bring about a change in the results of the negotiations, or if they cannot 
reach agreement with the developed countries on new realistic and effective bases 
for tackling the future stages of the negotiations, the most likely result will 
be that the North-South dialogue will be doomed in the future to frustrations 
similar to those registered in the past. 
/The bargaining 
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The bargaining power of the developing countries depends to a considerable 
extent on themselves. Consequently, the first essential step is to greatly 
heighten co-operation and .solidarity among their members. It is also obviously 
necessary to re-examine objectives, procedures and strategies with a view to 
future negotiations with the industrialized countries, so that the dialogue can 
be more effective and can be reflected in more positive results for the developing 
countries and the international community as a whole. 
/VI. REGIONAL 
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VI. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION j 
A. THE OVERALL PICTURE AS REGARDS INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION 
The last few years have been marked by severe challenges and.tensions for regional 
integration and co-operation. In some cases, these have been the result of policies 
of opening—up the international economy because of the belief that this would also 
open up prospects for a very dynamic increase in exports to the industrialized 
centres. In other cases, the reason has been financial permissiveness in the • 
procurement of external resources and à general resistance to conditioning national 
policies to the needs of integration and co-operation. 
The most visible result, as explained in greater detail in thé analysis made 
of each integration scheme, has been a reduction of the share of intra-regional. 
exports in the total exports of Latin America (see table 11). After having risen 
in 1979 to 16.5%, this share went down in 1980 to 15.2%, recovered a little to 15.9% 
in 1981, and finally dropped to 15% in 1982» . ! i ; ' 
This decline affected all the regional integration schemes, i.é.,¡ALADI* ¡the 
Andean Group and the Central American Common Market, the only exception ; being ; 
CARICOM, which increased the share of subregional exports in-its total Exports from 
7.4% in 1981 to 8.2% in 1982. " . \ 
The above figures show to what extent the efforts to consolidate the growing 
links among.the member countries of the integration schemes have had to yield, on' 
? 
the one hand, to the international crisis, and on the other to national policies in 
which the ¡¡component of cof-operation with,the other Latin American countries has 
either been; completely absent or insufficient. 
On the other hand, in the face of the problems caused by the breakdown of a 
financial order which seemed to promise a solution?.ta: the structural imbalances in 
trade caused by the asymmetrical insertion of the; countries of. thé region into worlt 
trade, thé circumstancés now make it necessary to. recognize the-value of regional 
integration and co-operation as suitable instruments for finding a way out from 
Latin America's development crisis. . 
Finding a solution to the present problems is a more complex matter than in 
the past, however, and the seriousness of thé situation Calls 'for Strategies : 
appropriate to the new needs' rpovptries and societies very different from those 
which .vient: beforé them, both as ; regards their degree of development, àrjd as regards 
their economic and social aspirations. 
/Table 11 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA: INTRA-INTEGRATION SYSTEMS, IHTRA-LATIN AMERICAN AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars at current prices. FOB) 
ALADI 
Total exports 
Exports to Latin America 
Exports to Latin America as a percentage of total 
Intra-ALADI exports 
Exports, to ALASI as a percentage of total 




Exports to Latin America 
Exports to Latin America as a percentage of total 
Intra-Andean Group exports ' 
Exports to Andean Group as a-percentage of total 
Exports to Andean Group as a percentage of exports 
to Latin America 
Central American Coiaaon Market 
Total exports 
Exports to Latin America 
Exports to Latin America as a percentage of total 
Intra-CACM exports 
Exports to CACTI as a percentage of total 
Exports to CACM as a percentage of exports 
to Latin Amèrica 
Exports to CACTI plus Panama as a percentage of 
exports to Latin America 
CARICOtg/ 
Total exports 
Exports to Latin America 
Exports to Latin America as a percentage of total 
Intra-CARICQM exports 
Exports to CARICOM as a percentage of total 
Exports to CARICOM as a percentage of exports 




Intra-regional trade as. a percentage of total 
I960 ; 1965; >y 19?0 1975 1978 1979 1980 19812/ 19822/ 
Growth rates 
I960- 1970- 1960-
_1970 1980 1980 
7 344.8 9 388.7 ;13 786.7 29 664.2 44 630.1 60 729.0 79 569.1 85 719.0 80 574.0 5.7 20.0 12.7 . l 583.5 5 031.2 7 174.3 10 Ö11.8 11 962.5 15 431.2 11 729.2 22.0 • • • 
- • - 12.4 17.0 16.1 16.5 . 15.0 15.7 14.6 566.6 841.9 l 266.0 4 010.2 5 838.4 8 574.6 10 879.3 11 933.6 9 811.7 8.4 24.0 15.9 7.7 9*0 9.9 13.5 13.1 14.1 13.7 13.9 .12.2 
- 79.9 79.7 81.4 85.6 90.9 88.8 83.7 
3 586.8 4 346.0 5 419.1 12 897.8 16 293.4 23 937.5 30 064.5 29 822.6 26 637.0 4.2 18.8 11.2 
.• - - 569.0 2 055.3 2 404.2 3 412.9 3 922.8 4 401.6 4 268.1 a ft 0 21.0 « O« 
- 10.5 15.9 1,4.8 14.3 13.0 14.8 16.0 
24*5 52.7 91.6 477.1 634.5 1 075.1 1 182.6 1 513.0 1 200.7 14.1 29.0 21.0 
0.7 1.2 1.7 3.7 4.2 . 4.5 3.9 5.1 4.5 
- - 16.1 23.1 28.5 31.5 30.1 34.4 28.1 
444.2 762.5 1 105.4 2 309.4 3 974.0 . 4 462.5 4 942.5 4 239.0 4 131.7 9.5 16.2 12.8 
- - 313.7 645.9 ' 965.7 . 1 034.2 1 172.0 1 125.7 993.0 14.1 • ® • 
- - 28.4 28.0 . 24.3 23.2 23.7 26.6 24.0 
30.9 132.8 287.1 541.3 3 862.8 896.7 994.3 921.9 775.1 25.0 13.2 19.0 7.0 17.4 26.0 . 23.4 21.7 20.1 20.1 21.7 18.8 
- . - 91.5 83.8 89.3 (36.9 84.8 81.9 78.1 
95.3 - 83.9 94.5 92.7 90.7 88.4 
543.7 750.2 1 000.1 3 028.5 3 190.2 3 908.1 5 498.4 5 137.0 4 591.2 6.3 18.6 12.3 
- - 63.2 259.7 297.6 439.6 593.9 657.4 701.6 0 0 • 25.0 O 0 • 
-. • - 6.3 8.6 9.3 11.2 10.8 12.8 15.3 
21.3 27.1 42.3 a 6 . 8 204.7 255.7 352.5 379.5 377.8 7.1 24.0 15.1 
3.9 3.6 4.2 7.2 6.4 6.5 6.4 7.4 8.2 
- - 66.9 83.5 68.8 "58.2; -: 59.4 57.7 53.8 
8 532.5 11 518.6 15 212.2 36 182.8 52 712.2 70 265.6 91 325.7 96 585.8 90 329.2 6.0 19.7 12.6 
749.9 1 275.3 1 969.7 5 964.8 8 536.5 11 583.3 13 882.9 15 357.9 13 513.4 10.1 22.0 15.7 
8.8 11.1 12.9 16,5 :•'-. 16.2 16.5 . 15.2 15.9 15.0 • • • 1.6 OOO 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics, 
a/ Provisional figures, 
b/ Excluding Chile. 
c/Including only Barbados,. Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
d/ Including eleven ALADI, five CACM, and four CARICOM countries. In addition, Panama and the Dominican Republic. 
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Finallyi xn -'drder to give a., more specific picture of:each integration ¡scheme 
and of the LatimiMerican Economic 'System:. (SELA:)̂  some details on each of them are 
given below.'»'«:-.*'.. •• . • ...; - • ;. •.,.; .,• ,;•... -r.-rj • . - ;•.•,'•. 
The'Latin American integration Associatidn (ALADI) 
The 1980 Treaty.of Montevideo replaced the twenty-year-old Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) by the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and 
created the legal framework for a complex process of negotiations on what was termed 
the Historical Patrimony, which was officially concluded on 12 May 198,3 at, the 
Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Conference;of the Contracting Parties. 
On this latter .occasion, the. Conference,adopted three.regional agreements on 
the opening-up of markets in favour of relatiyely less developed countries (Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Paraguay) and 39 partial-scope agreements, all of them of bilateral 
nature except for-Agreement No. 26, which sets up multilateral links between 
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. , 
1 The 1980 Treaty does not provide for.quantitative goals or fixed time limits 
for trade liberation; instead it sets up voluntary machinery for trade promotion, 
complementation and economic co-operation and prescribes differential treatment 
according to the level of development of the beneficiary countries. It maintains 
the final goal of achieving, the formation of a. Latin American Common Market: an 
objective to be reached through the gradual multilateralization of the partial-scope 
agreements and through the establishment of Regional ...Tariff Preferences (RTP). 
- .The renegotiation of the Historical Patrimony led to the withdrawal of a large 
number of concessions, most of them of little immediate trade potential, and also 
to the inclusion of a few new concessions. In many, cases, the validity of the 
concessions has been, limited to relatively short periods and import ceilings have 
been established. . The area of application .of the concessions has been significantly 
restricted, although it would appear, that these concessions will continue .to have 
some relation with the most important part of the trade among the parties. 
Furthermore, the relative importance of negotiated "trade within total trade has 
continued to go down: a tendency which began in 1968 and, became more accentuated in 
the last few years of existence of LAFTA* 
In 1981, the value of,intra-area trade still registered a modest growth rate 
of 6%, compared withanannuaj. average growth rate of 16% in the period 1960-1980. 
/In 1982, 
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In 1982, the world economic recession, which seriously affected the Latin American 
economies and caused the gross domestic product of the region as a whole, together 
with total exports and intra-area exports, to drop for the first time since the end 
of the war, also brought about a decline in trade within ALADI. In this latter 
year, intra-area trade represented a little over 12% of total exports. Furthermore, 
there are indications that in 1983 therè will have been an equally significant 
contraction in the import capacity of the countries, ' • , -. 
The difficult economic situation through which the countries are passing would 
appear to be the main cause of tliis contraction in trade, although the prolonged 
process of renegotiation of the Historical Patrimony must also have helped to create 
a climate which was not very favourable for reciprocal trade. Furthermore, since 
the end of 1981 the countries hâve been applying restrictions on their imports 
which, although they have assumed many forms, hàvë all been ultimately designed to 
adjust thé economy of each country to the difficult balance-of-payments situation. 
In general, these restrictions -which extend from partial limitations to the total • 
suspension of imports- have been applied indiscriminately to imports from inside 
and outside the area, affecting both trade flows equally. Reprisals on the part ofr 
the countries affected were not long in Coming, and at present there is still a 
generalized situation of trade restrictions which the countries are trying to solve 
in part through new forms óf trade such as the various kinds of compensated trade," 
that is to say, fuller use of the existing systems of reciprocal payments and 
credits, the negotiation of temporary quotas, etc. 
The Convention on the Settlement of Payments and Reciprocal Credits which was in 
effect in LAFTA from 1965 onwards and was incorporated into ALADI has functioned 
from the beginning with gréât efficiency. With the passage Of time, its operational 
methods have been perfected and thé machinery has shown adequate capacity for : 
overcoming the various difficulties which have arisen. In the period from its ' 
inauguration up to 1982, it 'channelled operations for over US$ 50 billion, leaving 
only an average of around 25% of"net debit balances to be paid off. A system with 
these features is of Special importance in the present situation of shortage of • 
foreign exchange and its excellent operation could be a determining factor in the 
recovery of intra-area trade. A number of measures aimed at perfecting the machiner; 
are being analysed, among them the extension of the period of coverage, the 
establishment of an instrument for the payment of extraordinary settlements, and 
/another instrument 
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another instrument,'.of a temporary nature, for the financing of bilateral, 
imbalances. Consideration is also being given to the incorporation of various 
Central American countries into the system and the establishment of.a Latin American 
unit of account. 
The only multilateral trade liberalization instrument provided for in the 
1980 Treaty of Montevideo is what is termed Regional.Tariff.Preferences,. Through , 
this instrument it is sought to establisha margin of ¿-preference as compared with 
the-tariffs applicable to third'countries, with this:preference .being applied.in 
principle to all products and: in favour-of ̂ all^member countries. The ALADI '••••: ; 
Seci?etariilt',.iwith.'!ther;assistance/0f, various advisory!bodies, has already undertaken 
the necessarji; technical r studies and" has carried; out. preliminary • meetings to. guide 
the subsequent process of negotiation. Although the-Regional Tariff Preferences 
are initially of ;a: rather; modest:nature, there can be no-doubt.that their approval 
and gradual building up.can provide important- support for- the cohesion,of the 
countries as a groups in view of their multilateral nature. Similarly, consideration 
could.be given within this'context:to the initiation of trade negotiations with the 
other Latin American countries which are not members of the Association: a. process 
which has already been begun by sane countries on the bilateral level. 
2. The Andean Group 
In analysing the progress made by the Cartagena. Agreement, it must, be borne in.mind 
that this scheme, more than the others existing.in the region, has sought from the 
beginning to set up a many-faceted network of interrelations in the economic, social 
and labour fields,.including the political and cultural areas. Ultimately, its 
long-term, objective is the building up of a true community of nations, although its 
first steps placed marked emphasis on economic and especially trade matters. 
It is precisely in this latter field that the Andean Group has had to face 
growing problems. As the world economic recession tightened around the member 
countries of the Andean Group, intra-area trade was seriously affected, and in 1982 
it went down for the first time since the Andean Group was set up. The member 
countries, almost all of which had severe.balance-of-payments deficits, imposed 
sharp restrictions on their imports and applied them indiscriminately to imports 
from inside an£.outside the area. The failure to fulfil the commitments to 
liberalize trade -a problem which has arisen since the very beginning of the process-
/was aggravated 
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was aggravated to such an extent that the countries affected began to take trade 
reprisals. On top of this deterioration, there was the continuing difficulty 
experienced by the parties in making progress in the negotiations on such essential 
matters as the establishment of the Common External Tariff and the readaptatioh of. 
the Sectoral Industrial Development Programmes. These signs of; stagnation and 
retrocession, together with the decline in area trade (which seems to; have got worse 
in the first half of 1983 ) ,* rheighten the awareness that drastic and immediate ... 
measures must be taken to.check this process of paralysation and deterioration and 
give new dynamism to the wholé- set;of relations/among the member countries* : 
At the level of the community bodies^.many actions were carried out with this 
objective, resulting in the adoption of the Plan for the Reorientátion of the 
Andean Integration Process, approved át the thirty-fifth extraordinary session of th( 
Commission (July 1983). This Plan provides for eight main areas of priority action: 
trade; industry; agriculture;.foreign relations; finance; science and technology; 
physical integration; frontier integration and tourism; and the special regime for 
Bolivia and Ecuador. In the face of the general picture of trade deterioration, the 
Board has proposed various options which have been presented to governments for 
their consideration, including: 
i) a commitment to refrain frcan imposing further restrictions or duties on 
Andean trade as from a certain date; 
ii) the withdrawal of all restrictions and duties which infringe thé 
liberalization commitments in respect of products considered to be "non-sensitive"; 
iii) the negotiation of import quotas for "sensitive" products; 
iv) the generation of new trade opportunities through pragmatic forms such as 
agreements on State purchases, managed trade, the marketing of surpluses and 
shortfalls, etc.; 
v) preparation Of a set of measures aimed at restoring subregional preferences. 
In the industrial area, the action would be centered on making the present 
allocations more flexible (promoting exchange agreements and compensating and 
rationalizing existing production), oh the promotion of industrialization through 
projects for Industrial agreements with ALADI countries, and on the special 
programmes connected with small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The agricultural sector has proved to be an area where it is difficult to 
make progress in integration, and the Andean Group has tried various methods of 
/dealing with 
dealing with this problem, which have sb far only had limited effects. The 
Reorientation Plan marks the beginning of a new stage -already formalized through 
the signing of the "José Celestino Mutis" agreement- on agriculture, food security 
and environmental conservation, •'' « 
In thé field of science and technology, the action envisaged includes, 
inter alia, the orientation of subregional science and technology policy, the 
provision of an adequate flow 'of financial resources for the development Of these 
fields, joint negotiations oh the acquisition of technology¿and the establishment 
of an Andean Technological Information Ŝ stétó, In the area of infrastructure * 
efforts will be made to facilitate 'ï'hé ti^sip&rt ' of persons "and goods through the-
rationalization of procédures àhd docùméritàtions at the entry points into Countries, 
For the tourism séctor, an Andêan proigraihme of tourist development and integration• • 
has recently been defined, 
Filially, as regards thé special régime for Bolivia and Ecuador, reféréfreè";:tìaé 
been made to the need fdr subregional co-operation to be based fundamentally-ow thè 
execution of specific projects located in these two'coiintriesso as to stimulate 
the expansion and divêrsificatibn of•their exports.' Member cburitfies must*facilita" 
thè access of such exports to their markets; The financial strengthening of the 
Andean Development Corporation and the Andean Reserve•Fund should be reflected in 
bigger flows of financial aid to these countries. 
In their joint declaration of 24 July 1983 entitled "For us our Motherland is 
America", the Presidents Of'àll thé member countries of "the*Cartagena Agreement 
reasserted their firm support for the process of Andéah integration and endorsed the 
main points'of the Reorientation Plan, '•'••• 
3, The, Central American Common Market (CÀCM) 
The recent evolution of the. Central American Common Market must be viewed in the 
light Of two conjunctural-situations which have a very marked conditioning effect 
on it. This group of countries; is perhaps the most seriously affected in the entire 
Latin American region by the world economi« recession,-which has.brought about a 
sharp drop in exports, and an equally-significant contraction in external financing, 
with all the consequences that are tô -bë" expected for.'the import capacity and growtl 
capacity of the Central American economies. Thus, in 1982 there.were drastic , 
declines in the levels of exports and imports of all the countries, with the sole 
/exception of 
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exception of imports by El Salvador, and everything seems to indicate that this 
situation will be repeated in 1983, At the same time, in 1982 the gross domestic 
product of the five .countries went down by close to 4%. after having stagnated in 
the period 1979-1981, On the other hand, the situation as regards indebtedness and 
terms of repayment of the external debt of the Central American countries, although 
varying substantially from one country to another,-are broadly no different from 
those of the majority of the Latin American countries. 
Furthermore, mention must be made of the aggravation of the tensions of a 
political nature in various countries and in the region as a whole. This phenomenon 
was particularly to be noted in 1982 and 1983, and coincides with sharp disparities 
.between the political attitudes of the governments and the presence of agents from 
outside the region who have given these tensions an East-West dimension. 
As was only to be expected, these two serious conjunctural phenomena finally 
affected the trade relations among the countries. Whereas in the 1970s intra-
regional trade had grown at an average annual rate of 15%, playing an important role 
as a shock absorber to smooth out depressions in the external sector and rising in 
1980 to a record level of around US$ 1 billion, this development became negative in 
1981 and 1982, when for the first time trade went down, to US$ 970 000 million and 
US$ 775 million, respectively. This contraction was even greater than that 
registered by exports to outside the subregion, so that the share of 
intra-subregional trade in total exports went down to 19% in 1982, Although it is 
not easy to forecast the outlook for 1983, it seems likely that there will be a 
further contraction, probably similar to that of the year before. 
The deterioration in trade among the Central American countries was accompanie 
by a decline in the amount of transactions channelled through the Central American 
Clearing House, which came to only 664 million Central American pesos (at par with 
the dollar) in 1982, so that, in contrast with the traditional situation, they 
amounted to less than the level of trade registered. At the'same time, unsettled 
balances accumulated in the Cleaning House, reflecting the reordering of trade and 
its loss of dynamism; Reciprocal trade has also been severely affected by the use 
of the hew restrictive measures adopted at the national level, as a result of which 




Nevertheless,I ifc^order to complete this .brief 'overview; of recent developments 
in the Central American integration process,, mention must be made of a number of 
events of a positive nature which reflect the continued vitality and survival 
capacity shown by. this movement over its long history.-: in spite of . the serious 
problems affecting them i the Central American countries--have so far managed to 
maintain their ideological cohesion as'regards the fundamental ¡and irreplaceable 
importance of subregional integration .¡as an- instrument for their development. In . 
the: first place., when the Treaty on: Central. American-Integration completed 20 years, 
of. existence in .1981, none of the members-countries denounced it, .which amounts to 
the tacit maintenance; of ..all :the. commitments, assumed. : Another important, eyent which 
took place iiiy recent years was the solution. in economic terms of the conflict bet wee 
El Salvador and Honduras* -In spite of the great, tensions to which these nations, 
were subjected, activities, continued in a relatively normal manner in the many,.fprunu 
which guide and accompany, the -intégrâtion. process, such as the meetings of ministers 
and vice-ministers.,responsible for integration;, those of the Central American 
Monetary Council; the meetings of the Assembly of Governors of the Central American 
Bank, and various meetings of the ministers of energy, ministers of transport, etc. 
In addition, the institutions responsible for Central American integration continued 
to operate normally. ' ' 
In the same connection, mention should bé made of the unanimous election of 
the new President of the Central American' Bank for Economic Integration in 
September 1983. 
Furthermore, in recent years some new institutions connected with integration 
have been established such as the ÔëiitràÎ American Electrification Council (1982), 
responsible for the interconnection of national electricity systems; the Central : 
American Maritime TrànspbrtComm'ission, and the Central American Railways Commission 
Joint éfforts have also continued for the implementation of Central American tariff 
and cus'tOmS reform, for the withdrawal'or;reduction of the restrictive measures 
applied to intra-area trade, and for the procurement of additional resources at thé 
..!••, . . . 
regional and international level with'a View' to reactivating such trade. In this 
latter respéct, special mehti<fe"should be made of the meeting organized by the 
Inter-American Dévelbpment Bank in Brussé'ls in 1983, at "which the representatives 
of Central American governments appeared jointly before the international financial 
/community. Finally 
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community. Finally, the countries managed to adopt common positions in international 
forums and negotiations such as the assemblies of IDB and the World Bank and the 
sessions of UNCTAD and SELA. 
Some of the above initiatives are still in an embryonic stage, yet for spme 
time past- they have had to face uf> to the sequels of the problems described earlier. 
Since-if isbimprobable that any rapid solution can be found to the present difficult 
situation, it iseems necessary to concentrate efforts on preserving and consolidating 
what has already been attained and making progress when possible in the areas which 
are most favourable for this, such as for example the implementation of co-operation 
activities with Other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.• • • • In this context 
mention may be made of the probable participation in the near future of the Central 
American countries' irf the mutual payments and credits systems in force among the 
member countries of ALADI. The areas of maritime-and rail transport, the marketing 
of fertilizersj multilateral or bilateral trade agreements, and joint defence of 
commodity prices seem to offer the best prospects for such collaboration. 
The Caribbean Community (CÁRIC0M) 
Like the other integration schemes in the region, CARICOM has had to face up to 
growing problems, many of them originating in the deterioration of the economic 
situation of its member countries, especially on account of the present world 
economic crisis.. Since the Caribbean countries are relatively small and have a high 
degree of openness to external trade, the impact of the economic recession has been 
proportionately very severe. The unfavourable external situation has been reflected 
in the stagnation of economic growth and the accumulation of growing balance-of-
payments deficits by almost all the member countries. At the same time, it may be 
noted that from 1981 onwards the total exports of CARICOM began to decline 
drastically, by 6% in that year and a further 11% in 1982, In the latter year, 
trade among the CARICOM countries remained practically at the 1981 level, however, 
so that its share in total exports rose to 8%. 
Trade within the subregion has encountered difficulties because of the 
growing balance-of-payments deficits and the. extreme shortage of foreign exchange 
affecting practically all the countries. Restrictions have been imposed on their 
imports, without making any exception regarding those from CARICOM itself. One of 
the countries adopted a multiple exchange rate system which was subsequently modifie< 
/by the 
^ ' u : . i 
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With regard to this latter set of tasks, the System has carried out a great 
deal of work covering such initiatives as the preparation of the region's common 
position at the last three sessions of UNCTAD, participation in the Paris 
International Economic Conference (the North/South Dialogue), the channelling of 
regional reactions with regard to the Falklands conflict, and, more recently, joint 
organization with regard to the subjects of regional economic security and Latin 
America's response to the international economic crisis. 
The aspects connected with regional co-operation have been channelled mainly 
through what are called the "action committees", whereby it is sought to achieve 
specific results in relatively short periods. Participation in these committees is 
optional, and compliance with their objectives is obligatory only for those 
countries which have expressed their adherence to them. By their very nature, their 
proper functioning calls for active participation by the interested countries. 
So far, 13 action committees have been set up, while a further nine which 
were proposed have not actually been set up for various reasons. Among those which 
have or have had the greatest impact, mention may be made of the Committee in 
Support of the Reconstruction of Guatemala, the Committee on Marine and Freshwater 
Products, the Latin American Technological Information System (RITLA) and the 
Committee on Fertilizers Manufacture. The Committee for the Establishment of a 
Regional Food Security System (CASAR) and the Committee in Support of the Argentine 
Republic were also set up recently. 
In the Biennial Programme of Regional Co-operation for the period September 
1982-August 1984 which was approved by the Latin American Council in August 1982, 
it was decided that priority areas for co-operation would be those of food and 
agriculture, external trade, science and technology, finance and payments, and 
information, transport and communications. In response to this Programme, the Food 
Security Committee was set up, 
A relative weakening of regional co-operation is to be observed at the 
present time, due mainly to the growing insufficiency of the funds available to the 
action committees. The recent initiative aimed at facing up to the effects of the 
international crisis on the Latin American economies presents the system with a new 
challenge which will call for the priority attention of governments and effective 
support for whatever joint action it is decided to carry out. 
/6. Other 
¡;v:-; 6v: Other areasof co-operation y. • 
Other prominent events in the area of co-operation are the new dynamism achieved in 
the energy field through the ratification in November 1981, in Santo Domingo, of the 
Latin American Eñe^y Co-bpea?átTón P?ogi?aniniíé"tPLA'CE),''VÍxÍeh*''Í"ays down the long-term 
objective's of such cooperation and determines the activities arid projects to bé 
carried out in the iiraneidiate future. The -Programme is also endowed with -a financing 
fund which is ofrmodest'size but sufficient to carry on its activities, 
Ariother concrete initiative iri this field-is the1México-Venezuela Energy 
Co-operátibn Agreementrvíith -dentral America 'and'the Caribbean which has been 
functioning effectively since August 1982 and Has just béén extended with some• 
modifications,' 
Mention should also he made of the increasing contacts between regional 
integration and co-operatiori bodies which are undoUbtédly facilitating the exchange 
of information and experience, the-:co-ordination of policies and positions, and 
ultimately the Convergence of the existing systems¿' Ss-was demonstrated by the 
holding of the Fourth Meeting of Latin American Economic Integration and Co-operatic 
Bodies (Antigua, Guatemala, August 1983), This méeting brought together practically 
all the bodies carrying out such functions in the region, and on this occasion they 
pledged their decided support in their respective fields of competence with a view 
to contributing to thé success of the forthcoming Latin American Economic Conference 
to be held in Quito in early January 1984, At the same meeting, a programme; of wor] 
was approved which is designed to present specific'proposals at that Conference, ; 
In addition, Latin American co-operation has continued to expand and grow. . 
deeper in a large number of bther areas and fields of action which it is impossible 
to list here* By way of example^ mention may be made of the activities of such 
bodies as GEPLACEA, thé Union of Banana Exporting Couritries, the recently-establish< 
Action Committee On Regional Food'Security,-the Latin American Organization for -
Fisheries Development, and the many organizations »? abusiness nature, all of which 
go-to make Up a vast and complex system of growing interconnection between the. . 
countries of the region, ;••<•••. 
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B. REGIONAL INTEGRATION 'AND CO-OPERATION VIS-A-VIS THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT 
AND INSERTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
1. Development, industrialization and integration 
The arguments in favour-of regional co-operation and integration have ¡traditionally 
been.,put fprward within a long-term perspective which recognizes the .need to 
overcome Latin America's peripheral status in the world economy and to promote 
industrialization as the central axis of the process çf economic development. 
Integration has been promoted fundamentally through the expansion and protection 
of subregional markets with a view to increasing the scale and efficiency of the 
infant Latin American industry. Likewise, the integration process would use 
this expanded economic space to create a "launching platform" for the export of 
Latin American manufactures to the markets of the centres. 
These ideas increasingly found concrete expression during the 1960s,.when 
the various subregional integration schemes now existing in Latin America were . 
founded and promoted. 
From'the 1970s onward, in contrast, the integration process encountered-
•. various kinds of difficulties in both its institutional structures and its 
mechanisms. Without prejudice to the need to make a more detailed analysis of 
the many specific aspects, which influenced this behaviour, there are at least 
two factors of a general nature which, from the second half of the 1970s onwards, 
upset the growth of intra-regional trade and reduced the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms and instruments being used. 
The first and most important of these was the change in the world structure 
of financing,.which was characterized by the prevalence of credit of private 
origin based on the big surpluses ;of the oil-exporting countries, recycled 
through;the international commercial banking system. The abundant inflow of . 
credits in dollars was accompanied, in a number of cases, by a violent increase 
in imports from every corner of the globe: a phenomenon which lasted until 1981. 
The composition of these imparts varied considerably among.the countries of the 
region. Thus, while some countries had to pay large amounts for petroleum, 
capital goods and intermediate inputs, others opened up their economies to 
external Compétition and thus brought about a rapid rise in their overall imports. 
/All this 
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All this led to a loss of effectiveness of economic integration and of the 
reciprocal Oustcms preferences which had been conceived. 
The Second factor which helped to weaken the vocation for industrialization 
and integration was the confidence in the. dynamic growth of the world economy 
and the big growth prospects which were believed to exist for Latin American 
exports in the long term. 
The above-described international situation lent transient vigour to the 
theory of static comparative advantages and led some countries to open tip their 
economies indiscriminately to imparts of goods, the massive supply of which 
created often ruinous competition for national manufactures, in return, it was 
believed, for the promotion and diversification of exports with comparative 
advantages. Other countries, which achieved significant growth in the 1970s, 
took advantage of the financial boom to initiate ambitious investment plans in 
infrastructure and industrial development, likewise on the basis of huge imports, 
sometimes of hydrocarbons, because they were confident that the economic and 
financial conditions prevailing at that time would continue. Similarly, the oil-
exporting countries carried out plans involving very large expenditure because 
they were confident that the high petroleum prices would continue and they therefore 
counted on future income which turned out to be an illusion as the 1980s began. 
At the beginning of the present decade, profound changes took place in the 
international economy as a result of the crisis of the centres which have made 
future trends uncertain. At the same time, however, this gives grounds for 
assuming that the guidelines for a possible and desirable strategy must be based 
on the strengthening and protection of Latin American production: in the short 
term, through a reactivation process which reduces the high levels of unemployment, 
and in the long term,' through the raising of the rate of capital formation, based 
on domestic saving and the use of the region's own capacity for producing the 
goods required. There is undoubtedly bound to be greater restriction on the use 
of international financial resources and a more austere attitude will have to 
be taken in the area of consumption, especially in view of the need to provide 
domestic financing for future investment efforts. 
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In this new international situation;,. Latin .American co-operation'arid ? • 
integration are seen to be .very valuable- Ways*' of. r̂ c±ivatiriî ê-ieooiioBi>ii8B.':of- :.-
the region in the immediate'future; and dispelliiig./lalbeit' partiaily, the da£k 
clouds hanging over Latin America's development in the longer term. For this ' >; 
purpose, it is urgently necessary to revitalize and adjust the co-operation and . 
integration instruments already in effect, in order to make the best possible use 
of the services, which theyi-CcBi render in coping with the present emergency and in 
improving the prospects of-"development in the long term, in view of the correlation 
and interdependence which- haturaliy exists between development, industrialization 
and economic integration^' • .v-
2.' This trends towards bilateralism 
The difficult .circu$j3£?inĉ . through which the. great Jnajority. of the Latin American 
economies are parsing have, obliged them to. seek various, alternatives for reducing 
imports and forcing.an increase •in exports with the aim of .compensating for the 
increased-^balance-ofrpayments...current account, deficit caused,, mainly, by the 
servicing of the external debt in recent years. . . ... 
, The future prospects as regards flows of„net external resources point to 
new and still more painful adjustments in the economies of the Latin American 
covintries, in which the.tendency to.restrict and control imports will be 
accentuated as a means of continuing to reduce theirmerchandise trade deficit 
and, if possible, generate a surplus. ...... . 
Thus, the creation of a merchandise trade surplus will undoubtedly be a 
priority objective in most of the countries, o,f the region* This goal can be 
achieved by. two different and complementary ways: the first consists of restricting 
imports and expanding exports. To the extent that aggregate world demand does 
not recover a,reasonable .growth rate, .however, in order to reach the goal of 
increasing.exports :it will be necessary to overcome both the protectionism of the 
industrialized countries and the competition from the exportable surpluses generated 
by an.international economy in.recession.. There therefore remains the alternative 
way of continuing to reduce imports to the lowest possible levels compatible with 
viable rates of development, bearing in mind the needs arising from the growth of 
the population and the legitimate aspirations of the countries which are still far 
from attaining levels of living acceptable to the majority of their inhabitants. 
/The industrialized 
The industrialized countries,-for their part, have been exerting different 
forms of. control in order to balance their foreign trade. These include in 
particular the use of their bargaining power to obtain "voluntary" restrictions 
on exports and the use of practices involving managed trade or trade regulated on 
a bilateral basis. When the bargaining power.of the parties is similar, managed 
trade can lead to more balanced results in.the trade flows, especially as regards, 
their composition and ValUe. The use of measures which restrict trade with 
countries of a'lower degree of development, in contrast, will only, accentuate the 
structural imbalances acting against the latter. 
In Latin America, there has been a- resurgence of tendencies to bilateralism 
as a logical "consequence of the need to limit the use made of.their foreign 
exchange resources, especially in emergency conditions such as those which the 
region experiénced during the Gréat Depression of the 1930s and the Second World 
War, and which it is facing now too. .> 
Within the integration schemes, efforts have been made to ensure that there 
are no permanent surpluses or deficits among the member countries. This is.not , 
always possible, however, since each country has very different, export potential. 
Because of its undoubted great importance, the search,for overall equilibrium 
in the region's trade should be directed substantially towards overcoming the. 
imbalances in trade with the industrialized-countries, not oqly because of the 
permanent texidency; to tradé-imbalances, caused by the unfavourable evolution of 
the terms of trade with those nations, but also because of the similar behaviour 
of the-services balance* It is-obvious that any attempts to compensate the 
imbalances with the industrialized regions on,an?individual basis will always 
run into, the difficulty of ;the unequal1 bargaining rpover.-*: 
Within Latin America, there are spme.rather complex situations such as those 
of the countries with.deficits:in the - energy field or. with only limited development 
potential. Both these kinds of countries have a natural propensity to register 
external sector deficits which are reflected not only in their- :relations with 
third countries, but also within the integration schemes they, belong to. 
The problem,', at the regional level, is that if all . the countries, pursue the 
goal of obtaining a surplus on their intra-regional trade through the reduction 
of imports, the task will become conflictive and even impossible and the adjustment 
/can only 
can only be achieved on the basis of reducing trade within Latin America. If 
each country-tries to balance its trade flows with each one of the other countries 
of the region, the result will be that the bilateral balance will be achieved 
on the basië of the export potential of the country with the least supply capacity, 
which will Undoubtedly cause total Latin American trade to go down. If, in 
contrast, what is sought is a multilateral balance in the reciprocal trade of 
each country with the rest of the region, the balance will be obtained through 
better use of the export capacity of each country, while at the same time there 
will be higher levels of intra-regional trade. 
Consequently,' bilateral agreements could be reserved for that part of the 
trade which cannot be • compensated at the multilateral level and which involves 
special unbalancing factors, Such as net imports of hydrocarbons or other products 
essèntial for thé development and economic security of countries which display 
a marked and permanent deficit situation. 
The payments compensation agreements of ALADI, CACM and CARICOM are a good 
example of the way in which a bilateral system, through its primary functioning, 
can sustain increased volumes of trade with the smallest possible use of convertible 
financial rèsources, when the corresponding bilatéral operations are turned into 
multilateral otiès. The great challenge, then, is to find additional formulas 
which will permit thé incorporation of higher levels of reciprocal trade within 
a concept of multilateral balance, so as to maké possible the dynamic growth of 
regional trade, " . • 
The interconnection'and ;expansion -of the payments compensation systems, the 
creation of a Latin American unit of account, the incorporation of services 
in the compensatory machinery 'and the possibility of obtaining additional resources 
to finance a greater trade flow -especially by increasing the time limits so as 
to permit the inclusion of capital goods- would appear to.be some of. the measures 
which" Latin America should take in the short term if the efforts to.achieve a 
higher level of reciprocal trade which will enable the region to emerge from its 
complex present situation are not to fall on completely barren ground. Insistence 
on the attainment of bilateral balances could lead to momentary, relief, but in 
the long run it would result in a clear setback in the search of "the solution 
desired by all the countries of the region, which is to .attain greater, balance not 




Finally,-there can be nò doubt that .one measurej\which would help ;to create 
an awareness of the need for multilateral approaches in trade.is the effective : 
establishment of regiònal tariff preferences and the halting, "in respect of mutual 
trade within Latin America, of the use of non-tariff, restrictive measures. 
C. HOW -INTEGRATION CAN HELP TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS ; • 
1. The initiative promoted by President Osvaldo Hurtado of Ecuador ,18/ 
As already noted, the latin American countries, like others in the developing 
world, have been faced with extremely serious economic,'political and social 
situations oh aòcount Of the recession in the world econotny. Furthermore, the 
policies for adjusting to the nëw situation are extremely inéquitable for 
Latin America. 
The consequences of this phenomenon are manifold. Suffice it to say that 
with thè reduction in their imports they have not only suffered a substantial 
decline in the level of their' economic activity but clear préjudice has also been 
caused "to the efforts made òvèr more than two'decades to consolidate trade flows 
among the' Latin American countries and to carry out economic Co-operation and: 
integration. Even more serious, however, is the fact that the private banking 
system has dèmanded that countries wishing tó obtain rèsoUrces for thé payment of 
intérest must reach prior agreements with' the IMF, which has imposed severè 
adjustment policies that have militated against the political, economic and social 
stability of sevèra! Latin American coùntriés. 
In this context, Mr. Osvaldo Hurtado, the President of Ecuador, asked the 
Executive Secretaries of ECLA and SELA to put forward concrete proposals to make 
possible a joint response by Latin America to the intérnètiònal crisis. This 
rèquest has set in motion a political process which matured at thé meetings of 
presidential representatives held ih:Quito and Santo Domingo in Mày and August 
1983, respèctively, and which will now culminate in Quito with the Latin Américan 
Economic Conference to be held in January 1984-,' at which a regional programme 
of action will be adopted to deal with the'international crisis. 
The request made by the President of Ecuador clëarly reflects the concern 
of a relatively less developed country Of Latin America over the scanty or 
non-éxistent bargaining power of thé countries, tàkên individually, in the face 
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of the impositions of the international private banking system and the IMF in 
the present crisis situation. It also emphasizes the awareness that has been 
growing up that it is not possible to keep on reducing the standard of living 
of the peoples, since this process has reached the limit of social tolerance. 
In short, it is a kind of early warning of the risks involved in excessive 
regional fragmentation in dealing with the challenges raised both by the external 
sector of the latin American economy and by the legitimate longing of all the 
countries for progress. . 
These, facts also explain the favourable reception given by the Latin 
American governments to the initiative of the President of Ecuador, as reflected 
not only by. the high level of the meetings of presidential representatives in 
Quito and Santo Domingo at which the ECLA/SELA document was considered,19/ but 
also, and above all, by the degree of political commitment which exists for a 
joint initiative by the region to deal with the crisis. 
It should also be noted that the Latin American governments are fully aware 
that the options of.tjtie regipn for dealing with the international situation, 
although they have technical bases, are fundamentally political. The Latin 
American Economic Conference therefore amounts to a conference of representatives 
of Heads of State.and Government of Latin America. It. is very possible that this 
institutional formula, which is unique of its kind, will make possible the adoption 
of substantive political decisions, in view of the leading role which governments 
have played in all its phases. 
The process set in motion by President Hurtado's initiative has enabled 
the world to appreciate the great prudence and realism displayed by the governments, 
since it. has been agreed that the programme of action to deal with the international 
crisis should be concentrated on a few areas of undoubted importance with regard 
to the situation, such as those of trade, financing, and the supply of fuels, food 
and essential services, with the aim of strengthening the regional integration 
and co-operation processes and converting them into real variables which will 
increase the bargaining power of the countries in the international coiranunity. 
Within these areas, a selective criterion has prevailed with the aim of 
preventing the Latin American Economic Conference from becoming a forum paralysed 
in its capacity for. political decisions. Priority has been given., in the field 
of trade,, to the halting of the evident deterioration in trade within the region 
/and the 
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and the placing of emphasis on raising it instead to the highest possible levels, 
and to the joint exercise of regional purchasing power in order to obtain better 
supply conditions and to promote Latin American exports to the markets of the 
North as a counterpart to the region's purchases. 
Within the broad topic of financing, special attention has been paid to the 
need to have the financial machinery necessary to support the sought-for expansion 
of intra-Latin American trade and to maintain common positions in international 
financial bodies .with the aim of securing- an increase in world liquidity. In 
addition, efforts will be made to set in motion an information system on external 
indebtedness within some of the existing bodies and to ensure that the governments 
of the region adopt some common criteria as regards- debt- servicing and exchange 
information regarding their experience in the application of adjustment policies, 
so as to help raise the bargaining power of each of the countries and clear the 
horizon. In this way, long-term development could once again become the central 
concern of all the countries of the region. 
As regards the supply of food and fuels, a meeting of government experts 
held in Caracas in September 1983 20/ made1 specific recommendations for reducing the 
present Latin American vulnerability in these areas, and these recommendations 
will doubtless be used at the Quito Conference to guide the decisions taken there. 
In all this process, it is obvious that the strengthening of regional 
co-operation-and integration and of Latin America's bargaining power with the 
exterior is essential in order to overcome the adverse situation now faced by 
the Latin American nations-.- The political decisions adopted at Quito will also 
help this strengthening, which is so necessary in the present circumstances. 
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